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ABSTRACT
Between 1949 and 1955 the supreme authority in the newly 
established Federal Republic of Germany did not lie in the 
hands of the elected representatives, but in the hands of 
the representatives of the three Western Occupying Powers, 
the Allied High Commissioners. Surprisingly quickly the 
character and the role of the Allied High Commission changed 
and it devolved more and more of its power to the German 
Government. This thesis recounts the history of the Allied 
High Commission from the perspective of the British High 
Commissioner. Three men consecutively held this position: 
Sir Brian Robertson, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, and Sir 
Frederick Hoyer Millar. They were three very different men, 
who had different perceptions of their role, different tasks 
to accomplish, and different degrees of influence on events 
in Germany and British policy on Germany. The three men are 
given epithets, which either describe their perception of 
their role as British High Commissioner in Germany or the 
role itself, and which serve as themes for the three main 
parts of the thesis. Sir Brian Robertson was called a 
"Benevolent and Sympathetic Viceroy" by his biographer, 
which not only describes Robertson's own perception of his 
role in Germany, but also is the best indication of the vast
powers of the Allied High Commissioners at the beginning. 
His successor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, was charged with 
negotiating the end of the Allied High Commission and for 
this act of self-eradication is given the epithet "The 
Negotiator". If it had not been for the French delay of the 
ratification of the 1952 treaties, Sir Frederick Hoyer 
Millar would have been the first British Ambassador to 
Germany. Instead he held the title fo British High 
Commissioner for his first two years in Germany, although 
for all intents and purposes he was an "Ambassador in 
Waiting".
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INTRODUCTION
The history of the Allied High Commission spans the 
first six years of the existence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany from September 1949 to May 1955. Made up of an 
American, a French and a British element, each headed by a 
High Commissioner, it held and administered the supreme 
authority over the territory of the new West German 
republic. This authority emanated from the total defeat of 
Germany and the responsibility which the Allies had assumed 
by occupying her territory after the Second World War. The 
fact, however, that it was limited to the three Western 
zones of occupation means that the Allied High Commission is 
a symbol and a manifestation of the division of Germany.
The aim of this thesis is to describe the history of 
the Allied High Commission from the perspective of the 
British High Commissioner, his role in Germany and his 
influence on British policy for Europe. In order to do this 
properly, it is important to recount the events, which led 
up to the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Allied High Commission.
On 8 May 1945 the supreme command fo the German Armed 
Forces signed the declaration of unconditional surrender of 
the German Reich; with the arrest of Hitler's successor,
6
Admiral Doenitz, and the acting head of the Reich 
Government, Count Schwerin of Krosigk, all German central 
administration ceased to operate. In the Berlin Declaration 
of 5 June the victorious Allies proclaimed that, considering 
the total defeat of Germany, they would seize supreme power 
in the country; they did not, however, formally annex its 
territory. It was divided into four zones, each to be allo­
cated to one of the Allied Powers, the United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. The 
supreme power in Germany was held by the Control Council 
consisting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the four allied 
armies: they were to administer and be responsible for their 
individual zones, but jointly and unanimously deal with all 
problems, which concerned Germany as a whole. Dr. Kurt 
Schumacher, later to become the leader of the Social Democ­
ratic Party in Germany (SPD), said at the time that total 
victory meant total responsibility.
On 17 July in Potsdam, the Big Three met for the last 
time: Stalin, Truman and Churchill, and later the last's 
successor Attlee, decided to demilitarise, denazify, 
decentralise and democratise Germany; reparations were to be 
paid from the current production, the dismantling and trans­
fer of industrial stock in the individual zones and from the 
seizure of deposits abroad; all territory east of the rivers 
Oder and Neisse were to be administered provisionally by the 
Soviet Union and Poland, and the German population living in 
these areas and in Czechoslovakia and Hungary were to be 
resettled in the four occupation zones.
Most importantly, the Big Three decided that Germany, 
despite its division into zones, would be treated as one 
economic unit. It became clear, however, that the wartime 
alliance would not last during peacetime. The Control 
Council became bogged down by French and Soviet obstructive 
vetoes and consecutive conferences of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers ended in deadlock, as no common policy for Germany 
could be agreed upon. Each occupying power started to shape 
the economic and political life of its zone in its own image 
and to its own advantage.
The end of 1946 witnessed a dramatic change in the 
attitude of two of the occupying powers: the United States 
of America and Great Britain. In July the two powers decided 
in principle to fuse their zones of Germany. The decision 
was formalised on 2 December and on 1 January 1947 the 
united economic area, known as the Bizone, was founded. The 
American Secretary of State Byrnes announced in a speech in 
Stuttgart on 6 September 1946 that the Germans were to be 
helped to regain an honourable place amongst the free and 
peace-loving nations of the world. He also declared that the 
democratic and economic reconstruction of Germany would be 
assisted. Six months later Byrnes' successor Marshall 
announced an European aid and reconstruction programme, of 
which the Western occupied zones of Germany were also to 
benefit.
At the end of February 1948 the deputy foreign 
ministers fo the United States, France, Great Britain and
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the Benelux States met in London and agreed on a common 
recommendation to their governments to create a federal 
state in Western Germany and to let this state participate 
in the international control of the Ruhr industries and in 
the Marshall Plan. The United States was able to persuade 
France to cooperate with them and Britain over Germany. 
Accordingly the three Military Governors formed the unoffi­
cial "Tripartite Board", which met 25 times before the start 
of the Allied High Commission and can be seen as its prede­
cessor .
As much as the London Conference marked the beginning 
of tripartite cooperation over the administration of the 
three Western zones, it also marked the end of quadrupartite 
control of the whole of Germany: the Soviet Military 
Governor Sokolowsky left the Control Council under protest 
over the recommendations of the London Conference and the 
founding of the Western Union, which was the first defence 
treaty between France, Great Britain and the Benelux States 
directed against the Soviet Union.
The second session of the London Conference, from 20 
April to 2 June, came to the conclusion that the German 
people should be given the opportunity to achieve 
unification on the basis of freedom and democracy and to 
gradually regain complete self-government. The Military 
Governors were to empower the German heads of the state 
governments, the Ministerpraesidenten. to convene a 
constitutional assembly.
The end of June saw the final rift between the wartime
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allies: the Soviet attempt to extend the currency reform of 
their zone to the whole of Berlin was frustrated by the 
Western Powers, who introduced the new West German currency, 
the Deutsche Mark, into their sectors. The Soviet Union used 
this disagreement to bring the growing conflict to a head: 
it imposed a blockade of all water and land routes to and 
from Berlin and declared the quadrupartite administration to 
have ended. In response to the Soviet blockade the United 
States and Great Britain started a massive airlift to supply 
the population of the Western Sectors.
The Berlin Blockade only strengthened the Western 
Allies' resolve to put the policy arrived at in London into 
effect: the Military Governors Clay, Robertson and Koenig 
presented the Ministerpraesidenten of the seperate German 
provinces (Laender) in Frankfurt a.M. on 1 July with three 
documents proposing to convene a constitutional assembly, to 
review Laender frontiers and laying down the basic princi­
ples of the relationship between the future West German 
Government and the occupying powers. The Ministerpraesiden­
ten initially hesitated to take up the offer of the Western 
Allies, because they feared that the formation of a state on 
the territory of the Western occupation zones would deepen 
the division of Germany. It was Berlin's mayor, Professor 
Ernst Reuter, who persuaded his colleagues that the new 
state would be a provisional core state, which could grow 
into a united Germany. A Parliamentary Council was convened 
on 1 September 1949, which drafted a "Basic Law for the
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Federal Republic of Germany" during the following eight 
months.
Meanwhile deliberations started amongst the Military 
Governors on the Occupation Statute, which was to form the 
basis of the relations between the new German state and the 
occupying powers. They submitted their final report on 17 
December 1948, listing the points of agreement and 
disagreement. These disagreements could not be settled at an 
Intergovernmental Conference in London at the beginning of 
the following year. In April, at a conference in Washington, 
Foreign Ministers Acheson, Bevin and Schuman finally arrived 
at a common policy for Germany: they approved a new, simpler 
and shorter text of the Occupation Statute, which conveyed 
wide authority to the new German Government, specified the 
powers reserved by the Allies and stated that it would be 
reviewed in favour of the new German republic within 
eighteen months. They also agreed to fuse the three zones 
into the Trizone and decided to replace the Military 
Governors by civilian High Commissioners.
Two months later, in Paris, the three Foreign Ministers 
signed the Charter of the High Commission. They had gathered 
in the city to meet their Soviet counterpart to end the 
Berlin Blockade. It was to be the last conference of the 
Council of Foreign Minsiters and the end of any 
quadripartite policy for Germany, except for Berlin, where 
the illusion of the four power Kommandatura was kept alive, 
although the Soviet Commandant's chair had been vacant since 
the beginning of the Berlin Blockade.
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The time period to be studied in this thesis is the 
term of the official effectiveness of the Occupation 
Statute, namely from the date it was promulgated on 21 
September 1949 until it expired with the ratification of the 
Paris Treaties on 5 May 1955. This period is of special 
interest for four reasons:
Firstly, not only the period to be studied in this 
thesis, but the whole occupation of Germany represents a 
historical precedent: Germany had been completely defeated, 
but her territory had not been annexed, merely occupied. 
Even the exception to this, the territories east of the 
rivers Oder and Neisse, according to the agreement between 
the victorious powers, were only going to be administered 
provisionally by the Soviet Union and Poland. Despite the 
unconditional surrender and the end of hostilities in 1945, 
the Federal Republic of Germany had to wait until 1951 for 
the Western Allies to officially end the state of war and 
until 1990 for a peacetreaties with all the wartime 
adversaries.
The second reason for the special interest in the 
period of existence of the Occupation Statute is the fact, 
that the three Western Allies succeeded in jointly holding 
the supreme power in Germany and in agreeing on a common 
policy for it. Although such commonality had existed between 
the allies during the war, it had quickly deteriorated after 
the common enemy, who had united them, had been defeated.
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The joint administration of Germany# decided at Potsdam# did 
not work.
Thirdly# Ludolf. Herbst in his book Option fuer den
Westen has identified a historical anomaly# which he calls
the "Machtdualismus" or "Doppelherrschaft■# which existed
during the period between 1949 and 1955. This describes the
co-existence of the Western Allies's claim to supreme
authority in West Germany, allied control and administration
on the one hand and a German constitution# German law and an
elected German Parliament and executive on the other hand:
"Das Besatzungsstatut stand ueber dem Grundgesetz 
und war das ranghoechste Dokument des damaligen 
Deutschiands. Es definierte die Rechte des 
Souveraens - und der Souveraen war eben nicht das 
deutsche Volk sondern das Kollektiv der drei 
westlichen Alliierten.■(1)
Finally# the period is of utmost importance in the
history of the Federal Republic# as all the foundations for
its future development were laid then: all the legislature
necessary for the existence and the working of a state had
to be passed#* the young Federal Republic had to gain her
sovereignty#* and during this period far-reaching decisions
were taken about rearmament and European integration:
"Fuer die Integration Westdeutschlands ist die 
Existenz des Besatzungsstatuts und der Alliierten 
Hohen Kommission sehr wichtig. Da die Integration 
zunaechst vorwiegend eine Frage der Aussenwirt- 
schafts und der Aussenpolitik war# ist es bedeut- 
sam# dass die Bundesregierung in diesen Bereichen 
Kompetenzen erst allmaehlich durch den Abbau der 
alliierten Vorbeha1tsrechte erwerben musste. 
Anders gesagt# bei der Integration besassen die 
drei Westalliierten zunaechst all Rechte und 
Kontrollmoeglichkeiten# hier konnte kein Schritt 
ohne ihr Wissen und ihre Billigung getan 
werden."(2)
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The Western Allies had planned a gradual transfer of power 
to the new Federal German Government. The ever-accelerating 
speed, however/ which this transfer took/ was unsuspected. 
It developed its own dynamics/ as with every new right to 
the German Government acquired, its bargaining position 
improved:
"The Western Allies found themselves forced 
increasingly to choose between bullying, bribing or 
supplicating to obtain their way, where before a 
hint or an order was enough. As German support was 
courted, so German bargaining power grew."(3)
Especially in the first two and a half years after the 
promulgation of the Occupation Statute developments are 
extremely rapid: barely two months after it came into 
effect, the end of the Allied dismantling programme was 
announced and many restrictions on German industry lifted. 
In March 1951 the Occupation Statute was revised and the 
High Commission conceded its supervisory function over 
German legislation and its rights to handle German foreign 
policy. Also in the first one and a half years first steps 
made towards European integration: in July 1950 the Federal 
Republic became an associate member of the Council of Europe 
and in March 1951 it signed the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty. The boldest step toward European integra­
tion, however, eventually failed: in a European Defence 
Community, German contingents were to form part of a Eu­
ropean army.
The EDC Treaty was signed simultaneously with and was 
coupled to the Convention on the Relations between the three 
Western Powers and the Federal Republic on 26 May 1952.
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According to this Convention the occupation regime was to be
ended and the Federal Republic to become a sovereign state;
allied reserved powers were to be limited to the stationing
of troops on German soil, to cases of emergency, and to
questions concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole, e.g. a
peace treaty and reunification.
The ratification of the two treaties posed huge
difficulties for all parties concerned, which proved
insurmountable for the nation whose brainchild the EDC had
been, namely France. When the French National Assembly
finally refused to ratify in 1954, it was the British
Foreign Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, who produced the
alternative plan, which was discussed by the London Nine
Power Conference at the end of September 1954. Following
this conference four treaties were signed in Paris at the
end of the following month. The first was the a revised
version of the Bonn Convention, in which the preamble of the
old treaty was deleted and Articles 7 and 10 modified:
"Pending the peace settlement, the Signatory States 
will co-operate to achieve, by peaceful means, 
their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a 
liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the 
Federal Republic, and integrated within the 
European Community."(4)
In the second treaty the Brussels Pact was revised and
extended to include the Federal Republic and Italy. It was
the founding treaty of the Western European Union (WEU). In
return for her inclusion in WEU the Federal Republic
accepted certain limits and controls of her arms production.
The third treaty was linked to the second: the member states
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of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation invited the 
Federal Republic to join; they recognised the Federal 
Government as the only legitimate German government and 
stated as their common aim the reunification of Germany; the 
Federal Republic declared its adherence to the United 
Nations Charter, the defensive character of NATO and WEU and 
renounced the use of violence to achieve reunification or a 
change of its borders.
Finally, France and the Federal Republic signed the 
Saar Statute and an agreement about closer biliteral 
cultural and economic cooperation.
Great Britain has played a very important role in 
Germany's war and post-war history: she had been a part of 
the Big Three and therefore considered herself one member of 
the real victors over Germany; after the break-up of the 
wartime alliance she became the most influential European 
country in the Western camp. Great Britain lost the 
initiative to France at the beginning of the movement 
towards European integration, but regained it one more time 
after the failure of the European Defence Community.
The period between 1949 and 1955 was a period of the 
closest relations between the Federal Republic and Great 
Britain. Although the latter was not the most powerful and 
definitely not the most vocal of the three occupying powers, 
it was to Great Britain the West German government turned to 
for support and mediation most of the time. In 1950 the West
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German Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer started a long series 
of appeals to the British Government for mediation between 
his country and France. It was only the beginning of a 
problem which was to bedevil Franco-German relations 
throughout the period under investigation in this thesis, 
namely the status and allegiance of the Saar territory.
The British government considered itself the "god­
father" of the rapprochement between France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This sentiment was expressed by Sir 
Anthony Eden in November 1951, when he said that Great 
Britain was glad to assist in the German-French friendship, 
which, in view of past tragic events, the British had hoped 
for. It is for this reason that Adenauer appealed to the 
British for mediation between himself and his French 
counterpart, as in August 1954 when he sent a telegram to 
Churchill urging him to appeal to M. Mendes-France to get 
the EDC Treaty ratified. All appeals failed: the French 
Assembly refused to ratify. It fell to the British to save 
the day: with the promise to maintain four divisions and a 
tactical airforce on the European mainland they achieved 
West Germany's integration into WEU and NATO.
"The proposals were put by Eden in order to the 
Benelux powers, to West Germany, to Italy and to 
the French. Their reception in Bonn underlined the 
degree to which the Federal Republic was still 
relying on Britain to protect them against a direct 
confrontation with a weak though obstructive 
France. The British aim to bind Western Germany 
closer to the West by including her in the 
consultative provisions of the Brussels Treaty 
accorded directly with Dr. Adenauer's views."(5)
The British were also the most responsive to the German
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wishes on the defence of the Federal Republic. Since 1948
the Soviet authorities had built up an armed force in thier
German occupation zone. These and other threatening gestures
from the East induced Dr. Adenauer to approach Sir Brian
Robertson with a proposal for a motorised, semi-militarised
police force similar to that established in East Germany.
"Sir Brian supported the idea strongly (and it is 
significant of the good state of relations between 
the British representatives in Germany and the 
Federal Government that it was the British whom 
Dr. Adenauer approached), but he was forced to say 
that the matter would have to be raised with the 
other Western High Commissioners."(6)
One month later the outbreak of the Korean War prompted a
discussion about a general rearmament of West Germany. Sir
Ivone Kirkpatrick, Sir Brian's successor, wrote in his
memoirs:
"My views at this time are on record in writing: 
'It is quite wrong to assume that West Germany 
wants to form an army. This is quite so.' Mr. 
Bevin agreed. . . . (He fought hard for the 
militarised German police force requested by Dr. 
Adenauer.)"(7)
But the Americans were against it. They accused the British 
of obstructing German rearmament because of their fears of 
German resurgence. The outcome of the New York Conference of 
Foreign Ministers in September 1950 was the adoption of the 
American Plan and the British agreement "in principle" to 
the rearmament of West Germany.
Another area where the Federal Republic relied - not 
exclusively but very heavily - on British support was in its 
dealings with the Soviet Union. This became acute when in 
1951 the Federal Republic regained control of her foreign
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affairs. In November of that year Adenauer visited London.
Here the German Chancellor received assurances that there
would be no agreement with the Soviet Union at the expense
of Germany. In his autobiography he quotes Churchill: "Haben
Sie voiles Vertrauen zu England, wir werden nicht hinter
Ihrem Ruecken Geschaefte machen."(8) Adenauer left London
with the assurance that he would be consulted before any
negotiations with the Soviets about the future of Germany.
Karl Guenther von Hase, the Federal Republic's ambassador to
London between 1970 and 1977, wrote:
"Der erste Londonbesuch Adenauers leitete - so kann 
man rueckblickend feststellen - die waehrend der 
gesamten vierzehnjaehrigen Regierungszeit Konrad 
Adenauers fruchtbarste Spanne der deutsch- 
britischen Beziehungen ein. Sie fand ihren 
Hoehepunkt in der historischen Initiative des 
britischen Aussenministers Eden."(9)
Considering what must have seemed like a close and
advantageous relationship between his country and Great
Britain, it is not surprising that Dr. Adenauer hoped and
wished to tie Great Britain permanently to West Germany and
Europe. His autobiography is filled with praise for the
British parliamentary traditions, which he deemed so
necessary as an example for the rest of Europe. His hopes
that Great Britain would join the European Coal and Steel
Community and the European Defence Community were not only
guided by the knowledge of the importance that would add to
the two endeavours but also by her ability to mediate
between France and West Germany. In March 1951 Dr. Adenauer
expressed his regrets about Great Britain staying outside
the European integration process:
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MIch wiederholte mein grosses Bedauern darueber, dass 
England bei der Integration Europas, die durch den 
Schuman-Plan und den Pleven-Plan begonnen habe, 
abseits stehe. Ich sagte Lord Hendersen, dass ohne 
die Beteiligung Grossbritanniens ein wichtiger Faktor 
fehle. Ich gaebe die Hoffnung noch nicht auf, dass 
Grossbritannien nicht vielleicht doch einige Grund- 
saetze ueber Bord werfe, um sich dem gemeinsamen 
grossen Plan anschliessen zu koennen."(10)
It is clear that Great Britain was important to the Federal 
Republic during these first years of its existence. 
Britain's reluctance, however, to become even more and 
deeply involved in German affairs can be explained by the 
fact that for Britain Germany was only one of its concerns 
and obligations. At a dinner in 1953, Sir Winston Churchill 
explained the British position to Chancellor Adenauer by 
drawing three intersecting circles on his placecard, one 
circle for the United States of America, one for the Common­
wealth and one for a united Europe, with Britain at the 
intersection of the three, not exclusively part of one 
circle, but belonging to all three.
In this global framework of British concerns, Germany 
was important to Great Britain for two reasons which were 
interlinked: it was the vital ingredient in the strategic 
plan to keep the Americans in Europe and it was instrumental 
to a lasting peace order in Europe. The British aim was 
therefore clear: although they were willing to gradually 
transfer the direct power held by the victorious powers over 
German affairs to the newly formed Federal Republic, it was 
nevertheless essential to perpetuate the control over the 
country by firmly integrating it into a security network.
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Never again should a German state become so dominant 
as to be able to threaten the peace in Europe. Britain's 
economy, however, was severely weakened by the Second World 
War and it could not muster the influence in Europe and the 
world it might have liked to perpetrate. Because of this and 
because of their atlanticist inclination, the British 
governments of this period looked to the United States for 
support of their aims. They were not going to let America 
withdraw, like she did after the First World War, and the 
Anglo-American cooperation in Germany was the way to assure 
continued American involvement in European affairs. This 
also explains British concessions, especially on the issue 
of German rearmament, as they bought American security 
guarantees and averted the threat of an American withdrawal 
from Europe.
Great Britain was represented in Germany consecutively 
by three men who held the position of British High 
Commissioner: Sir Brian Robertson, from the promulgation of 
the Occupation Statute in September 1949 to June 1950, Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, from 1950 to 1953, and Sir Frederick 
Hoyer Millar, until the end of the Allied High Commission in 
May 1955. The aim of this thesis is to describe the role and 
work of these three men and in the process describe the 
history, functions and role of the Allied High Commission.
Its time of existence can be divided into three 
periods: from the promulgation of the Occupation Statute and 
its institution on 21 September 1949, to the revision of the
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Occupation Statute on 6 March 1951; from this date to the 
signing of the Bonn Conventions on 26 May 1952; and from 
this date to its final dissolution and the Federal Republic 
of Germany becoming a sovereign state on 5 May 1955. 
Although these three periods only very roughly correspond 
with the tenures of the three British High Commissioners, 
their perception of their roles in Germany clearly reflect 
the changes these three periods encompassed.
Sir Brian Robertson regarded himself as a "colonial 
administrator" which reflects the large extent of power the 
Allied High Commissioners held during this first period. Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick's tenure witnessed the greatest reductions 
in the power of the High Commissioners, a process in which 
he was actively involved, as the French Foreign Minister 
Schuman pointed out on the occasion of the signing of the 
General Treaty in 1952 "that never in history had men worked 
with such zeal to abolish themselves."(11) The long delay to 
the ratification of the Bonn Conventions meant, however, 
that Kirkpatrick's successor, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, 
still held the title of British High Commissioner, although 
he regarded himself as an ambassador.
The head of the historical division of the American
High Commission, Elmer Plischke, described the role of the
Allied High Commission as follows:
"The handling handling of the German problem by the 
Allies involves both the formulation of policy and 
its implementation -- the determination of basic 
relations and their practical application ... the
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practical application of the policy and the han­
dling of day-to-day contacts with the German Gover­
nment has been the responsibility of the Allied 
High Commission. The latter has been concerned with 
details of policy formulation within the broader 
declarations of principle decided upon by the Fo­
reign Ministers and with the implementation of 
tripartite agreements concerning G e r m a n y (12)
The Allied High Commissioners held a pivotal role in this
period of Germany under occupation: they were the head of a
vast organisation; they were involved in the formulation of
the policy for Germany of their respective governments; they
held supreme power in Germany and represented it towards the
outside world; they represented their own governments in
negotiations with their High Commissioner colleagues and
with the German Chancellor. Although there were contacts
between all levels of the Allied High Commission and the
West German executive, Professor Hans-Peter Schwarz points
out that
"Dennoch gilt fuer die gesamte Geltungsdauer des 
Besatzungsstatuts (21. September. 1949 bis 5. Mai. 
1955), ganz besonders aber fuer die Jahre von 1949 
bis 1952, dass Fragen von Bedeutung zwischen 
Adenauer und den Alliierten Hohen Kommissaren meist 
direkt verhandelt und besprochen wurden."(13)
It is also true, that direct contact between Adenauer and
the heads of government and the Foreign Ministers of the
Western Allies increased, especially during the last period
of the occupation. This, however, does not reduce the
importance of the High Commissioners. It only reflects their
changing role, as they still represented a vital link
between their governments and the Chancellor.
This thesis will be based on evidence from published
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and unpublished German and British sources and on oral 
history interviews with surviving members of the British 
administration of that time. On the British side mainly 
Foreign Office files, containing the records of the British 
High Commission, and Cabinet papers have been consulted. 
Some papers concerning Adenauer have recently been recalled 
by the Foreign Office. The contents of those and other 
retained files can only be assumed in hopefully educated 
guesses or substituted by German published sources.
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GENERAL BRIAN H. ROBERTSON
"THE LIBERAL AND SYMPATHETIC VICEROY"
In August 1970, in an oral history interview for the 
Harry S. Truman Library, General Robertson said about the 
British perception of their role in post-war Germany: "We 
rather fancied ourselves as colonial administrators, I 
suppose, and we were pretty good at it"(l) . This rather 
candid admission says a great deal, at least subconsciously, 
about the British attitude towards Germany: the atrocities
committed in her name during the Third Reich had lost her 
the right to count herself among the civilised countries. 
Accordingly, after the war, the British occupation forces 
behaved like colonialists in an uncivilised country.
They displayed the paternalist, but also rather 
condescending attitude towards the 'natives' typical of the 
British colonialists: to be re-educated and led on the way 
to democracy. Germany was treated like an A-class mandate 
had been under the Covenant of the League of Nations, with 
the British - amongst others - holding the trusteeship. 
Eventually she was to be given her 'independence', firmly 
tied into a 'commonwealth' though, integrated politically 
and possibly militarily for the common good and in order to 
perpetuate the influence and control of the former 'colonial 
powers'.
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The Allies had created a historical precedent in Germa­
ny after the Second World War: they had occupied the whole 
of the country and, after the unconditional surrender and 
the demise of the German administration, had assumed the 
sovereignty in a territory which they, however, had not 
annexed. It is not surprising, therefore, that they searched 
for frames of reference in their national experience, which 
would help them to deal with this historical precedent. For 
the British it seems to have been their experience as a 
colonial power.
If the British regarded their occupation of Germany as 
a period of colonial rule then it follows that they must 
have regarded the tenure of the Allied High Commission as 
the period of decolonisation: self-rule under the supervi­
sion of the 'colonial' power and the gradual transfer of 
power to the 'native' government leading up to eventual 
independence and sovereingty of the colony and her member­
ship in a 'commonwealth'.
In order to understand General Robertson's personal 
attitude towards his role as British High Commissioner in 
Germany between September 1949 and Jvne 1950, one has to ' 
look at his career up to that date. A soldier by profession, 
he had resigned his commission in 1935 to become managifg 
director of Dunlop, South Africa. In 1940 he was recalled as 
a reserve officer to become administrative officer in Field 
Marshal' Montgomery's staff, whom he followed to Germany as 
Deputy Military Governor from 1945 to 1948 and then succeed­
ed as Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor from 1948 to
1949.
Sir Brian Robertson's career is significant in two 
respects: firstly, his absence from Europe in the inter-war 
years left him untained by negative impression Germany left 
on so many of his fellow country men and influenced their 
attitude towards Germany after 1945. Secondly, he saw his 
job in Germany after the war through the eyes of a highly 
efficient supply officer: the country had to be rebuilt as 
it could not be supplied indefinitely by her occupiers. His 
skills as a supply officer were tested to the ultimate, 
when, as Military Governor in 1948, he was faced with the 
Soviet blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin and had to 
organise and execute, together with his American colleague 
General Clay, the Berlin Airlift. But he was more than just 
a soldier: during his tenure as High Commissioner he had to 
be a politician and a diplomat.
When the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 
1949 and the Western Allies replaced the military rule of 
their zones with a civilian, General Robertson stayed on as 
British High Commissioner for Germany. He was the only one 
of the Military Governors to do so. Sir Brian, however, 
regarded himself as just a transitional candidate: "It is of 
course the most natural thing," he told his French and 
American colleagues, when his departure from Germany had 
been announced, "that I should go. It would have been very 
natural, that I should have made way to a civilian, when the 
change was made to the High Commission. It is more than
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natural now, because I shall have been in Germany for nearly 
five years and I think it is not right, that any man should 
stay in one job too long."(2)
Robertson had only stayed on in Germany as High Commis­
sioner on the specific request of the British Foreign Secre­
tary, Ernest Bevin(3). Robertson and Bevin came from diffe­
rent backgrounds and held different political beliefs -- one 
an aristocratic soldier who held conservative beliefs, the 
other a former trade unionist now Labour minister -- but 
the Foreign Secretary valued the General's input highly. In 
a letter to Prime Minister Attlee, Bevin described Robertson 
as "a tower of strength to me since you placed the responsi­
bility for Germany on my shoulders."(4) Both men had the 
highest personal respect for one another. In fact, Robertson 
later insisted that Bevin had asked him to stay on in Germa­
ny despite different political affilitations and never tried 
to influence his actions in Germany in an ideological way:
"And though there are various accusations that have been 
made against the British on that point in Germany, one 
which is completely off net, is an accusation that the 
Socialist Government of England was pushing things for a 
Socialist future. Well, they didn't, I can assure you. 
All the time that I was there England had a Socialist 
Foreign Secretary. There's his picture, Ernie Bevin, and 
he never pushed me that way, ever. Ever."(5)
Actually it seems to have been the other way around: the 
personal rapport between the two men actually enabled 
Robertson to push the Foreign Secretary to make decisions, 
which went against the latter's beliefs. Bevin disliked and 
mistrusted the Germans and it is only because he trusted 
Robertson's judgement that he allowed him to implement some
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of his more sympathetic policies in Germany.
In the already-quoted oral history interview General
Robertson described the initial British attitude towards
Germany after the end of the war and how and why it changed:
"Our instructions, broadly, were that Germans must be 
put in their places, that we must denazify them, that we 
must remove the weapons of war and the means of obtai­
ning new ones. We must be careful because the country 
would be starving, and it might be full of disease, and 
our troops must be careful and we shouldn't allow 
troops to fraternize, as it was called, with the German 
Frauleine. We had to try to stop that and, of course, 
were quite unsuccessful. ... We ourselves realized that 
these instructions were no good, rather more early than 
did the Americans."(6)
As the reason for the change of attitude towards the Germans 
General Robertson pointed mainly to one thing: the deterio­
rating relationship with the Soviets. This led the former 
allies to compete for German allegance: "The truth of the 
matter was that in those early days we were fighting a 
battle over the soul of Germany."(7) When the differences 
between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union came to a 
head in Berlin in 1948, Robertson wrote in a memorandum to 
the Foreign Office: "Germany should be brought into the
community of Western European nations as a partner and not 
as a servant."
In this memorandum the colonial theme re-appears:
"We should recognise that there is very little possibility 
of our staying indefinitely in Germany as a benevolent 
colonial authority. The democratisation of Germany will 
not be achieved by means of a protracted and delayed 
tutelage. On the other hand we should see to it that, 
though our authority is withdrawn, our influence is 
perpetuated."(8)
These kind of statements might have induced his biographer,
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Charles Richardson, to describe him as the "liberal and 
sympathetic viceroy"(9). General Robertson was indeed the 
man who set in motion the "decolonisation" of Germany, in 
other words, who initiated the gradual transfer of power to 
the Federal German Government’ and Germany's integration into 
the "commonwealth" of Western nations. This chapter will 
prove that he deserves the epithet of "liberal and sympathe­
tic viceroy".(10)
A viceroy, per definitionem, is the person governing as 
the deputy of a sovereign. The Allied High Commissioners 
were indeed "governing". The Occupation Statute, which had 
been agreed upon by Foreign Ministers Acheson, Bevin and 
Schuman in Washington in April, came into effect in Septem­
ber 1949. It stated that the representatives of the three 
Western powers, the Allied High Commissioners, should join­
tly exercise the supreme authority in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and should exercise control over the Federal 
Government and the governments of its constituent Laender. 
The Statute, however, also proclaimed that "the German peop­
le shall enjoy self-government to the maximum possible deg­
ree" and that "the Federal State and the participating 
Laender shall have, subject only to the limitation in this 
instrument, full legislative, executive and judicial powers 
in accordance with the Basic Law and with their respective 
constitutions."
These limitations, also known as "reserved powers", 
concerned:
(a) "disarmament and demilitarisation"
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(b) "controls in regard to the Ruhr"
(c) "foreign affairs"
(d) "displaced persons and the admission of refugees"
(e) "protection, prestige and security of Allied forces"
(f) "respect for the Basic Law and the Land constitutions"
(g) "control over foreign trade and exchange"
(h) "control over internal action, only to the minimum 
extent necessary to ensure use of funds, food and other
supplies in such a manner as to reduce to a minimum the
need for external assistance to Germany"
(i) "control over persons charged by courts or tribunals of 
the occupying powers1
The occupying authorities also "reserved the right ... to 
resume ... the exercise of full authority if they consider 
that to do so is essential to security or to preserve democ­
ratic government in Germany or in pursuance of the interna­
tional obligations of their Governments." In addition, "any 
amendment of the Basic Law will require the express approval 
of the occupation authorities before becoming effective. 
Land constitutions, amendments thereof, all other legisla­
tion, and any agreement made between the Federal State and 
foreign governments will become effective 21 days after its 
official receipt by the occupation authorities unless pre­
viously disapproved by them."(11)
The High Commissioners' way of "governing" varied, in 
some fields directly in others indirectly. They directly 
exercised certain sovereign prerogatives, especially concer­
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ning the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Federal 
Republic: for example, foreign diplomats were accredited to 
the Allied Council, made up by the three High Commissioners. 
It is important to note that, at the very beginning of his 
tenure as British High Commissioner, Sir Brian initiated the 
transfer of part of this prerogative to the Federal German 
Government: it was allowed to establish consular representa­
tion abroad and to join certain international organisations, 
such as the International Labour Organisation.
Secondly, the High Commission exercised its authority
indirectly by consulting, conferring and negotiating with
the German Government. Contacts took place on all levels of
the administration, but the most important were the meetings
between the three High Commissioners and Chancellor
Adenauer. The latter jealously guarded what he regarded as
his exclusive right to deal with the High Commission. In a
letter to his ministers of October 4th, 1949, he wrote:
"Urn eine einheitliche Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen 
der Bundesregierung und der Alliierten Hohen Kommission 
zu gewaehrleisten, bitte ich, den gesamten Verkehr mit 
der Hohen Kommission ueber mich zu leiten. Technische 
Einzelfragen koennen von den einzelnen Ministerien in 
unmittelbarer Verbindung mit der Hohen Kommission 
behandelt werden, ich bitte jedoch, mir auch hiervon 
Kenntnis zu geben."(12)
Although the High Commissioners were also careful to main­
tain the correct line of command, they nevertheless insisted 
in November 1949 that contacts between the High Commission 
and the Federal Government had to take place on all levels. 
During the 6th meeting of the Council General Robertson 
said:
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"The Chancellor at the moment is trying to establish the 
position, that nobody has the right to talk except the 
Council to the Chancellor. I don't think, that that is 
right. I think, that it is quite right, that nobody has 
the power to give orders except the Council to the 
Chancellor. (But) I believe there must be contact 
between our committees and the responsible ministers."(13)
During General Robertson's tenure as British High Commissio­
ner the number of committees, sub-committees and ad-hoc 
working parties of the Allied High Commission steadily grew, 
which is natural in the initial phase of a new kind of 
administration. The Charter of the Allied High Commission, 
which was promulgated in June 1949, only envisaged five 
committees and the Military Security Board, but included a 
provision that "the number, functions and organisation of 
such committees or bodies may be changed, adjusted or elimi­
nated entirely by the Council in the light of experien­
ce" (14) . At the end of Robertson's tenure in 1950 the number 
had grown to nine main committees and twentyseven sub­
committees plus the Allied Secretariate. All of these bodies 
were staffed and organised like the Council itself: tripar­
tite basis with monthly rotating chairmanship. They had an 
advisory capacity, but the Council could delegate executive 
functions to them.
"The main committees exclusive of the Military Security 
Board, held a total of 337 meetings during the first year 
of the Allied High Commission. ... the sub-committees 
held 957 sessions. ... the total number of copies of 
documents of the High Commission for its first year, not 
including the Official Gazette, was 1,122,905."(15)
These numbers are quoted here to show the magnitude of the
High Commission's "Government".
Thirdly, the High Commission fulfilled many of its 
responsibilities by enacting legislation in five broad
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fields: law and justice, external affairs, internal affairs, 
economics and finance and foreign trade. These enactments 
could take the shape of laws, regulations, directives, deci­
sions, declarations and instructions.
Finally, in order to fulfill their supervisory 
function, the High Commission exercised a negative power 
with respect to German legislation: all amendments to the 
Basic Law required unanimous approval of the Council; Land 
constitutions, amendments thereof, all other legislation, 
and any agreements made between the Federal German Gover­
nment and foreign governments became effective 21 days after 
its official receipt by the Council unless previously disap­
proved by it, provisionally or finally. Decisions to disap­
prove German legislation, like other decisions of the Cou­
ncil, were taken by majority vote (subject in certain cases 
to appeal to governments) or by a "weighted" vote in propor­
tion to the funds provided for Germany by the Power concer­
ned (only in areas which affected the need for these funds). 
The Occupation Statute clearly specified the reasons for 
such disapproval: "The occupation authorities will not disa­
pprove legislation unless in their opinion it is inconsis­
tent with the Basic Law, a Land constitution, legislation or 
other directives of the occupation authorities themselves or 
the provisions of this Instrument, or unless it constitutes 
a grave threat to the basic purposes of the occupation."(16)
Besides "governing" jointly, each High Commissioner was 
responsible for his country's zone of occupation. The Char­
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ter of the Allied High Commission defined the responsibili­
ties of the individual High Commissioners:
"Each High Commissioner shall be responsible to his 
Government with respect to the Laender of his zone for the 
matters in the fields reserved to the occupation 
authorities listed below:
(a) maintenance of law and order if the responsible German 
authorities are unable to do so;
(b) ensuring the protection, prestige, security and 
immunities of the Allied forces of occupation, of the 
Allied occupation authorities;
(c) the delivery of reparations and restitution property;
(d) care and administration of displaced persons;
(e) the disposition of war criminals;
(f) administration of justice in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of Allied courts;
(g) control of the care and treatment in German prisons of
persons charged before or sentenced by the courts or
tribunals of the occupation authorities, over the carrying 
out of sentences imposed on them and over questions of 
amnesty, pardon or release in relation to them."(17)
In the Land capitals of his own zone the High Commissioner
was represented by Land Commissioners and in his colleagues'
zones by Land Observers, who acted as close advisors to the
Land Commissioners.
All in all, General Robertson was in charge of 125,000
allied personnel, supported by a German auxiliary staff
numbering 199,000. One of the last acts of the Military
Governors in August 1949 was to decide "that the expenses
incident to the High Commission should be borne by the
German Federal Republic"(18). For the financial year
1949/1950 the three High Commissioners agreed on the total
sum of 4,593,434,000 DM occupation costs, of which
2,309,940,000 DM was allocated to the British Zone. From the
very start there was a unanimously supported move to reduce
personnel and thereby the occupation costs: thus the grand
total for the financial year 1950/1951 was reduced to
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4,050/962,500 DM, of which 1,742,810/600 DM went to the 
British Zone (19). These sums, as well as the size and 
complexity of the organisation of the Allied High 
Commission, are comparable to any colonial government. And 
like colonial governors and "viceroys" the High Commissio­
ners were governing as deputies of their governments: 
Robertson once told the German Chancellor that he was not 
free, but only a tool of his government.
The American executive tied their representatives ab­
road to very clear and detailed directives. The British, 
however, prefered the more practical way of giving broad 
policy outlines, but leaving the implementation to their 
representatives on the spot. This method worked well with 
General Robertson: as a soldier, he was used to receiving 
orders, but relying on his own initiative how to implement 
them. He once put it in a rather humerous way: "My Gover­
nment gives me advice sometimes, but it is a rather con­
ceited person and likes its advice to be taken" (20) .
Robertson's hands seem to have been tied especially on 
issues which the British Government considered vital to 
British security: for example, the question of socialisation 
of the basic industries, coal, iron and steel. The British 
Labour Government did not regard the issue of socialisation 
so much from the prespective of ideology but of security: 
these industries should not fall back into the hands of 
those magnates, who had supported and financed the Third 
Reich. The aim of socialisation, however, was not shared by
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the Americans. When the American and the British zones were 
merged in 1947, Robertson, who was British Military Governor 
then, found it difficult to reach a compromise on this topic 
with his American counterpart, General Clay. This compromise 
had to be re-negotiated in the autumn of 1949 in order to 
include the French.
The centre of the evolving argument was the preamble of 
Law 75, which left the ultimate decision about the ownership 
of the these industries to the Germans. Robertson regarded 
the re-negotiations as a "personal challenge", appealing to 
McCloy not to go back on his predecessor's word(21). He was 
also bound by explicit instructions from London: on April 
12th, 1950, he was told to bring the preamble to a formal 
vote in the Council. If his American and French colleague 
refused, he should appeal to the governments. The following 
day, Robertson, as the chairman of the 24th Council meeting, 
brought about the vote: the Americans finally agreed to the 
preamble, as the re-negotiated law included a new Article 5, 
which provided for compensation of the previous owners; the 
French were outvoted, but their appeal only delayed the 
passage of the law. The Foreign Office congratulated 
Robertson: the result was "as satisfactory as could have 
been expected"(22).
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, head of the Foreign Office Ger­
man Section since 1949, apologized at that time to Robertson 
for having tied his hands in such a way. He did not know 
that one year later, as Robertson's successor in the office 
of British High Commissioner, it was going to be he, who was
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outvoted in the final decision on socialisation.
In fields other than socialisation, General Robertson 
enjoyed great latitude, greater maybe than any other "dep­
uty" of his country abroad. This degree of latitude grew out 
of Foreign Secretary Bevin's trust and respect for the High 
Commissioner and their reciprocal liking. In June 1950, 
shortly before his departure as High Commissioner, Robertson 
expressed his gratitude for Bevin's confidence:
"I have had a wonderful job in Germany. I am conscious of 
having made many mistakes and hope only that there is a 
small balance on the credit side. You have backed me up 
at all times, right or wrong. What more can a subordinate 
ask? It has been the greatest privilege and pleasure to 
serve you."(23)
The personal and close relations between Bevin and Robertson 
also meant that the latter had great influence on the Fo­
reign Secretary's political decisions concerning Germany. 
Sir Frank Roberts, at that time Bevin's Private Secretary, 
said in an interview:
"He had great influence on Bevin. Whenever there were 
problems, as to was the Foreign Secretary going to accept 
these or those recommendations and if the Foreign Office 
people could not presuade him, we would always as a last 
resort send for Brian Robertson, who usually could."(24)
This seems to have been the case in the dismantling ques­
tion. In April 1949 a treaty had been signed establishing 
the International Authority for the Ruhr, in which represen­
tatives of the three Western Occupying Powers and the Be­
nelux States were to set the quotas for production and 
export and the prices of Ruhr coal, coke and steel. It was 
agreed that eventually German representatives should join 
the Authority. The treaty also provided for a sharp red­
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uction of the dismantling programme, which had been agreed 
at the Potsdam Conference. This programme had been initiated 
for two reasons: industries, which had contributed to the 
German war effort, were to be dismembered to ensure that 
Germany could never again build offensive arms; and secon­
dly, the dismantled factories were to form part of the 
reperations for the countries which had suffered at the 
hands of Germany during the war. When the Ruhr Authority 
Treaty was signed, the British (and the French) had hoped it 
would be substantially the final word on the matter of 
dismantling(25).
This was not to be, because the American idea of how the 
Ruhr Authority should function differed considerably from 
that of the British and French: for the Americans the IAR 
was a first step towards European integration; they wanted 
to do away with the burdens of reparations and dismantling 
on the young Federal Republic. This information was leaked 
by the American High Commissioner to the German press in an 
"off the record" interview in October 1949, undermining at 
the very beginning the united front which the Allied High 
Commission was supposed to represent and scoring propaganda 
points withe the Germans. Robertson complained in his weekly 
personal telegram to Bevin that "it accentuated still 
further the general belief that Great Britain alone is 
responsible for the dismantling policy."(26)
Britain and France were opposed to a further reduction 
of dismantling for security and economic reasons. Britain
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was also opposed to any moves towards European integration, 
which had a supranational element to them. A working party, 
initiated by William W. Henderson, had produced a paper, 
"the Ruhr Authority and Economic Integration of Western 
Europe", in which it was clearly stated that the IAR should 
be seen separately from the integration process and that the 
American pressure was hasty and that OEEC was an already 
existing alternative. This paper was sent to Robertson as an 
outline of British policy on Germany and Europe. The High 
Commissioner reacted very strongly:
"I have read the paper with interest but confess that I am 
frankly disappointed at its contents. ... all I am allowed 
to glean regarding reasons for our negative attitude 
towards the concept of associating IAR with the concept of 
West European integration is contained in some very 
general statements in paragraph 17-18. These statements 
crystallize out in the sentence 'The objection(s) to all 
these forms of integration are obvious'. ... If I am going 
to play any useful part in this battle, I feel that I 
should be better prepared for it than this."(27)
Robertson was a stranger to Foreign Office jargon; his main 
aim was the efficient administration of his zone and the 
implementation of the dismantling programme caused him con­
siderable headaches. He was a soldier and used to following 
orders: this explains the intensified dismantling efforts in 
October and November. In every one of his weekly personal 
telegrams to the Secretary of State, however, he described 
the heightening tension over dismantling: intimidation of 
German contractors carrying out the programme - "in the 
present climate of opinion it is inevitabel that these men 
should be regarded as traitors to Germany ... a number of 
contracts will shortly expire and we must expect increasing
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reluctance to sign up for a further period"(28); and German 
government officials, who "openly defied the authority fo 
the Land Commissioner by closing down and then imposing 
fines on a number of dismantling contractors". He did not 
fail to point out what he regarded as the greatest weakness 
of the dismantling programme: the differences of opinion 
between the Allies, which could be exploited by the German 
Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer: "It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that Adenauer enjoys an appreciable tactical 
advantage in having to deal with representatives of three 
powers whose views are not always in harmony. This is the 
kind of game at which he is extremely proficient."(29) The 
following day, 27 October, Robertson went to London to press 
his point even further.
Bevin "had already made up his mind that dismantling 
would have to stop soon. Nonetheless the decision went 
against his grain. He grumbled to Acheson that it was al­
right for the Americans; they had been lucky and finished 
their dismantling quickly. He was caught between a public 
opinion at home and a public opinion in Germany, whose 
demands were in conflict. Neither Bevin nor Schuman was yet 
ready to take a decision."(30) On 19 October he declared in 
the House of Commons on dismantling: "I am not satisfied yet 
that the rest of the world is entirely safe."
Yet barely a week later, one day after Robertson's 
arrival in London, Bevin wrote to Acheson, urging him to 
come to a joint solution of the dismantling problem, to 
"seize this last opportunity of grappling with the problem
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from a position of relative strength. Unless we do so we
shall suddenly find that dismantling has in fact ceased, and
that we no longer enjoy any freedom of choice." The second
paragraph of Bevin's letter, in which he described the
situation, sounds like a direct quote from the telegrams,
which he had received from Robertson: it is the clearest
indication of the degree of the High Commissioner's
influence on the Secretary of State on Bevin:
"It is clear that for several reasons the moral authority 
of the High Commission and of the Allies in Germany is 
being rapidly destroyed. The principal cause of this is 
the present dismantling programme, which is arousing 
bitter resentment and opposition in Germany, particularly 
in the British Zone, where most of the dismantling is 
taking place. ... it is only a matter of a few weeks 
before dismantling collapses for lack of labour. In my 
view we cannot afford to wait until our whole dismantling 
policy falls about our ears, and the Western powers are 
publicly humiliated in front of the Germans.n(31)
In the letter Bevin suggested that "the High Commission
should be authorized to work out an acceptable solution." He
had authorised his own High Commissioner already, as
Robertson, one day after the letter was written, returned to
Germany and immediately requested a meeting with Adenauer.
He indicated that he had found a way to break the vicious
circle - "den Ring zu sprengen"(32) - another indication
that during his two day stay in London he was able to sway
Bevin and returned to Germany with a solution, in whose
shaping he had had a major part.
On 31 October Robertson suggested to Adenauer that a 
reduction of the dismantling programme should be linked to 
the Federal Republic joining the International Authority of
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the Ruhr and cooperation with the Military Security Board.
He told the Chancellor that the dismantling problem had to
be seen not as an economic question, but as a question of
security: if the security requirements of Britain and
especially of France could be satisfied, a solution to many
problems, which stood in the way of a closer association of
the Federal Republic and the West, could be found. The
Chancellor agreed to write a letter to Robertson and to
express in it his willingness to accomodate these demands:
"Die Bundesregierung schlaegt vor, sofort einen Ausschuss 
unter Teilnahme deutscher Vertreter zu berufen, der die 
Sicherheitsfrage und auch die mit ihr zusammenhaengenden 
internationalen wirtschaft1ichen Fragen prueft. Sie 
bittet, die Demontagen bis zum Bericht dieses Ausschusses 
nicht fortzusetzen, auf alle Faelle sie entsprechend zu 
verlangsamen. Die Bundesregierung verspricht sich von der 
Arbeit dieses Ausschusses eine wesentliche Foerderung der 
europaeischen Zusammenarbeit."(33)
This was the first step towards the settling of the 
dismantling issue: at the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference 
the High Commissioners were given the task of negotiating 
the settlement; the negotiations started on 15 November and 
on 22 November they and Chancellor Adenauer signed the 
Petersberger Accord. It went much further then just the 
removal of certain plants from the dismantling list: the 
Federal Republic was allowed to establish consular 
representations in Western countries, to join international 
organisations, as for example the Council of Europe, and to 
restart their shipbuilding industry. The Petersberger Accord 
is significant for two reasons: on the side of the Western 
Allies it was the first outward sign of their policy to tie 
the Federal Republic to the West, for which they were
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willing to make concessions. Bevin had made this point in 
the already-quoted letter to Acheson:
"If, however, we are to avoid during the coming period 
constant series of differences and disputes with the 
German Federal Government, which can only retard the 
fulfillment of our policy of associating Germany closely 
with the Western World, I suggest that we should be 
within our interests to try to reach an understanding 
with Dr. Adenauer on a programme for dealing with as many 
as possible of the more important problems, which are 
likely to cause trouble in the course of the period 
before the time comes to consider a revision of the 
Occupation Statute."(34)
On the German side it meant, as Adenauer put it: "Zum
erstenmal seit dem Zusammenbruch wurde unsere Gleichberech- 
tigung offiziell anerkannt, und zum erstenmal traten wir in 
die internationalen Sphaere ein." The Petersberger Accord 
was the first agreement which had been negotiated between 
representatives of the Western Allies and the Federal 
Republic and, as Hans-Peter Schwarz points out, the times, 
when the Western Allies had made far-reaching decisions 
about Germany without previous negotiations with the 
Germans, were over.(35)
The third part of the definition of "viceroy" is 
"sovereign": in the case of the Allied High Commission it 
was shared sovereignty. In the Trizonal Fusion Agreement of 
April 1949 it was laid down that the three High 
Commissioners, one of each occupying power, would jointly, 
tripartitely hold the supreme authority in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The Fusion Agreement also stated that 
in the Allied High Commission a majority voting formula
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should replace the rule of unanimity which had bedeviled the 
administration of Germany by the Control Coucil. The only 
exception to this rule were changes or amendments to the 
Basic Law, which required unanimous approval of all three 
High Commissioners. An appeal procedure was made available 
to the one High Commissioner, who found himself in the 
minority:
"If a majority decision of the High Commission alters or 
modifies any intergovernmental agreement relating to 
disarmament, demilitarization, or certain other matters, 
any dissenting High Commissioner is empowered to appeal 
to his government. Such appeal serves to suspend the 
decision pending agreement among the three powers at 
governmental level."(36)
In all deliberative organs of the Allied High Commission, 
including the highest, the Council, which consisted of the 
High Commissioners or their deputies, each national element 
had an equal vote.
"It is specifically provided in the fusion agreement, 
however, that in cases in which the exercise of, or 
failure to exercise, the powers reserved to the Allied 
High Commission in the field of foreign trade and 
exchange would increase the need from United States 
Government appropriated funds, weighted voting may be 
used. Under this system the representatives of the 
Occupying Authorities enjoy a voting strength 
proportionate to the funds made available to Germany by 
their respective governments."(37)
It is important, however, to note that questions were 
rarely put to a formal vote: in the first year of its 
existence the Allied Council only resorted to a formal vote 
in eight instances; in only three cases the dissenting High 
Commissioner appealed to his government. The American High 
Commissioner, John McCloy, at one point gave one reason for 
this reluctance to use the appeal procedure: "I think, each
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time we appeal we've got to delegate from our own authority 
and p o s i t i o n (38) On another occasion he said that the High 
Commissioners should always make the greated effort to reach 
a compromise: “I think, that we don't make great progress, 
at least around this table, in referring to the attitude of 
one country rather than the other countries. We act as a 
Commission and we must melt in the Commission the attitudes 
of the three c o u n t r i e s (3 9)
John McCloy (1895-1989) was a lawyer by profession. 
During the war he was appointed Undersecretary of State at 
the Ministry of War and went on to head the Civil Affairs 
Division of United Chiefs-of-Staff. Between 1947 and 1949 he 
was the President of the World Bank, before coming to 
Germany to become American High Commissioner.
His French colleague was even more eager to achieve a 
compromise, when decisions were made in the Council, as the 
weighted voting system would have worked against him. Andre 
Francois-Poncet repeatedly appealed for unity, "for the 
solidarity which above all must unite ourselves."(40) This 
solidarity between the High Commissioners was important, 
because they had to present a common front towards the 
German Chancellor, who was an expert in exploiting allied 
differences to the advantage of the Federal Republic. It is 
important to recall the already-quoted remark of General 
Robertson that "this is the kind of game at which he 
(Adenauer) is extremely proficient."(41)
In his youth Andre Francois-Poncet (1887-1978) had 
studied in Germany and had learned to speak the language
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without an accent . He had embarked on a 
career as a scholar of German literature when World War I 
broke out. After the war he became active in politics: his 
special interest lay with industrial matters. He had aquired 
substantial holdings in the French steel industry through 
marriage and therefore had close connections to the Comite 
des Forges, the French iron, coal and steel control.
World War I also saw the beginning of his long and 
distinguished diplomatic career. Between 1931 and 1938 he 
had been French Ambassador in Berlin and then for two years 
in Rome. From 1940 to 1943 he had been a Member of the 
National Council. He was interned by the Nazis in Germany in 
1943. In 1948 he became an adviser to the French Military 
Governor and to the French Government on German questions 
before being appointed High Commissioner in 1949.
Charles Richardson adds two adjectives to his 
description of Sir Brian Robertson as a viceroy: "liberal
and sympathetic". Indeed, in his one year as British High 
Commissioner, Robertson proved to be a champion of a liberal 
interpretation of the Occupation Statute. As Military 
Governor he had been instrumental in the framing of the 
Statute and he therefore knew better than either of his two 
colleagues its scope and intentions.
In May 1950 a long smoldering disagreement on principle 
came to a head between the American High Commissioner, John 
McCloy, and General Robertson. The High Commission had been
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inundated with Land legislation which sought to re-introduce 
ideas which were based on the old German tradition of 
guilds, "Zuenfte". The piece of legislation which was 
described by McCloy as "the most outrageous one I have seen 
this far", was a law on music teachers:
"The idea that one can't go out and employ any singing 
teacher that he wants to teach his children, seems to be 
an outrageous thing, but it is not only that, if we 
accepted the concept of the Meistersingers you have here. 
What I consider really outrageous are the provisions 
limiting the number of music teachers that may operate in 
a locality."
He stated that he "would like to be able to deal with it as 
a principle rather than as a series of rather silly laws" 
and urged his colleagues to let him prepare a statement on 
policy regarding the freedom to engage in any trade, 
business or profession(42). He objected to professional 
bodies imposing limitations on free-lance employment in 
their fields.
Already at that time Robertson raised objections which 
he reiterated when the American statement came up for dis­
cussion in June. He maintained that, however noble the 
principles which guided the American objections to these 
laws, the High Commissioners were not entitled to enforce 
them under the Occupation Statute. He was not convinced by 
the American argument that decartelisation, mentioned in the 
Statute as one aim of the occupation, covered this matter:
"Some years ago under quite different conditions when the 
Occupation Statute was not in force and the Allies 
decided on a policy of decartelisation in the interest of 
security. I do not consider that this question of 
restraint of trade through licensing affects security. I 
said that I respect your point of view about it and I do 
so because I can see that you wish to introduce a better
social order in Germany. For that I have sympathy, but I 
have to say that the Occupation Statute does not entitle 
us to impose a particular social order in this 
country."(43)
At the very best, Robertson said, it would be stretching the 
word decartelisation, "and we have been instructed not to 
stretch the Occupation Statute." If one defines liberal as 
meaning laissez-faire then this is the best proof for Sir 
Brian's liberalism. He knew more than anybody the difference 
between the total, absolute powers of the Military 
Governors, who could shape the future of their parts of 
Germany by decrees and orders, and the supervisory powers of 
the High Commissioners.
In the Occupation Statute it was laid down that "the 
German people shall enjoy self-government to the maximum 
possible degree" and that meant that even "desirable" legis­
lation could not be imposed unless it fell under the High 
Commission's reserved powers. Robertson's remarks also prove 
that the British had a much more pragmatic attitude to the 
occupation of Germany, while the Americans pursued the 
idealistic aim of shaping the Federal Republic in the image 
of the United States.
The second attribute, which General Robertson is given 
by his biographer, is "sympathetic". Two questions pose 
themselves in discussing this attribute: sympathetic to whom 
and why? Sir Brian clearly displayed the sympathy of a 
victor - i.e. a rather patronising attitude. Also his 
sympathy for certain German causes was mostly based on clear
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considerations of the British interests in Germany.
Three issues, on which Robertson displayed clear 
sympathies for German concerns, will be discussed here: the 
first is Berlin, a problem which occupied, in various 
disguises, the minds of all three British High 
Commissioners. Robertson, however, displayed the greatest 
sympathies of all three for the plight and aspirations of 
the Berliners. Even among his High Commissioner colleagues 
he turned out to be the greatest advocate of the Berlin 
cause.
The reason for his sympathetic attitude can be found in 
the fact, that he was the only one of the three, who had not 
only witnessed the Soviet Blockade of Berlin between 1948 
and 1949, but had organised, together with the American 
Military Governor General Clay, the Western response to it, 
the Berlin Airlift. This experience had left in him a high 
esteem for the courage and persistence of the population of 
Berlin. It also shaped his conviction that the West should 
not be caught unprepared again, in case of a repetition of 
the Soviet action against the Western sectors of Berlin: 
during the very first meeting of the Council of the Allied 
High Commission he urged his colleagues to build up and 
maintain at all times stocks of food and fuel supplies, 
sufficient for five months, in the city.
As in so many matters, which involved a financial 
committment from the Western Allies, Britain's ability to 
contribute was curtailed by her considerable economic 
difficulties after the war. In an interview in 1970,
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Robertson put this problem in very simple terms: "The sums 
of money involved were very considerable. Rations were short 
in England too, and it was no easy thing to persuade the 
government to spend large sums of money on feeding 
G e r m a n s (44) Thus, from the very start, he argued for the 
involvement of the West German Government in the upkeep of 
Berlin: "the only way funds can be provided is by the
Federal Government."(45)
Not only stockpiles had to be maintained; Berlin also 
suffered from a high level of unemployment and a large 
budget deficit. It was General Robertson who pressed the 
Federal Government to give financial aid to the city. At the 
first meeting between the Council and the Chancellor on 14 
October the matter was at the top of the agenda. Adenauer 
conceded that
"we are prepared to help Berlin to the extent of what we 
are able to do. However, according to what we have heard 
so far there is a certain danger if the money which so 
far has come from the West to Berlin has not been put to 
the use for which it has been earmarked."(46)
He pleaded for an executive of the Federal Government to be
sent to Berlin to supervise the use of Federal funds for the
city. Robertson had forseen this demand; on 28 September he
wrote in his weekly personal telegram to Bevin:
"it is evident that so long as the present currency 
arrangements continue, we shall have to face not merely a 
recurrent crisis, but a permanent and inevitable drain on 
the economy of the city and the on the resources of the 
West, which must support it. It is hardly conceivable 
that the Federal Government should undertake this burden 
without tangible addition to its authority in Western 
Berlin and I forsee that willy nilly we shall be 
compelled to make concessions in this respect." (47)
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One week later he added that this demand would also be made 
by the West Berliners:
"These developments have drawn from the West Berliners 
renewed demands for the incorporation of the Western 
Sectors in the Federal Republic coinciding with growing 
realisation that Berlin's economic dependence on the West 
inevitably calls for closer political ties."(48)
The day before Robertson had introduced a proposal on 
the political and economic situation in Berlin to his 
colleagues in the Council. He said that two seperate reasons 
demanded the change of the status of Berlin. The first was 
economic: Berlin permanently depended on aid, which could 
only come from Western Germany; the second wa s 
psychological: its population felt deserted. Robertson 
supported the wishes of the Berliners and many West Germans 
and proposed to end the suspense of Article 23 of the Basic 
Law and let Berlin become the 12th Land of the Federal 
Republic, but it became clear that special, international 
considerations made that nearly impossilbe.
Although Robertson had hoped to have taken into account 
all possible objections by his colleagues when he made this 
proposal, it became obvious that there were very clear 
divisions between the three on the future status of Berlin: 
the French Deputy High Commissioner, M. Berard, did not see 
the solution to Berlin's problems in allowing it to assume 
its position under Article 23 of the Basic Law. Mr. McCloy 
stated that the US Government, because it wanted a solution 
which was both definite and elopent, would go further than 
Robertson's proposal and allow Berlin to assume its position 
as 12th Land. The Council agreed that the Federal and Berlin
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administrations must be consulted and indeed must contribute
to a solution. General Robertson offered several compromises 
in the wording of the proposal, as he intended to get a 
joint recommendation of the Council to their governments on 
the status of Berlin.(49)
The consultations with the Federal Chancellor took 
place on 14 October 1949. Robertson, however, was wrong to 
assume that the Federal Government was in favour of Berlin 
belonging to the Federal Republic as the 12th Land. Dr. 
Adenauer stated at that meeting:
"I'm speaking very frankly here, Gentlemen, when I say 
that it seems that the motive of the SPD Party group in 
the Bundestag when they urge the pushing of the question 
of Berlin being made into a twelfth Land in the Federal 
Republic their motive is that they want to gain 
influence this way in Germany. In the light of this, 
Gentlemen, I think you will see that it takes quite a 
lot of courage to counteract these cheap nationalist 
demands and to take the stand that it is in the genuine 
German interest to take the stand that it would not be 
desirable to have Berlin as a twelfth Land."(50)
Adenauer was clever enough though not to be branded a
traitor of the Berlin cause. He was bound to the Basic Law,
which included Article 23, although it had been suspended by
the Allies when they passed the Basic Law. This article
reads:
"For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the 
territory of the Laender of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, 
Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig- 
Holstein, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Wuerttemberg-Hohen- 
zollern. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into 
force on their accession."(51)
Adenauer wanted to pass on the responsibility for this very 
unpopular decision to the Allies when he said:
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"As far as I can see now, I think that it would be best 
if I am going to recommend to the Bundestag to propose 
any kind of official action until they have heard from 
teh High Commission, I mean to say until we have 
obtained the opinion of the High C o m m i s s i o n (52)
Robertson, who had not been present at the meeting as he was
in Berlin at the time, wrote furiously in his weekly
telegram to Bevin:
"On the Berlin issue Adenauer, who has sound party 
reasons for opposing the incorporation of Berlin into 
the Federation, has unashamedly attempted, by exploiting 
Allied differences, to cast on the Occupying Powers the 
responsibility for thwarting Berlin's aspirations. I do 
not intend to let him get away with this and I shall 
bring the issue into the open at the next Council 
meeting."(53)
These "sound party reasons", which Robertson hinted at, were 
of course the fact that Berlin was a SPD stronghold, 
governed by the very popular SPD mayor, Professor Ernst 
Reuter, and the inclusion of voting members from Berlin in 
the Bundestag could have tilted the small majority, held by 
Adenauer's CDU led coalition, to the opposition SPD's 
favour. The Chancellor also had other reasons for opposing 
the 12th Land solution, as he explained during a cabinet 
meeting on 11 October:
"Eine Eingliederung Berlins als 12. Land werde Komplika- 
tionen nach sich ziehen, weil dann die Bundesregierung 
in die schwierige Lage kaeme, mit den Russen verhandeln 
zu muessen und das koenne gegebenenfalIs bedeuten, die 
westlichen Alliierten aus ihrer bisherigen Verantwortung 
fuer Berlin zu entlassen. Wir seien gewillt, jede Hilfe 
fuer Berlin zu leisten. Es sei jedoch untragbar, dass 
ein Teil der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sowjetischer 
Kontrolle unterliege und wir mit den Russen verhandeln 
muessten."(54)
After meeting with Berlin representatives, Adenauer, during 
his next encounter with the High Commissioners on 20 
October, took a much more conciliatory position: "As far as
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the political requests of these people are concerned, it is 
the wish of Berlin as well as our own that Berlin should be 
taken as a twelfth State in the Federal Republic." However, 
he pointed to one problem: the Magistrate had wanted Greater 
Berlin to be incorporated into the Federal Republic. 
Adenauer repeated his concerns "that for a country as weak 
as the Federal Republic it is not very desirable if a part 
of the Republic would in name belong to the Soviets.(55)
On 2 6 October General Robertson wrote in a telegram: 
"On the problem of financing Berlin's deficit we appear to 
have reached some degree of finality." Indeed, the Berlin- 
hilfegesetz was passed by the Bundestag on 7 March 1950. In 
this telegram Robertson acknowledged Adenauer's changed 
attitude:
"On the related question of Berlin's political status the 
position is still obscure, with the Allies still in 
disagreement upon the course which they wish to see 
taken, while on the German side there has been an 
increasing measure of agreement and readiness to accept 
the substance of Berlin's membership of the Federation 
without insisting upon the form. Adenauer has not persued 
his attempt to pin upon the High Commission the 
responsibi1ty of denying the extreme demands of the 
Berliners and he appears to have succeeded to carry the 
SPD with him in following the more modest course. I am 
bound to acknowledge a degree of courage and adroitness 
on his part which exceeded my expectations."(56)
On 27 October the High Commissioners agreed to common 
recommendations to their governments. The paper was regarded 
as the "lowest common denominator"(57) and proposed that 
Berlin should be a city and a Land; that it should be 
represented in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat by non-voting 
members; that legislation should be adopted by the
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Federation with a view to its extension to Berlin through 
legislative action of the Magistrate; that their should be 
closer cooperation between the Federal Government and the 
Berlin Magistrate in terms of aid and its use; the 
recommendations also repeated the Statement fo Principle of 
May 1949.
The recommendations explicitly stated that the British 
and American High Commissioners would have been prepared to 
go further to meet Berlin's aspirations, but joined the 
present recommendations having particularly in mind the 
attitude of the Federal Government on this question.(58) 
When Robertson initially proposed his paper on Berlin he had 
made it clear that he had not consulted his government 
beforehand. From this and later statements by British 
officials, it can be gathered that Robertson's sympathies 
for Berlin's aspirations were personal one.
His successor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, wrote in his 
weekly telegram to the Secretary of State on 22 August 1950 
that "we (AHC) also reached agreement upon the method of 
approving the Berlin Constitution which, I hope, will not 
antagonise the Germans in Berlin, but which at the same time 
avoids commitment on the 12th Land issue."(59) From the last 
part of this statement one can gather that he was not as 
keen on the idea as his predecessor had been. Article 1, 
Paragraph 2 and 3 of the new Constitution ("Berlin is a Land 
of the Federal Republic of Germany" and "The Basic Law and 
the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany are binding on 
Berlin") were suspended; Article 87 was interpreted as
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meaning that, during the transitional period, Berlin should 
possess none of the attributes of a 12th Land. These were 
the reservations of the Allied Kommandatura when it approved 
the Berlin Constitution on 29 August 1950.
General Robertson, however, was not only concerned
about the financial and economic situation of Berlin, but
about the general economic situation of the Federal Republic
as a whole. At the end of the 14th Council meeting on 26
January 1950, he raised this issue with his colleagues:
"For some time past I have been getting rather worried 
about the general economic situation in the country and 
after talking it over the other day with my Economic 
Advisor, I asked him to put my point of view and his 
views down on paper. The paper is based on the principle 
that the High Commission is bound to take note of the 
general economic situation, not from purely economical 
effects, which are a matter for the ECA and others, but 
from its possible political effects."(61)
In 1950 there were about two million unemployed in the 
Federal Republic: this not only put a heavy burden on the 
already stretched finances of the young republic and on the 
West, who supported it; Robertson, and everybody who knew 
the reasons for the collapse of the last republic on German 
soil, also knew that large scale unemployment was 
potentially a hotbed for political extremism. His 
sympathetic attitude towards the economic problems of the 
Federal Republic was therefore well founded on political 
considerations of protecting the democratic advancements of 
post-war Germany.
As far as he was able to, Robertson was also
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sympathetic towards the position taken by the Federal 
Government. The degree of sympathy, of course, depended on 
the matter concerned and the latitude he was given from 
London on it.
At the beginning of 1950 an issue became acute, which 
placed enormeous strain on Franco-German relations, and on 
which Adenauer appealed to the United States and especially 
Great Britain for mediation and support: the future of the 
Saar. The Saarland had been part of the French Occupation 
Zone, but France clearly aimed at more: an economic union of 
the territory with France. At the beginning of 1946 the 
French sequestrated the mines and at the end of the same 
year drew a customs-frontier between the Saarland and the 
territory of the Western occupation zones (including their 
own). In 1947 the Saar Constitution was passed, which was 
based on the economic association with France and on the 
Saarland's political independence from Germany.
The Petersberg Accords, signed in November 1949 by the 
three Allied High Commissioners and Chancellor Adenauer, had 
envisaged that West Germany should become a member of such 
international organisations as the Council of Europe. This 
particular membership, however, was in doubt at the 
beginning of 1950, because it became known that the Saarland 
would also apply for membership. The Federal Government had 
never accepted the existence of the Saarland as a seperate 
state, and membership of both in the Council would have been 
a tacit acceptance of the status quo.
Robertson, from the very beginning of the argument,
59
tried to remain aloof/ intervening at times as a mediator. 
From his telegrams to London one can deduce that his 
sympathies lay with the Federal Government. On 31 January 
1950 he wrote:
"Francois-Poncet endeavored/ at the Council meeting on 
26th January, to persuade us to approach Adenauer with a 
direct inquiry, whether and when he would be prepared to 
acceed to the Council of Europe. It is clear, that the 
French tactics were based on the assumption that the 
German campaign over the Saar could be compared with that 
over dismantling and that Adenauer would climb down when 
confronted with a firm attitude. Hays and I refused to be 
drawn into this..."(62)
In March 1950 the problem came to a head. On 3 March the 
French and the government of the 'autonomous7 Saarland 
agreed on 12 conventions, which consolidated their economic 
association by granting a 50 year lease of the Saar mines to 
France. The German reaction to the Saar Conventions was 
unanimous outrage. The leader of the SPD opposition, Dr. 
Kurt Schumacher, exclaimed at a public meeting in Neuss on 4 
March: "Die Saar-Konvention ist der groesste Sieg der
Sowjetunion und der Nationalisten in Deutschland."(63)
To the enraged public the Federal Republic's member­
ship of the Council of Europe began to appear increasingly 
less desirable. Robertson was sympathetic to Adenauer's 
difficult position, who wanted to join the Council of Europe 
despite public opinion now angered by developments at the 
Saar:
"I intend to see him (Adenauer) before the debate in the 
Bundestag on Friday in order to council moderation, 
advising against an intransigent attitude towards 
admission to the Council of Europe. I doubt whether my 
advise will have any immediate effect. (On the other 
hand I suspect that Adenauer has deliberately planned
60
his tactics in such a way, that although he will swim 
with the popular tide at the moment, at a later 
opportunity of his own choosing, he will shift his 
position) ." (64)
He was even willing to help Adenauer to overcome the 
complications created by the Saar Conventions. He send a 
letter, informing the Chancellor about Lord Henderson's 
speech in the House of Lords, in which it was stated that 
the final status of the Saar could only be decided by a 
peace treaty with Germany. Although Adenauer acknowledged 
the receipt of the British assurances "mit besonderem Dank", 
they did not go far enough in his opinion and he pressed 
Robertson for further clarification:
"Ich waere Ihnen zu grossem Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie 
die Aufmerksamkeit Ihrer Regierung auf diese nach 
meiner Ansicht entscheidende Tatsache lenken und eine 
moeglichst baldige Stellungnahme Ihrer Regierung zu 
dieser Frage herbeifuehren koennten."(65)
Robertson sent the desired'clarification on the same day and
Adenauer was clearly much obliged, as he wrote the next day:
"Ich moechte nicht verfehlen, Ihnen zu sagen, dass die 
Praezisierung des Standpunktes Ihrer Regierung zur Saar- 
frage, die Sie mir mit diesem Schreiben uebermittelt 
haben, fuer die Bundesregierung von grossem Wert gewesen 
ist und mir meine Stellungnahme zum Saarproblem vor dem 
Bundestag wesentlich erleichtert hat. Ich darf Ihnen 
daher fuer die Uebermittlung dieses Schreibens meinen 
aufrichtigen Dank zum Ausdruck bringen."(66)
Adenauer quoted Robertson's clarification in his
autobiography:
"Meine Regierung hat in der Erklaerung Lord Hendersons 
zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass es ausdruecklich festgelegt 
ist, dass der endgueltige Status der Saar nur durch den 
Friedensvertrag geregelt werden kann. In diesem Sinne 
haben die Abkommen nur vorlaeufigen Charakter und gelten 
nur bis zum Friedensvertrag. ... Es ist ganz sicher,
dass meine Regierung diese Auffassung beim Abschluss des 
Friedensvertrages aufrechterhalten wird."(67)
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Although Robertson was highly critical of his 
colleague, Francois-Poncet7s handling of the matter, his 
sympathies for the German standpoint had clear limits, which 
reflected the British attitude towards the question of 
Germany's membership in the Council of Euorpe and her future 
in general. This becomes very clear in his telegram of 28 
March 1950:
"When my colleagues and I met the Chancellor on 22nd 
March, Francois-Poncet, on his initiative, clumsily 
attempted to force the pace and gave the Chancellor the 
opportunity to try out some pressure on his own 
account. ... Francois-Poncet7s handling of the whole 
affair has been extremely inept and I was glad to see 
from your telegrams that his action does not appear to 
be in accordance with M. Schuman7 s thinking on the 
subject."(68)
During this meeting Adenauer and Francois-Poncet had clashed 
quite vehemently. At the end Robertson summed up the 
proceedings:
"Der erste klare Schluss, den ich aus der heutigen Unter- 
haltung ziehe, ist der, dass im Augenblick keine Hoffnung 
dafuer besteht, dass Deutschland auf Grund einer Abstim- 
mung im Bundestag ein Gesuch urn Aufnahme in den Europarat 
stellt. ... Der zweite Schluss, den ich aus dem heute Ge- 
sagten ziehe, ist der, dass der Herr Bundeskanzler der 
Meinung ist, dass die Lage noch geaendert werden koennte, 
wenn man irgendwie ein neues Element hereinbringen 
wuerde. ... Ich glaube aber, dass der Beitritt Deutsch- 
lands zum Europarat von allergroesster Bedeutung sowohl 
fuer Deutschland als auch fuer Europa ist."(69)
The next day the Chancellor addressed a letter to the High
Commissioners asking for a written undertaking, that the
Allied governments were anxious for German accession to the
Council of Europe; that the Saar's membership of the Council
would be subject to the peace treaty; and that Germany would
become a full member of the Council as soon as possible,
with the right meanwhile to send an observer to the Council
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of Ministers. Robertson wrote to London: "We were able to
agree on a reply satisfactory to him on the first two 
points, but the third point was, of course, quite out of the 
question."(70)
Full membership of the Council of Europe would have 
meant that the Federal Government would be granted the right 
to handle her foreign affairs, which was still a reserved 
power of the Allied High Commission. The British Government, 
for its part, was not willing to make such a concession as 
the gesture Adenauer had been asking for. It rather saw it 
as a possible consequence of the Federal Republic's 
willingness to associate herself with the Council of Europe. 
This was pointed out to Herbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer's 
special emissary, by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, head of the 
German Department of the Foreign Office and designate 
successor of Sir Brian Robertson, when the former visited 
London in May 1950:
"Wenn ich aber einen Rat entgegennehmen wolle, so sei es 
der, dass die Entscheidung fuer den Europarat ein 
Bekenntnis zu Westeuropa bedeute und dass eine solche 
Haltung zweifellos neue Konzessionen der Alliierten auf 
den verschiedensten Gebieten mit sich bringen werde. Man 
duerfe nich den vorsichtigen Hinweis des britischen 
Aussenminister Bevin ueberhoeren, der sich erst kuerzlich 
in einer Rede im House of Commons mit dem deutschen 
Beitritt zum Europarat befasst und die Moeglichkeiten 
einer Uebertragung der Fuehrung der Aussenpolitik an die 
Bundesrepublik angedeutet habe."
The same message was repeated by Lord Henderson,
Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs:
"Die Frage der vollen Mitgliedschaft Deutschland im 
Europarat werde in kuerzester Zeit sicher positiv ent- 
schieden werden, es sei aber hierzu notwendig, dass die 
deutsche Regierung einmal vorleiste, damit das
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Misstrauen, das sich in letzter Zeit angesammelt habe, 
beseitigt werde."(71)
In the end, Adenauer got his gesture, which enabled him to
lead the Federal Republic into the Council of Europe, not
from the British tough, but from the French in form of the
Schuman Plan, the proposal to integrate French and German
heavy industry. Robertson's comment on the Schuman Plan was:
"The net effect on German opinion has been good, though 
the strong limelight projected on France has for the 
presence put our own wishes about the future of Germany 
somewhat in the shade."(72)
The Schuman Plan marks the beginning of a period when 
the initiative in European affairs, publicly at least, pas­
sed from the British to the French, only to be regained in 
1954, after the collapse of the French plan for a European 
army. General Robertson did not hold the office of British 
High Commissioner long enough to see matters through: for 
example, his commitment to Law 75, the reorganisation of the 
coal, iron and steel industries, had an unsuccessful sequel 
-- unsuccessful from the British perspective; the Berlin and 
the Saar problem were also to haunt the Allied German rela­
tions throughout the existence of the High Commission.
Sir Brian Robertson, however, laid the foundations for 
the future relations between Great Britain and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. He held very strong views about the 
future of Germany and was not afraid to challenge policies 
developed by the Foreign Office and was able to influence 
them. The most important example for this were his comments 
on the paper prepared by the Permanent Under-Secretary's 
Committee on "The Future of Germany": after having apolo­
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gised for seeming "impertinently critical towards the able
and experienced body of men who have written the paper", he
explained that "it is probably because I have been brought
up in the military profession that I find this statement of
our problem so contrary to my philosophy." His two main
criticisms of the paper were that it did not state with
"unequivocable clarity" that Britain supported Germany's
desire to be re-unified:
"We should not wait for the Russians to propose it 
because they will choose a time which suits themsel­
ves and not us; they will get all the credit, among 
the Germans, for having made the proposal and they 
will thereby gain a vital advantage in the inevitab­
le tug-of-war between the East and the West for 
possession of the soul of the re-united Germany.
My second point of difference is that I do not 
believe in the conception of a re-united Germany 
held disarmed, even after the conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty, under the supervision of quadripartite 
missions is a misconception."(73)
It was due to the high respect in which Robertson was held 
within the Foreign Office and especially by the Foreign 
Secretary that his observations on such a documents were 
sought and that they had an actual impact on the development 
of the British policy towards Germany. This is why his call 
for a "re-united" and "re-armed" Germany, which should be 
firmly "integrated into the Western Association of nations" 
on the basis of an "equal partnership", is a not only pro­
phetic but also significant legacy.
Taking up the colonial frame of reference from the 
beginning again, General Robertson indeed set in motion the 
"decolonisation” of Germany as, in the words of his biograp­
her Charles Richardson, the "liberal and sympathetic 'vice-
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roy' intent on guiding the social and democratic advancement 
of a future ally." Stewart Easton, in his book The Twilight 
of European Colonialism, wrote:
"The master idea of the British has been to accustom the 
dependent peoples to working the institutions of 
democratic self-government before being considered ready 
for a further installment. Thus these peoples are 
constantly on their good behavior, as it were with the 
mother country watching, ready to hand out rewards for 
the deserving."(74)
There are amazing similarities to the British attitude to­
wards Germany under occupation. One only has to recall as an 
example Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's remarks to Herbert Blanken- 
horn. Easton also quotes the 1948 White Paper:
"The central purpose of the British colonial policy is 
simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to 
responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in 
conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a 
fair standard of living and freedom from oppression in 
any quarter."(75)
These could equally have been the instructions issued to the 
British High Commissioner in Germany: guide the Germans to 
responsible self-government; work towards the integration of 
the Federal Republic into the Western world, which became 
acute during Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's period as British High 
Commissioner and the discussions about the Federal Rep­
ublic's integration into the Western defence system; the 
concern for a fair standard of living and freedom from 
oppression mirrors Sir Brian Robertson's economic initia­
tives and the continuous struggle of all High Commissioners 
against communist interference in Berlin and the Federal 
Republic. Parallels to the British decolonisation policy are 
therefore numerous.
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It seems, however, a rather patronising and condescen­
ding attitude. One has to put it in perspective: the Britain 
was not able to play the part of the colonial "mother cou­
ntry" to the full for three reasons: she was joint sovereign 
together with the United States and France and their general 
relations and developments of other common interests influe­
nced their co-operation in Germany; world developments and 
especially relations with the Soviet Union dictated changes 
of attitudes towards Germany which Britain might otherwise 
not have made, or at least not so soon; and thirdly, the 
first German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, being a shrewd 
political manipulator and cunning negotiator, was increasin­
gly able to speed up the "decolonisation" of the Federal 
Republic and did not just sit back and gratefully receive 
devolved powers as a gift from the "colonial sovereign". 
This attitude of a colonial power, which the British adopted 
at the beginning of the occupation of Germany and still 
maintained in the first year of the High Commission, was 
about to change. The new form of relations between the 
Western Allies and the Federal Republic, however, could no 
longer be imposed, but was going to be the result of nego­
tiations. This is why the second British High Commissioner 
is given the epithet "The Negotiator".
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SIR IVONE A. KIRKPATRICK
THE NEGOTIATOR
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was the longest serving of the 
three British High Commissioners; he also held the position 
during the central period of transition, namely from June 
1950 to September 1953: he was British High Commissioner, 
when the Occupation Statute was revised in March 1951 and 
the Federal Republic regained control over a large part of 
her foreign and internal affairs; and it was he, who nego­
tiated her rearmament and almost complete sovereignty in May 
1952. If Robertson exercised the supreme authority of the 
Western Allies in Germany, Kirkpatrick negotiated it away. 
He therefore can justly be given the epithet "The 
Negotiator".
A description of Kirkpatrick's character, which fully 
supports this claim, is given by Herbert Blankenhorn, the 
Federal Chancellor's liaison officer to the Allied High 
Commission and later head of the political section of the 
German Foreign Office, in an entry in his diary on 14 
August 1953: Kirkpatrick possesses one quality in partic­
ular, writes Blankenhorn, which is crucial in a diplomatic 
life: to distinguish the essential from the non-essential 
and to recognise quickly the weak points of proceedings, 
negotiations or discussions and to draw from them the neces­
sary and for British policy most advantageous conclusions. In
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negotiations he aims for extreme clarity and is never at a 
loss for a compromise solution, when the other negotiating 
parties have reached deadlock. How many times, exclaims 
Blankenhorn, has he proven this in the negotiations leading 
up to the Contractual Agreements. Blankenhorn goes on to 
describe the mask of a lethargic, tired man, behind which 
hides an extremely keen observer, and he highlights 
Kirkpatrick's sense of humour and his courage in defending 
his opinions, even when they were unpopular (1).
Blankenhorn's last observation is very accurate, espe­
cially in light of certain proposals, which Kirkpatrick made 
during his time in Germany and which were progressive in 
contrast to Foreign Office thinking and therefore not always 
popular or successful: for example his proposals on the 
future of Heligoland were put into effect, while he was only 
partially successful with respect to the Saar, and his 
differences with Whitehall over the treatment of German war 
criminals pushed him to the verge of resignation. 
Kirkpatrick dared to think ahead, for example on the rear­
mament of the Federal Republic and her integration into 
NATO, and to argue his case vigorously, pushing the Foreign 
Office to adopt his line of thinking.
Sometimes his personality might have hindered the 
success of his proposals: his Foreign Office colleagues 
described him as highly intelligent, but rather waspish, and 
some resented him for his at times high handed approach. 
On the other hand Kirkpatrick was much more powerful, than
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any other British representative abroad: his staff at the 
beginning of his tenure numbered 6000 British officials and 
even more German auxiliaries; he also had unparalled freedom 
and room for manoeuvre which he hinted at in his autobiogra­
phy: "Of course in the exercise of these supreme powers the 
High Commissioners were controlled and fortified by their 
Governments. But the departments at home could only follow 
events in a general way and Ministers could not be expected 
to acquaint themselves with all the problems arising from 
the administration of Germany"(2).
Kirkpatrick's ability to influence the shaping of Bri­
tish policy towards Germany also depended his rapport with 
the Foreign Secretary: he was sent to Germany by Ernest 
Bevin, with whom he got on well and who he admired greatly. 
Bevin's successor, Herbert Morrison, resented the collegia- 
lity which had existed between Bevin and his staff and 
Kirkpatrick was one of "Bevin's men". He nevertheless 
praised Kirkpatrick and expressed total confidence in the 
High Commissioner, when he visited Germany in Spring 1951. 
Morrison's term as Foreign Secretary was a short one, how­
ever, as Labour lost the 1951 election and Sir Anthony Eden 
became Foreign Secretary. Eden had the highest regard for 
Kirkpatrick whom he recalled from Germany to become Perma­
nent Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office. In his 
autobiography Eden praised "the high quality of Foreign 
Office leadership under Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick" (3) and it is 
reasonable to assume that the high respect which the Foreign 
Secretary held for Kirkpatrick, was formed or at least
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corroborated by their co-operation during the latter's term 
as British High Commissioner in Germany. However, Eden's 
praise for Kirkpatrick was mainly influenced by the fact 
that the latter was one of the few Foreign Office officials 
who shared his attitude to Colonel Nasser and the Suez 
Crisis.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's opinion and attitude towards 
Germany and the Germans changed during his tenure as High 
Commissioner and it is therefore essential to describe his 
initial opinion in these introductory paragraphs, while the 
change will become apparent in the course of this chapter as 
a whole. In November 1948 he wrote a minute for the Foreign 
Secretary, which Bevin considered to be a "thoughtful con­
tribution" to the appreciation of the whole scene. In it 
Kirkpatrick wrote that Germany again could become "a mortal 
peril" if she joined the Soviet bloc:
"In order therefore to achieve security versus 
Germany, the first, and indeed the only aim must be to 
prevent her joining the Soviet bloc. How is this aim 
to be achieved? Certainly not by running after the 
Germans and telling them that their accession to 
Western Union is essential to us. The Germans are the 
best chisellers in Europe and such an approach would 
only excite them to play off the East against the 
West. . . . The most promising course is to take 
advantage of the present day desire in Germany to be 
received back into decent society. ... If we can play 
upon this foible, we can bamboozle the Germans by 
roping them in and eventually making them so dependent 
economically, politically and militarily on the 
Western world that they cannot afford to break away 
and join the East. ... under the cloak of equal rights 
for Germany, we should in fact achieve complete 
control ... But we should not wait until the admission 
ceases to be a favour and we find ourselves dealing 
with Germans whose policy will be governed by the 
conviction that Germany is in a position to confer a 
favour upon us."(4)
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In contrast to Robertson, who had come to Germany 
untainted by such unhappy memories, Kirkpatrick had spent 
almost his entire career dealing with German affairs. As a 
child he had spent the summer holidays in the Black Forest 
and had learned to speak German fluently. During the First 
World War, at the age of twenty, he was sent to Holland to 
head an intelligence gathering operation. The most important 
and detrimental experience, however, came when the Foreign 
Office transferred him to Berlin in August 1933, where he 
acted as Charge d' Affaires in 1936, 1937 and 1938. Before 
1933 he had spent three years in Rome at the Holy See and 
had watched Mussolini rise in power. When he came to Berlin, 
Hitler's "Machtergreifung" had just taken place. For six 
years he observed the building of the Nazi state and its 
expansionist tendencies. He had first hand experience of the 
deteriorating German-British relations and rejected the 
British policy of appeasement, although he was not in a 
position successfully to oppose it. He left Berlin on 15 
December 1939, after Great Britain had declared war on 
Germany because of the German invasion of Poland. All these 
experiences had turned Kirkpatrick into a man, whom his 
colleague John Coleville described in his diary entry of 31 
October 1939 as "fanatically anti-German"(5).
During the war Kirkpatrick was seconded to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation to take charge of propaganda 
against Germany. When the tide of war started to turn in the 
Allies' favour the Control Commission for Germany was fou­
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nded to prepare for the administration of the country after 
her anticipated defeat. Kirkpatrick became Deputy Commissio­
ner (Civil) in the British Element in September 1944. In 
August 1945 he returned to the Foreign Office and in Februa­
ry 1949 was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
(German Section). He therefore wrote the above quoted minute 
shortly before his appointment to head of the German Sec­
tion; one can only assume that the stand he took in it was 
at least one of the reasons for his appointment, as it eq­
ualed Bevin7s general dislike and mistrust for the Germans 
after the war. Both men, however, were forced by the turn of 
events to adopt a more mellow and liberal approach towards 
Germany, though it seems from the tone of correspondence 
between Kirkpatrick and Robertson that the former did so 
rather grudgingly:
"A liberal policy," Kirkpatrick told Robertson in a 
letter on 31 August 1949, "can only be adopted and 
put into effect if public opinion is satisfied that 
the Germans can be trusted not to abuse our 
liberalism. . . . My second conclusion is that it 
would be very helpful to our cause if we could find 
some excuse for jumping on the first Nazis and rabid 
nationalists who raise their heads. Germans are 
impressed by strong action. If, however, they find 
that they can commit a political misdemeanour with 
impunity their success not only goes to their heads 
and they become more and more difficult to control 
but they attract followers"(6). On 8 September he 
wrote: "I was very glad to note from the press and
your telegrams that you had taken such effective 
action about the press law. This is the sort of 
action that impresses the bad Germans and encourages 
the relatively few good ones"(7).
It will become clear in the course of this chapter that 
Kirkpatrick's attitude towards Germany changed considerably 
when he went to Germany as Robertson's successor in the
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position of British High Commissioner. One reason for this 
change of heart must be seen in Kirkpatrick's rapport with 
the German Federal Chancellor Adenauer. In his autobiogra­
phy, Kirkpatrick described Adenauer as a "remarkable figure 
... a man guided by principle ... a redoubtable but charming 
adversary ... rational man"; but he also added that "indeed 
there are few more cunning manipulators of men and situa­
tions than Dr. Adenauer"(8). Especially in that last charac­
teristic Kirkpatrick might have recognised something of 
himself. It is clear that the rapport between the two men 
depended on their similarities: both were Catholics, both 
had similar characteristics, both were shrewd negotiators.
In the course of the chapter it will become clear that 
many of Kirkpatrick's most pro-German proposals were in fact 
made with Adenauer's interests in mind: for example his 
move to return Heligoland, which had been a RAF bombing 
range since the war, to its former German inhabitants, were 
designed to support the Chancellor; the German public was to 
be convinced that Adenauer's leanings towards the West were 
beneficial for Germany. Kirkpatrick did not prop up Adenauer 
because of any personal likes. The Chancellor's political 
survival was essential for the success of the British policy 
to tie Germany firmly to the West. Kirkpatrick clearly 
stated that in a secret telegram on 22 November 1950: "There 
is no doubt that Adenauer with all his defects is more 
likely than any other German politican to take a large view 
of current problems and to carry through a western policy in 
Germany. Consequently we have an interest in sustaining him
by demonstrating, so far as we are able, that his Western 
policy is in fact bringing concrete advantages to Germa­
ny" (9) . One week later he wrote: "Adenauer is probably the 
best chancellor we can get" (10). This was not a common 
British view of Adenauer, then or later.
When Adenauer was elected in September 1949 Kirkpatrick 
had been anything but enthusiastic: "He is not the man we 
should have chosen, but he is the elected choice and we 
shall have to work with him"(11), he told the Prime Minis­
ter. The fact that by November of the next year he had 
changed his mind so drastically, points to the fact that 
Kirkpatrick might have been swayed by the Chancellor's per­
sonality to a certain degree afterall, as they were in 
constant personal contact with each other from June 1950 
onwards.
Kirkpatrick's support for Adenauer's policies, however, 
only went as far as they were in accordance with British 
interests. It was in Britain's interest to foster European 
integration and to champion the Federal Republic's partici­
pation in it, but Adenauer's pleas for Britain to join this 
integrated Europe fell on deaf ears. During talks with 
Churchill in London in December 1951 Adenauer expressed his 
hopes most clearly: Great Britain must be more than a good 
neighbour. Churchill replied that Britain sincerely desired 
to see the constitution of a European Army and that Britain 
would stand at the side of such an army. At the same time he 
must make it clear that although Britain was in favour of
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this European Movement, she was not an integral part of it 
since she was an island. Adenauer interjected that neverthe­
less Mr. Churchill was the father of the European Movement. 
The Prime Minister explained that the reason he had spon­
sored this idea was that he desired to create a firm Franco- 
German friendship in which Britain could extend a helping 
hand by preserving a balance in Europe(12) .
According to Adenauer's auto biography Churchill had 
illustrated this point at a dinner party by drawing three 
inter-secting circles on his place-card, one representing 
the United States, one the Commonwealth and one Europe. The 
Prime Minister explained to Adenauer that Great Britain was 
the interesection of these three circles, being a part of but 
not exclusively belonging to each.
Britain's aloofness was personified by Kirkpatrick. He 
wanted to integrate the Federal Republic into the West and 
in order to achieve this it was paramount to lay to rest 
once and for all the Franco-German "Erbfeindschaft". One of 
his main task was therefore to mediate between the French 
and the Germans, whether on the personal or at the state 
level. Two examples: on 17 October 1950 Kirkpatrick wrote in 
his weekly personal report to the Secretary of State that 
the Chancellor had "expressed misgivings about the future of 
France whom he described as 'sick to death'. He hinted cau­
tiously that we might have to organise Western defence 
without France or at least without relying on the French 
army. I depreiated this line of thought and said that the 
French troops might work as well as all troops if they were
properly led. The Chancellor also said that he had reluc­
tantly come to the conclusion that Francois-Poncet was out 
to ruin Franco-German understanding. He was beginning to 
think that all his attempts to achieve a rapprochement were 
doomed to failure. I told him that on the first point he was 
wrong in fact and on the second unduly pessimistic. The fact 
is that Dr. Adenauer and Francois-Poncet have conceived a 
violent dislike for one another"(13).
The second example of Kirkpatrick's desire to foster 
Franco-German rapprochment was his bold attempt to persuade 
the Foreign Office to urge the French Government to come to 
an agreement with the Federal Republic over the Saar. On 8 
June 1951 he wrote:
"I submit therefore that the time has come for His 
Majesty's Government, in conjunction if possible with 
the United States Government, to consider giving 
friendly advice to the French about the course that 
events in the Saar territory are taking. We should not 
hesitate to let the French know that we view with 
increasing concern the growth of the Saar issue to the 
status of a problem calculated to prevent the 
attachment of Germany to the West and to undermine the 
policy to which the three governments are committed in 
Western Europe. If this policy is to be successful the 
causes of tension between France and Germany must be 
removed, and the greatest single issue between the two 
countries is the attempt to develop and maintain the 
political seperation of the Saar from Germany"(14).
Kirkpatrick's change of attitude towards the Germans was a 
gradual progress and not so much a change of heart as it was 
in response to changed circumstances: one day after he 
arrived in Germany as the new British High Commissioner the 
Korean War broke out and it became the general belief that 
this was only the prelude to a third World War. Germany,
81
which displayed frightening similarities to the divided 
Korea, was bound to be the first area of conflict in Europe 
and, more importantly, could provide the casus belli for a 
general war.
The following chapter will discuss the British policy 
on a German contribution to Western defence. Kirkpatrick's 
negotiating skills were required in three different areas: 
firstly, he influenced the development of the policy of his 
own government; secondly, he was involved in the formulation 
of a common Allied policy, both at the governmental level 
and on the High Commission; and thirdly, he had to convince 
the Germans to go along with the Allied decisions. 
Kirkpatrick's involvement on these three levels is a theme 
which will run through the whole chapter. It will try to 
prove his considerable influence on the decision whether and 
in what form the Germans should contribute to Western defen­
ce. This decision was fundamental to the Western Allies's 
policy towards Germany from the beginning of Kirkpatrick's 
tenure until the end of the Allied High Commission in Germa­
ny.
The third chapter will discuss the revision of the 
Occupation Statute. It will provide a unique insight, from 
the viewpoint of the British element, into the working of 
the Allied High Commission. This part of the chapter will 
prove that the British tended to interpret the Occupation 
Statute in a much more liberal way and were willing to go 
further in its revision than their American or French col­
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leagues.
In the fourth chapter of this part the most important 
development of Kirkpatrick's tenure will be recounted: the 
negotiations leading up to the contractual agreements bet­
ween the Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Considering the magnitude and significance of these agree­
ments and Kirkpatrick's considerable influence on and role 
in their formation, this part of the chapter will justify 
his epithet "The Negotiator".
The last chapter will describe briefly the 
major developments between the signing of the contractual 
agreements and Kirkpatrick's departure from Germany: the 
beginning of the long and protracted process of ratifica­
tion, the Soviet initiative of 1952 and the Naumann case. It 
will also try to give a concluding assessment of 
Kirkpatrick's record as British High Commissioner in 
Germany.
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A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN DEFENCE
The British Chiefs of Staff had started discussing a 
possible German contribution to the defence of Western Eu­
rope as early as 1944. The Western Union staff discussions 
on the defence of Europe had arrived very early, i.e. in 
July 1948, at the realisation that Europe should be defended 
as far east of the Rhine as possible and that could not be 
done without either German or American troops -- preferably 
with both. These discussions took on a new urgency in August 
1949, when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. 
There was also the growing threat of the East German 
People's Police, which was being equipped to undertake mili­
tary operations, although it was ostensibly intended for 
internal security purposes. The question arose, whether a 
strong gendarmerie should be built up in West Germany to 
form a counter balance to the East German People's Police.
On 25 April 1950 Kirkpatrick wrote to Bevin: "Though 
the arguments in favour of the eventual establishment of a 
gendarmerie are strong, I had hoped that the problem need 
not arise at the moment. However, the Chiefs of Staff, who 
have been examining the question in the wide context of the 
defence of Western Germany, have now recorded the emphatic 
view that the establishment of a gendarmerie in Western 
Germany 'should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.'" As
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the head of the German Department of the Foreign Office he 
prepared for the Secretary of State a brief for the forthco­
ming ministerial meeting in London in May. The brief recom­
mended that "a) the three Foreign Ministers should decide in 
principle that if the Federal Republic applies for leave to 
form a Federal Gendarmerie they will not oppose it. b) the 
initiative in proposing the formation of such a body should 
be left to the Germans and the decision at a) should be kept 
secret."(15) In his accompanying note Kirkpatrick pointed 
out that "as you know the German Federal Chancellor has for 
some time been complaining that we have left him in the 
dark about our plans for the defence of Germany. General 
Robertson has recommended that if at all possible he should 
be given authority to discuss this matter with Dr. 
Adenauer." Although Bevin agreed with the general con­
clusions of the brief/ he did not want the High Commissioner 
to take any further action before he had had his discussions 
with Mr. Acheson and M. Schuman(16).
Four days later, on 29 April, General Robertson repor­
ted in a top secret telegram that “the Chancellor presented 
us with a written proposal for the authorisation of a Fede­
ral Police Force 25000 strong as a general reserve for the 
enforcement of the will of the Federal Government and as a 
local police for the Federal Capital."(17) On 4 May cabled 
to London that the Chancellor's proposal had been the topic 
of discussion at a private meeting of the three High Commis­
sioners; both McCloy and Francois-Poncet "discussed this 
proposal in a realistic manner and recognised the inevitabi­
lity and indeed the desirability of the creation of such a 
force. However, they laid great stress on the need for very 
careful handling of this issue. ... As you know, I am in 
favour of the acceptance of the Chancellor's request in 
full.n(18)
One explanation for Sir Brian's support for the German 
request of a Federal Police Force might be that he was 
involved in shaping this idea. The German Chancellor at that 
time was inofficially advised on security matters by Gehard 
Detloff Graf von Schwerin(19). Schwerin had been recommended 
to Adenauer by Sir Brian Robertson. In April he had travel­
led to London and had had conversations with the Chiefs of 
Staff and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. Sir Ivone later vigorously 
denied that it had been anything but a "courtesy call" and 
that "neither remilitarisation nor the creation of a Federal 
Police Force were discussed"(20). It is a fact, however, 
that the German request, formulated in consulation with 
Schwerin after his return from London, corresponded closely 
with the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff at that 
time.
On 11 May the three High Commissioners agreed on the 
formation of a Federal Police Force: the French pointed out 
that his Foreign Minister was prepared to accept the forma­
tion of a force not exceeding 5000 but that he would not 
agree to any larger force. The American High Commissioner 
supported the French position. General Robertson added in 
his letter to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick: "Under the circumstan-
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ces it seemed to me to be better to take what we can for the
moment. I hope that the Chiefs of Staff will feel comforted 
by the instructions to the High Commissioners to study this 
matter further as obviously the result of this examination 
would only be to recommend an increase in the size of the 
force."(21) On 15 June the Council of Allied High Commission 
decided to set up a committee to study the matter further 
and to produce recommendations to be considered by the three 
governments.
In a top secret letter to Bevin on 4 July 1950 the
outgoing High Commissioner Sir Brian Robertson put his full
weight behind the argument in favour of German rearmament:
"It is this danger of Soviet aggression which, in my 
opinion, presents the allied statesmen with their 
biggest problem so far as Germany is concerned. The 
British Chiefs of Staff have recorded their opinion 
that Western Europe cannot be defended without the 
inclusion of Western Germany in the defensive 
arrangements. That is no more than a statement of 
the mathematically obvious. ... My strong recommen­
dation is that this matter of German re-armament 
should be faced at once and that those questions of 
"when" and "how" should be submitted forthwith to 
careful technical study. ... Such a difficult ques­
tion as the above will obviously require very deli­
cate handling and the closest co-operation with our 
Allies. I think that the Allied High Commission can 
be a helpful element in this discussion. My collea­
gues are broadminded, sensible men and I have no 
doubt that my successor will get on with them very 
easily. ..." (22)
Sir Brian was the most outspoken supporter of the German 
request for a large gendarmerie, but then he considered the 
question from a military standpoint. He was first and fore­
most a soldier, while his two High Commissioner colleagues 
were both civilians. His successor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 
was a diplomat and therefore considered the question from a
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political/ a diplomatic viewpoint. He clearly saw the diffi­
culties whcih the rearming of the former enemy would raise 
at home and with Britain's allies. He was therefore a more 
reluctant supporter of the idea of gendarmerie, but his 
support was still more forthcoming than that of the Ameri­
cans and the French.
When Kirkpatrick arrived in Germany as the new British 
High Commissioner on 24 June, the opposing positions had 
hardened on the question of a Federal Police Force. 
Francois-Poncet had been issued new instructions on the 
subject, of which the Foreign Office had been informed by 
the French Embassy in London: "The French line is to take up 
the various reasons in favour of such a force which Adenauer 
has advanced at one time or another and to demonstrate how 
adequately the various requirements and deficiencies which 
he cites can be met by methods other than the creation of a 
Federal Police, a step to which the French Government re­
mains firmly opposed. ... it is unlikely that French opposi­
tion will be overcome and progress made without direct 
ministerial intervention."(23) The Americans were equally 
reluctant to support the idea. On 30 June Sir Ivone wrote in 
a letter to Sir Donald St.Clair Gainer:
"McCloy said that the State Department had been some­
what excited at reports that we intended to press for 
the immediate reconstitution of a German Army. He said 
that in his view a decision on the Police Force must 
depend largely on whether it was regarded as a first 
step in the reconstitution of a German Army or whether 
it was advocated entirely on its merits. I told him 
that the State Deparment could sleep quite easily in 
their beds. Neither our Chiefs of Staff nor anyone in 
the Foreign Office, and still less no-one in the Bri­
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tish Government, advocated the rearmament of Germany, 
although I must in all frankness tell him that our 
military view was to the effect that Western Europe 
could not be effectively defended without a German 
contribution. Nevertheless it was recognised on all 
sides that German rearmament now was not practical 
politics. Consequently the establishment of a German 
Federal Police must be considered entirely on its 
merits without relation to German rearmament(24)
One day later Kirkpatrick complained to Gainer: "We are 
doing our best to fulfil the wishes of the Chiefs of Staff 
and to secure tripartite agreement to the immediate establi­
shment of a Federal Police Force. But, as you will have 
gathered from the telegram I am sending you today about the 
proceedings in the Special Committee and from previous cor­
respondence, our efforts are being disastrously handicapped 
by the circumstances that we are getting no support from the 
American. Indeed, it seems that the US High Commissioner has 
instructions virtually to block our proposal.n(25)
On 25 June 1950 North Korean troops crossed the 38th 
parallel and invaded South Korea. The parallels between 
Korea and Germany were not lost on the people and the gover­
nment of the Federal Republic: a divided country, the build 
up of a military force in the communist half capable of 
aggression against the other half. "It was felt," 
Kirkpatrick wrote in his autobiography "that the Korean War 
was only a curtain-raiser to a Russian sponsored war of 
unification in Germany"(26). The presence of the Allied 
occupation troops in the Federal Republic seemed little 
reassuring, especially in light of the initial inability of 
the American troops, brought in from Japan, to stop the 
North Korean advances. The tentative optimism which had
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existed in the Federal Republic at the beginning of 1950, 
because of the visible improvement in the economy, the end 
of rationing and the announcement of the Schuman Plan, had 
quickly disappeared in the light of events in Korea. There 
was a definite wave of panic and some Germans started to 
hoard food, make preparations to flee or sought ways to re­
insure themselves with the Communists. Though this 
phenomenon had already been evident in the Spring of 1950, 
the outbreak of the Korean war let it take on much more 
serious proportions.
On 11 July Adenauer came to see Kirkpatrick and im­
plored him to take decisive actions to build up morale in 
the Federal Republic. The Chancellor was deeply upset after 
receiving gloomy reports about the situation from Count 
Schwerin, who told Adenauer that the West had no defence in 
Europe against the East and seemed to be taking no serious 
steps to organise one. Indeed, only 4 Anglo-American divi­
sions and practically no air-force stood between the Channel 
and the 22 Soviet divisions stationed in the Soviet occupa­
tion zone of Germany. There was no promise of a continuation 
of the American presence in Germany ad infinitum. France was 
politically and militarily weak and it would take some time 
to rearm it sufficiently. Britain had huge economic problems 
which would make it difficult to find the necessary resou­
rces for the defence of West Germany.
Kirkpatrick reported his conversation with the.Chancel­
lor on 11 July to Sir Donald St.Clair Gainer in a four page
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top secret personal letter. He wrote: "The Chancellor then 
reverted to what he described as the short term problem, and 
said that the Korean incident had only brought into relief a 
situation which must already have been clear to all of us. 
It could not be denied that we were living on a volcano. But 
had the Western Powers thought out all the short term possi­
bilities? For example, had we considered what we should do 
if the Russians played the Korean game in Berlin and em­
ployed the Volkspolizei to attack the western garrisons in 
the Western Sectors? In this connection he drew my attention 
to a statement by Stalin to the effect that a war for the 
unification of a country was not a war of agression"(27). 
Kirkpatrick promised at the end of the letter to send his 
personal comments on the conversation and the general situa­
tion. On 15 July he sent three top secret telegrams to 
London: in the first he described the Council meeting on 13 
July, during which his conversation with the Chancellor had 
been discussed. Both his colleagues had "expressed the view 
that we should have bad news from Korea and that we must 
expect the western Germans to become shaky in their allegia­
nce to the West. Both thought a Russian coup in Berlin or an 
attack on the West might come sooner than anyone expected, 
even this year"(28). In the second he outlined his views on 
what to do:
"The Korean war has brought the defencelessness of 
Germanyto the notice of the Federal Government and the 
Western Germans. They are aware that at present we 
cannot protect them or indeed western Europe from a 
Russian attack.
The Western Germans look to us to take urgent action 
to improve our military position. Failing any evidence
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of our resolve there will be an increasing tendency to 
compound with the Russians while there is time. On the 
other hand their sympathy is with the West and it 
should not be impossible to hold the position despite 
reverses in Korea if we can show the Federal 
Government that we are tackling the Russian menace in 
a business-like and resolute manner. They realise that 
we cannot do everything in a day but would like to see 
a beginning made, at all events with some of the 
short-term problems in Germany. Those specifically 
mentioned to me by the Chancellor were the creation of 
a federal police, the improvement of the dienst- 
gruppen and preparations to deal with refugees. If we 
cannot cope with these problems, the solution of which 
lies within our power, the Germans will conclude that 
we do not mean business and are unlikely to face the 
much more difficult problem of western defence. One 
the Germans reach this conclusion their morale will 
collapse and with it our German policy.
Accordingly I recommend that we should lose no time in 
tackling these short term problems and that we should 
do so in consultation and cooperation with the 
Chancellor."(2 9)
In his third telegram he dealt with the threat to Berlin 
which Adenauer had used as an example to illustrate the 
general threat to Germany. Kirkpatrick reiterated his opi­
nion that "our whole German policy is based on the supposi­
tion that we shall eventually be able to build up a position 
of strength in the West. But the Chiefs of Staff tell us 
that in fact we cannot do this without German participation. 
On these grounds I advocate making a beginning now with the 
police and the dienst-gruppen. This procedure would have the 
following advantages. We should not be remilitarising Germa­
ny. We should be more likely to enlist full German coopera­
tion than if we came up with a proposal for German militari­
sation which would araous opposition in many quarters and 
would compel others to pose unacceptable conditions. It 
would be a relatively small and unobtrusive operation least 
calculated to alarm the Russians. We should have a basis on
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which to build if we so decided."(30)
From then on Kirkpatrick was involved with the question 
of the defence of Western Germany on three levels: in Germa­
ny he was negotiating with his colleagues to come to a joint 
recommendation to their governments on the Federal Police 
question and sounding out the feelings of the German gover­
nment and opposition on the question of defence; at the same 
time he was involved in the policy making process in London, 
where Bevin was reconsidering revision of his policy for the 
defence of Western Europe. Kirkpatrick received instructions 
from Gainer: "If the police question comes up in the High 
Commission in the near future you should base yourself on 
Adenauer's original letter of 28th April, on what passed at 
the meeting of Ministers, and on Mr. McCloy's statement to 
the Chancellor to the effect that the three Foreign Minis­
ters had agreed that a good base for the formation of a 
Federal Police Force could be established. ... If there 
seems to be a likelihood of discussion of this question in 
the High Commission resulting in a decision to organise the 
police force on the unsatisfactory basis proposed by the 
French, it might be to our interest that discussion should 
be deferred for the present"(31). This met completely with 
Kirkpatrick's assessment of how far he could go in the 
negotiations with his High Commissioner colleagues: "As
regards the federal police I would not object to beginning 
on a Land basis in order to satisfy the French, provided 
there is sufficient central control of training, estab­
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lishments etc. to make the force effective. If we insist on 
a manifestly ineffective force we shall not only waste money 
and effort, but create in the German mind the impression 
that we are frivolous"(32).
The negotiations turned out to be protracted and com­
plicated. It took the three High Commissioners three months 
to come up with a joint answer to Adenauer's proposal, which 
he had tabled on 28 April. The French were taken aback at 
any mention of what the British deemed as the essential 
elements of central control. Finally, on the evening of 27 
July, it was decided that any delay of the answer to the 
Chancellor would be damaging to German morale and a letter, 
in which substantial changes had been made to accomodate the 
French qualms, was dispatched inviting the Federal Gover­
nment to submit proposals for such a force. McCloy and 
Kirkpatrick, however, did not fail to warn their French 
counterpart that they would insist on the acceptance of any 
reasonable German proposal, as it was of paramount 
importance to secure an effective force. Kirkpatrick wrote 
in his telegram to the Foreign Office: "One encouraging 
feature in the conversation was the startling evolution in 
McCloy's attitude. I was not surprised that Hays should be 
strongly for a large and efficient force but McCloy was just 
as strong. He said opinion in America would regard our 
present proposals as inadequate. As against this, although I 
believe Berard to be genuine, I am doubtful whether his 
government means business and we may have to take a very 
firm line if this police force is to be effective. I would
greatly welcome it if you would cause the French Ambassador 
to be made aware of our doubts in regard to the French 
attitude"(33).
French apprehension, however, was only one of the ob­
stacles to overcome on the way to a Federal Police Force. 
The fact that the Allies had agreed that the Force should be 
organised on a Land basis meant that the Federal Government 
was faced with negotiations with the Laender governments 
over the central control of the force. As Kirkpatrick poin­
ted out in his report on the first Allied-German negotia­
tion: "it was evident that the Federal Government are by no 
means over-confident of their ability to get their way in 
discussions with the Laender. The first point that arose 
therfore was how far Allied authority could be used to force 
through the Federal Government's ideas. To this we replied 
that specific points must be referred to us before there was 
any question of Allied pressure on the Laender"(34).
On 17 August the three High Commissioners met the 
Chancellor. Adenauer started the discussions with a long and 
grim expose of the situation: he talked of the expansion and 
the offensive character of Soviet troops in the Eastern Zone 
and the militarisation of the East German Volkspolizei, 
which now numbered 50,000 to 60,000 men. The Soviets, accor­
ding to Adenauer, were not planning to invade themselves, 
but the Volkspolizei would be used like the North Korean 
army. Morale in the Federal Republic was so low that little 
resistance would be rendered against such an invasion and
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the Federal Republic with all her industrial potential would 
fall into Soviet hands, as the Western Allies would not risk 
a war with the Soviet Union over Germany. The Federal Gover­
nment was totally helpless: the enlargement of the police by 
10000 agreed by the Allies would not be enough to withstand 
the East German Bereitschaften. The Chancellor implored the 
High Commissioners to persuade their governments to demon­
strate military might in Germany; the public should be given 
the confidence that resistance was possible. Secondly, the 
Federal Government should be allowed to raise an armed 
150,000 strong volonteer force to defend the Federal 
Republic against an attack by the East German Volks­
polizei . (35)
When Adenauer made these statements to the High Commis­
sioners, he knew that he had the whole hearted support of 
the British High Commissioner: Kirkpatrick and he had had 
lunch together two days before, at which the Chancellor had 
expressed his anxiety about the low level of morale. 
Kirkpatrick cabled to London: 111 retorted that the Russian 
propaganda was effective because of the military weakness of 
the Western Allies. If we could improve our military situa­
tion, we should have no reason to fear the Russian propagan­
da. ... Finally he said that something must be done to 
improve the quality and reliability of the police. ... On 
this point the Chancellor is right. In order to scotch the 
German menace we have so organised matters that no piece of 
German Governmental apparatus can be a menace to anyone 
including the Communists"(36).
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Despite Kirkpatrick's general support for Adenauer's 
proposal to raise a volunteer force to match the East German 
Bereitschaften, he, together with his colleagues, resisted 
the Chancellor's pressure to impose this idea by High Com­
mission decree on the basis of Article 3 of the Occupation 
Statue. All three High Commissioners also disapproved of the 
fact that Adenauer had ventilated his proposal publicly and 
thereby had antagonised the SPD, the Land governments and 
parts of his own party; on the other hand, Kirkpatrick 
wrote, "his action has the advantage of making it clear that 
this is a German and not an Allied initative"(37).
Adenauer recapitulated his proposals in a memorandum, 
which he presented to the High Commission on 2 9 August: he 
asked for the reinforcement of the occupation troops, for 
the establishment of a Western European army with German 
contingents as a counterweight to the militarised Volks­
polizei , and for the establishment of a Federal Police to 
warrant internal security. Together with this memorandum on 
security went one on the question of the reorganisation of 
the relations between the Federal Republic and the Occupa­
tion Powers: referring to the London Conference communique 
of 13 May, that the German poeple should be granted their 
natural wish for an easing of controls and the reestab­
lishment of their sovereignty, the Chancellor demanded a 
greater degree of freedom of action, which accorded with new 
duties towards the common defence of Western Europe. He 
spelled out his concrete demands:
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"Die Bundesregierung haelt es daher fuer notwendig, 
dass die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den 
Besatzungsmaechten auf neue Grundlagen gestellt 
werden. Die Bundesregierung bittet die alliierten 
Aussenminister, auf der kommenden Konferenz in New 
York etwa die folgenden Erklaerungen abzugeben:
1. Der Kriegszustand zwischen den alliierten Maechten 
und Deutschland wird beendet.
2. Der Zweck der Besatzung ist in Zukunft die 
Sicherung gegen aeussere Gefahr.
3. Die Beziehungen zwischen den Besatzungsmaechten und 
der Bundesrepublik werden fortschreitend durch ein 
System vertraglicher Abmachungen geregelt."(38)
These requests went much further than Adenauer's letter in 
April: the Federal Police Force now only constituted one 
part of Adenauer's great design. He had taken up the propo­
sal of a European Army, which had been put forward by the 
leader of the British opposition, Sir Winston Churchill, at 
a meeting of the Council of Europe on 11 August. The German 
Chancellor also for the first time demanded the replacement 
of the occupation regime by relations based on contractual 
agreements.
At the end of the discussion on these memoranda between 
the Chancellor and the High Commission Kirkpatrick tried to 
reassure Adenauer: "Kirkpatrick sagte mir am Schluss der 
Sitzung, dass sich die Alliierte Hohe Kommission der grossen 
Schwierigkeiten der gegenwaertigen Lage in der Bundes- 
republik voll bewusst sei. Die drei Hohen Kommissare wuer- 
den ihren Einfluss in New York nach Kraeften dafuer ein- 
setzen, dass etwas geschehe, was einem Appell an weite 
Kreise des Volkes gleichkomme."(39 ) However, Adenauer's 
recollections of Kirkpatrick's statement are misleading: the 
latter agreed with the underlying analysis, but he did not 
come to the same conclusions as the Chancellor. Kirkpatrick
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did not favour the idea of a European Army nor the abolition 
of the occupation regime at the present time. He did want to 
bolster German morale, but in his opinion this required a 
strong Federal Police for internal security and the reinfor­
cement of Allied troops for external security.
Kirkpatrick expressed his views in a minute which he 
wrote in August for the Secretary of State. The Foreign 
Office attached the following comment: "For your meeting on 
21st August with H.M. Representatives in West European coun­
tries on the subject of the possible use of German resources 
for Western defence, I attach two important papers, the 
first prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, and the second by Sir
I. Kirkpatrick. Though differing in their approach to the 
subject and in the arguments they use, both papers in effect 
reach the same conclusion. The conclusion is that we must 
accept the need for using German resources to fill the gap 
in Western defence, and that we should consider now the best 
method of initiating the gradual rearmament of Germany with­
in the framework of Western defence." In the above mentioned 
paper Kirkpatrick wrote:
"In Europe our declared policy has been: (1) to build up
a position of strength in the West (2) to incorporate 
Germany into the Western system, eventually as an equal 
partner. ... We hoped to achieve this by the Brussels 
treaty and subsequently by the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Had our hope been realised our policy would be coherent 
and our prospects fair. But the Chiefs of Staff now tell 
us that our original expectation is vain and that in 
fact we cannot build up the necessary strength to assure 
the defence of the West without the participation of 
Germany. If we accept this military advice, the 
conclusion is clear: unless we can find ways and means 
of securing the participation of Germany in Western 
defence, the conditions of success which we ourselves
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have laid down will not exist and our whole policy must 
fail."
Kirkpatrick argued for a gradual approach to German partici­
pation in Western defence. As the first step he insisted on 
the establishment of an "effective gendarmerie" and the 
improvement of the German auxiliary forces. The essential 
precondition for the next step, actual German rearmament, 
was the strengthening of Western forces in Europe.
"We should face the fact that the establishment of 
proper German auxiliary forces will have to be followed 
at a later stage by a degree of German rearmament. From 
the purely German point of view this can only be contem­
plated when the Western Powers have built up very much 
stronger forces than they possess today. If we are not 
to alarm German opinion as well as French and Russian 
opinion our policy should be to rearm Germany as unob­
trusively as possible and gradually to integrate the 
German armed forces into the Western European forces of 
which they will form a part."
According to Kirkpatrick, it was important to keep in mind 
that the Germans were in general not in favour of rearma­
ment. Thus it was essential to support the present German 
government, as it was most inclined to support the West and 
to make some contribution to its defence.
"That is to say we must sustain the prestige of the 
Federal Government; and this in turn means a revised 
Occupation Statute under which or day-to-day inter­
ference is much reduced; in which the German are 
allowed, subject to the retention of certain reserved 
powers, to conduct their own foreign affairs. We must as 
Germany become progressively tied to the West, progres­
sively lift the existing restrictions on German 
industry."(40)
In other words: the defence of Western Europe had to be 
strengthened. As a first step the forces of the Western 
Allies in Europe had to be enlarged and equiped. If as a 
second step a German participation in Western defence was
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contemplated, then the Allies would have to agree to a 
substantial reduction of their occupation powers in Germany 
to bring about such a participation. Kirkpatrick was not yet 
thinking of an abolition of the Occupation Statute, but he 
was beginning to see the end of the occupation regime in its 
present form. It would depend on his negotiating powers in 
the future to limit the reduction of the Allies' rights to 
the absolute minimum deemed essential by the British.
On 21 August 1950 a group of nine top level Foreign 
Office men, the British Ambassadors to France, the Nether­
lands, Belgium and Italy and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick congre­
gated around Bevin to discuss how to prevent another world 
war and to assess the morale and strength of the ofther 
European countries. At the beginning of the discussion the 
Secretary of State outlined the most important aim of his 
policy: the continued involvement of the United States of 
America in Europe. "We wanted the U.S., whose position as a 
powerful intimidatory force had been weakened by events in 
Korea, to play a really active part. But, in order to con­
vince the United States of the desirability of applying her 
resources to Europe, it was necessary to get Europe on the 
move and to induce the various Western countries to take 
action." During the debate Kirkpatrick launched several 
attacks on the French: "the attitude of the French in Germa­
ny was equally frivolous. They kept talking about showing 
strength in the face of the Russians and yet refused to take 
such small useful actions as might contribute to an improve­
ment of strength. For example, they had sabotaged the idea
of a federal police ... the object of the Schuman Plan was 
rather to keep the German Government out of European af­
fairs, and to see that Germany never raised her head again 
or had an effective Government."
When the meeting turned to the question of Germany, 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that "the actual re-armament of 
Germany was not really a practical possibility ... our 
object must be to take those steps which would stop the 
outbreak of civil war in Germany by providing a counterpart 
to the People's Police capable of dealing with it. ... In 
any case, though the Germans were not reformed characters, 
present conditions of warfare and the cost of modern weapons 
put full scale aggression beyond the reach of a country with 
the economy and population of Western Germany, the real 
danger was that German potential might pass into the Russian 
hands, or form a bait for the Russians, rather than any 
danger of German domination by itself. The Secretary of 
State, while emphasising his misgivings as to the possibili­
ty of a resurgence of German aggression, agreed that some­
thing must now be done for the security of Western Germany.
... The Secretary of State would not propose himself to 
raise the major question of re-armament of Germany, but 
would be ready to discuss it if Mr. Acheson or M. Schuman 
wished to do so."(41)
It was decided that Kirkpatrick should write a paper 
for Cabinet with a view to discussing, on a tripartite 
basis in New York, the question of a federal police. This
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paper corresponded closely with the letter which Kirkpatrick
had written earlier. In it he made eight recommendations:
"1. It should be recognised that it is not practicable 
at the moment to rearm Germany on the scale 
recommended by the Chiefs of Staff.
2. Nevertheless, the United States and French 
Governments should be brought to agree that the 
Federal Chancellor should be told in reply to his 
request that in view of the threat of an invasion by 
the Eastern German Army he may as a first step raise a 
federal force of 100,000 volunteers trained and 
equipped on the model of the Bereitschaften, the arms 
to be supplied by the Western Allies.
3. A similar force of 3,000 men should be raised in 
Berlin.
4. The proposal to create a gendarmerie on a Land 
basis should be abandoned.
5. The auxiliary forces serving with the British and 
U.S. armies should be improved and reorganised in 
units.
6. The German Frontier customs Police Force should be 
improved and slightly expanded.
7. Germany should make an industrial contribution to 
Western strength.
8. The High Commissioners should be empowered to 
discuss the implementation of these steps with the 
Chancellor and with German representatives nominated 
by him.■(42)
On 1 September the Defence Committee of the Cabinet had 
approved the proposals regarding German association with the 
defence of the West which were made in the paper that was 
drafted after the meeting held in London on 21 August. 
Kirkpatrick was told very pointedly, however, that the Ger­
man Chancellor should only be told that the question would 
be discussed by the Foreign Ministers in New York. The 
British Ambassadors in Paris and Washington were instructed 
to sound out the feeling in these two capitals.
The French attitude towards the idea of a German Fede­
ral Police Force was expressed by the French Ambassador to 
London when he called to see Bevin on 5 September: MM.
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Massigli said that the French Government had certainly come 
along in their thinking about the German gendarmerie and 
were prepared to countenance larger numbers than they had 
envisaged previously. They doubted, however, whether the 
gendarmerie should be placed under Federal authority so long 
as (a) this was not agreeable to the Laender; (b) it would 
require constitutional amendment; (c) there was division on 
the subject within the Federal Government."(43) This state­
ment shows quite clearly how much the French were able to 
shape the High Commissioners' joint recommendation to their 
Foreign Ministers on the issue of the gendarmerie.
Kirkpatrick did not succeed in persuading his colleag­
ues to adopt his proposals of a strong and effective federal 
force because he could not rally American support against 
French opposition; the British Embassy in Washington infor­
med the Foreign Office on 9 September that "the Bureau of 
German Affairs are flatly opposed to the creation of a 
centralised German police force which they fear would be 
used by Adenauer for quelling social unrest, e.g. on the 
part of refugees, not necessarily connected with Communist 
tactics. Therefore if further police forces are required 
they should be on a decentralised basis. However, the Bureau 
of German Affairs do not regard an increased police force as 
an adequate protection from possible trouble with the Be- 
reitschaften. To meet this they favour the creation of 
German Armed forces in the proper sense as part of a Eu­
ropean Army."(44)
On 4 September the Americans had introduced a totally
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new proposal of an integrated defence force in Western 
Europe in which not only American divisions but also German 
contingents could participate under an American Supreme 
Commander. During the meeting in the Foreign Office in 
August Bevin had stressed the importance of persuading the 
United States to continue to apply their resources to Eu­
rope. Now the Americans seemed willing to do just that. The 
American proposals would meet Britain's military require­
ments and had the added political advantage of tying the 
United States to Europe. The only disadvantage of the Ameri­
can proposal in the eyes of the British was the inclusion of 
a German contingent in the integrated force. The gradual 
progress towards a German contribution towards Western de­
fence, which was prefered by the British, now seemed under 
pressure to advance faster than the British wanted.
The discussions in New York started on 12 September. 
The Americans made a very strong case for a German contrib­
ution towards Western defence; if Germany was left as a 
vacuum the Soviet Union would take it over and thereby gain 
resources which would enable it to carry on the fight 
against the rest of Europe and probably win. On 14 September 
Bevin urged his cabinet colleagues in a telegram to give him 
permission to agree to the American proposals: “Our country 
is a leading power and I cannot take part in the discussions 
without giving some opinion. We must either reject the 
U.S.A. thesis or accept it and cooperate with them. Other­
wise Great Briain will look weak and indecisive. ... I would
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propose giving general support to the U.S.A. proposal."(45)
The answer from London was affirmative: the cabinet "were in
general agreement to an acceptance in principle of German
participation in Western defence. ... the subject should not
be presented in such a way as to suggest that the Atlantic
countries were wooing the Germans."(46) The next day Bevin
cabled to London:
"I arranged to see Mr. Acheson before the afternoon ses­
sion of the Atlantic Council today in order to inform 
him of the attitude of His Majesty's Government on 
German participation in Western Defence. I explained why 
there was a good deal of hesitation in the United King­
dom on the subject. I said we were most anxious to avoid 
a position in which we seemed to be appealing to the 
Germans. I then referred to the great importance which 
His Majesty's Government attached to a solution of th 
problem of a German police force. Our decided reference 
was a Federal police force, but the main thing was to 
ensure that the Federal Government were in a position to 
maintain law and order."(47)
Acheson made it quite clear to Bevin that the American
proposals were a package deal; he would not be able to
convince the American defence authorities to commit more
divisions and a supreme commander to Europe, if they were
not reasonable prospects of success in a possible conflict,
and that this could only be the case if Germany contributed
to Western defence. All he wanted, Acheson assured Bevin,
was a decision in principle on the ultimate incorporation of
German units.
Bevin subsequently saw M. Schuman: "As far as he was 
concerned however he had no authority to commit his Gover­
nment to an immediate decision. He had not yet had a reply 
from Paris, but he rather feared that when it came it would 
be unfavourable. He would not have found it so difficult to
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agree to a decision in principle being taken now if it could 
have been kept secret. He feared however that this would not 
be possible." The French were not going to agree to the 
rearmament of Germany until the other European powers had 
been substantially strengthened, as they feared renewed 
German militarism more than possible Soviet agression, which 
could even be provoked by German rearmament.
The French also argued that the Germans themselves 
would not welcome rearmament, a point which was supported by 
the three High Commissioners: "Public opinion in Germany is 
in general at present opposed to the remilitarisation of 
that country. This is particularly true of the recreation of 
a German National Army." The High Commissioners, however, 
argued in their report, which they presented to the Foreign 
Ministers on 13 September, that the Germans were prepared to 
contemplate the recreation of a German military force, if 
this was to form part of a European defence force, especial­
ly as it was assumed that this involved a progressive and 
substantial return to equality of right and German 
sovereignty.
The British delegation was unable to convince their 
American and French counterparts with regard to the question 
of a Federal Police Force. It had been the British who had 
championed this German proposal from the start in the face 
of American hesitation and French opposition. Now, however, 
with the American 'package deal' for European defence on the 
table, the British proposal was simply off the agenda. The
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solution to the short term problems of German morale and 
internal German security was overruled by the long term 
perspective of keeping the Americans and their resources 
tied to Europe. The microcosm had to submit to the macro­
cosm: British policy on Germany had to submit to British 
global policy. In New York the following compromise was 
achieved:
"Nevertheless the Foreign Ministers are impressed by 
the case which the Federal Chancellor has developed, 
and are anxious to meet him so far as possible. They 
are accordingly prepared to agree to the formation of 
a security police force on a land basis, with a total 
initial strength of 30,000 subject to review. This 
force would have no normal powers of arrest, and would 
not perform routine police duties, but would be 
trained and used solely for the preservation of public 
order. Its units would be housed in barracks and 
equipped with light arms only."(48)
Kirkpatrick was obviously disappointed that his propo­
sals for a strong federal police force had been rejected. 
With hindsight and sparcely hidden glee he wrote in his 
autobiography: "I may say in passing that events proved us 
right and the Americans wrong. The American purpose was to 
bring about a degree of German rearmament as quickly and 
effectively as possible. They would have achieved their aim 
more quickly if they had simply acceded to Dr. Adenauer's 
request. Instead at least seven years were wasted in pres­
sing on the Germans a proposal they disliked and the accep­
tance of which was made conditional on substantial conces­
sions by the Allies."(49)
The British accepted in principle the American proposal 
for a German contribution to Western defence, because it 
corresponded closely with their long-term objective of inte­
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grating the Federal Republic into NATO. It was also the only 
way of getting US troops committed to the defence of Europe 
and a US Commander-in-Chief for NATO. In the end, however, 
the Americans accepted a temporary rebuff at the hands of 
the French; there was to be no agreement regarding, or 
public reference to, the inclusion of a German contingent in 
the integrated force, and planning for the integrated force 
would proceed forthwith, despite previous American hints 
that progress on this subject was linked in their minds with 
the creation of a German contingent. "The main failures of 
the New York conferences undoubtedly related to defence. As 
far as the British delegation was concerned, the main 
casualty of tripartite clashes on defence had been Anglo- 
American hopes of accelerating the integration of the F.R.G. 
into the west. British officials regretted that clumsy Ame­
rican tactics on the defence issue had led to unsatisfactory 
compromises on Occupation questions and placed Anglo-French 
relations under strain."(50)
Kirkpatrick returned to Germany with the task of soun­
ding out the Federal Government's stand on a German contri­
bution to Western defence. Bevin had suggested this proce­
dure: "I thought that we should reply to Dr. Adenauer that 
we were prepared in principle to consider German participa­
tion in European defence and invite him to discuss the 
question further with the High Commissioners. ... I felt 
that the High Commissioners were best placed to handle this 
problem and to judge what were the possibilities of German
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collaboration. Only in this way could we obtain a clear 
picture of the German p o s i t i o n (51)
On 27 September, Kirkpatrick wrote in his weekly perso­
nal telegram to the Secretary of State: "My colleagues and I 
met the Chancellor on 23rd September to convey to him the 
results of the New York conference. The Chancellor seemed 
very pleased with the published statement and said that I 
could rely on him and the Federal Government to make a 
success of the new phase of our relations with Germany now 
opening. I think that he is determined to make the best of 
the new situation and that Schumacher is of the same opinion 
on this question. ... I regard this positive attitute as 
encouraging."(52)
Kirkpatrick realised that the problems of internal 
security and external security had to be handled seperately 
in order to make any progress. With regard to internal 
security the existing Land police forces could not be relied 
on to preserve order in cases of emergency. Consequently a 
specially trained armed mobile police force on a Land basis 
was required. Kirkpatrick, however, stressed that "the
S.P.D. can and will prevent the police being raised on a 
basis which make it a camouflaged army, and if we were able 
to circumvent the S.P.D., who would maintain order after we 
had converted the police into military units? The idea of 
allowing Germany to have a private army which is not integ­
rated is dangerous and I have assured the S.P.D. leaders 
that His Majesty's Government will not be party to it." (53) 
The question of external security was much more compli­
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cated and far reaching: it was the question of the possible 
participation of a German contingent in an integrated defen­
ce force. "British preparations for the next meetings in 
Washington concentrated on how to bring the French round. On 
the military side safeguards for keeping German rearmament 
under control were worked out by the chiefs of Staff in 
conjunction with the Foreign Office. The main difficulty was 
how to draw up safeguards which would be militarily effec­
tive abnd yet politically acceptable to the Federal gover­
nment. Sir I. Kirkpatrick, the U.K. High Commissioner in 
Germany, was influential in striking a fair balance."(54) 
This meant that Kirkpatrick was involved on three levels: he 
was involved in the preliminary discussions with the German 
government and opposition; the second level were discussions 
with his High Commission counterparts; and on the third 
level he influenced the policy making process of his own 
government.
On the first level Kirkpatrick reported a conversa­
tion with Adenauer in a top secret telegram to the Foreign 
Office on 26 September: "The Chancellor then asked me when I 
thought the High Commission would receive instructions to 
get to grips with him on the subject. I told him th as he 
would see from M. Francois-Poncet's statement we already had 
instructions to discuss the matter of the German contri­
bution in a general way, but I did not know when we should 
be authorised to go further than this. I would, however, 
like to put a personal non-committal question to him. What
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would be his answer if we invited him to raise a German 
contingent for an integrated army. He replied that, provided 
this German contingent was admitted on exactly the same 
footing as any other contingent, he would personally agree 
without any further condition. Under cross-examination he 
said that Germany would not require a strategic air force 
but that she would ask that the German contingent would have 
the same weapons, the same staff arrangements and the same 
air support as any other contingent."(55)
Nine days later he told the Foreign Office that "at the 
moment we cannot profitably carry these exploratory dis­
cussions any further. The United States High Commissioner 
and I are, however, doing what we can in conversation with 
the S.P.D. and others to prepare the ground for German 
participation if this is eventually decided. All this sounds 
regrettably slow. But you must bear in mind that the Germans 
are hopelessly divided and we must help them to sort them­
selves out. Schumacher, Kopf and other S.P.D. politicians 
have emphasised the delicacy of the situation and begged me 
not to attempt to bulldoze through the mess."(56)
On the second level, the discussions with his High 
Commission colleagues, Kirkpatrick rejected the idea to 
restrict German contribution to the size of battalions inte­
grated into Allied brigades, an idea the French were toying 
with. He agreed, however, with both his High Commissioner 
colleagues that "it would be best if matters could be so 
arranged that the Germans appeared to be neither begged, 
coerced nor bought"(57) in the matter of contribution to the
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defence of Western Europe.
On the third level Kirkpatrick was called upon to 
comment on policy papers produced by the Foreign Office. 
Gainer praised the High Commissioner's contributions and 
told him "that it was most important and valuable for us to 
have the answers over your signature and with your authori­
ty." (58) Knowing the importance of terminology in diplomacy, 
Kirkpatrick in all his correspondence with the Foreign Of­
fice talked about "conditions of participation" rather than 
"safeguards".
"The problem is to devise conditions of German partici­
pation which will alleviate French fears but will not 
prove unacceptable to Germany. I agree that any 
restrictions should so far as possible be tacit and not 
published. That is why I suggested in my telegram No. 
1492 a public announcement of the principle and a con­
fidential directive to the High Commissioners. You will 
remember that this procedure worked well before the 
Petersberg Agreement."
In Kirkpatrick's opinion the only effective solution was a 
German military contingent in an integrated force. He knew 
that the French were not ready to accept a German national 
army. He also knew, however, that the Germans would not 
accept being treated differently to any other participant of 
an integrated force. He therefore suggested that "the German 
contingent like every other contingent would be integrated 
into an Atlantic Force and would come under the operational 
control of the Supreme Commander and his staff. Germany 
would be suitably represented on the staff of Supreme Head­
quarters." Kirkpatrick was willing to go to some length to 
meet the French: "The highest German formation would be the
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division. The number of German divisions will not exceed one 
fifth (or one quarter) of the total number in the Atlantic 
Force. The German contingent will have armour and a tactical 
air force in proportion to its strength. But tanks and 
aircraft will not be delivered except in small quantities 
for training until the Allied forces are equipped." However, 
Germany would have to accept restrictions on its production 
and posession of certain military equipment. Kirkpatrick, at 
this point, still insisted that "the occupation regime will 
have to continue so long as the present international ten­
sion requires it" (59).
Kirkpatrick substantially influenced British policy­
making at the time: "With regard to Sir I. Kirkpatrick's
twelve points on conditions for German participation, Sir P. 
Dixon informed Mr. Bevin on 16 October that 'the first view 
of the Foreign Office is that they offer a better chance of 
being accepted by both the French and the Germans than 
either of the other two sets of proposals. On the other hand 
they clearly need looking into in detail'. It was agreed 
that the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office should concert 
to work out a further set of conditions of participation on 
the basis of Sir I. Kirkpatrick's twelve points. Action was 
then set in train for the revision of D.O. (50) 85 which 
included the recall of Sir I. Kirkpatrick and Sir 0. Harvey 
to London for discussion on 20 October."(60) Extracts from 
the Brief by the Chiefs of Staff show how much Kirkpatrick 
was able to influence the policy making: "It is essential to
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obtain German co-operation and this must be based on an 
identity of interest. Thus we can obtain the maximum safe­
guards for our own security against her future military 
resurgence. Whilst these are described as 'Safeguards' to 
satisfy French fears, some term such as 'conditions of 
participation' would be more appropriate in negotiations 
with the Germans " (61).
As before in the case of the proposals for a Federal 
Police Force, British policy making was overtaken by propo­
sals launched by their allies. The brief by the Chiefs of 
Staff quoted above is dated 20 October. Four days later the 
former Defence Minister Rerte Pleven gave his first gover­
nmental statement as the new Prime Minister. In it he pro­
posed a European Army, not a coalition of national armies, 
but an amalgamation of men and equipment under a European 
political and military High Authority and a European Defence 
Minister. With this plan the French accepted the principle 
of German rearmament, as German units were supposed to form 
part of this European Arnry.
The British official reception of the Pleven Plan was 
mixed. The main fears were that German rearmament, which 
militarily was deemed urgent, would be delayed by complica­
tions involved in the implementation of the plan. In the 
eyes of the British it also diverted attention from the idea 
of an Atlantic unified force and thereby the involvement of 
the Americans, which was the ultimate British policy aim. 
British participation in a federated European force was out 
of the question. Politically, the British had already demon­
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strated their reluctance to become involved in the European 
movement when the Schuman Plan had been proposed, because 
they did not regard themselves as a solely European power. 
Militarily, the plan was rejected as unsound. Even the 
French Chiefs of Staff might have even concurred with this 
judgement, but the plan was never submitted to them by the 
French Government.
The German Chancellor's first reaction to the Pleven 
Plan was also guarded; in a press conference on 28 October 
he said that "the plan in its present form was not clear in 
certain respects, and in particular he regretted that accep­
tance of the Schuman Plan had been made a condition of 
German participation in European defence. Thereby France 
conveyed the impression of exercising pressure"(62) . He 
stressed again that Germany could only make a contribution 
to Western defence if German contingents had complete equa­
lity of status; German soldiers were not going to become 
mercenaries.
In his comments on the Chancellor's press-conference, 
Kirkpatrick pointed out that "generally speaking, German 
opinion is slowly hardening against participation and the 
factor most likely to swing it in the reverse direction 
would be evidence that the Western Powers have passed from 
the stage of planning to action"; the Foreign Office in 
London was more and more convinced that this meant "a higher 
price for us to lay out when we eventually come to ask for 
their participation"(63).
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Although Adenauer's first reaction had been guarded, 
he publicly welcomed the Pleven Plan during the foreign 
affairs debate in the Bundestag on 8 November; in his view 
it not only guaranteed the security of the Federal Republic, 
but also paved the way for reunification. In his comments on 
the debate, Kirkpatrick pointed out, that
"Adenauer deserves credit for courage in making his 
positive declaration, on behalf of the Federal Gover­
nment, of its readiness to make an appropriate contri­
bution to the construction of a defensive front. ... I 
think he deserves equal credit, though his action may 
prove embarrassing later and not only to him, for his 
acceptance of the Pleven plan as a basis of d i s ­
cussion, although by claiming equal rights he really 
rejected it. He is about the only German who has 
accepted it; and he probably did so because of the 
need for good relations with France. Perhaps he cal­
culates that the best way to kill the plan is by 
kindness to France; but we should not overlook the 
fact that its European federal character gives it 
attraction in Germany which it lacks for us"(64).
At a meeting between the High Commissioners and the 
Chancellor on 16 November, the latter announced the resigna­
tion of Count Schwerin, which he hoped would serve as a 
reassurance that there would not be a return of a powerful 
arcane Prussian officer class: "Wenn wir zur Aufstellung 
deutscher Brigaden kommen, dann wollen wir alles dafuer tun, 
dass diese deutschen Brigaden nicht ein Staat im Staate 
werden, nicht eine Klasse fuer sich bilden, sondern sich als 
Teil des gesamten deutschen Volkes fuehlen und dass sie sich 
der zivilen Macht unterworfen fuehlen. Urn das alien deut­
schen Generalen von vornherein klarzumachen, habe ich dem 
General von Schwerin nahelegen lassen, sofort urn seine Ent- 
lassung nachzusuchen, weil ich ihn sonst sofort entlassen 
haben wuerde. Der Graf von Schwerin hatte naemlich angefan-
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gen zu politisieren"(65).
In a long letter to Gainer Kirkpatrick defended the 
General: Schwerin had been in a very difficult position 
because "his task was to make preparations for doing a job 
which the Federal Government had not yet agreed or indeed 
even been requested or authorised to do: namely, the crea­
tion of a German contingent for European defence"; the 
Chancellor, according to Kirkpatrick, had used Schwerin as a 
scape-goat, when his dealings had been exposed. "Schwerin's 
departure is something of a loss so far as we are concerned. 
As Steel explained in his letter of 13th September, his 
appointment was almost certainly made as a result of a 
suggestion put to the Chancellor by General Robertson. 
Schwerin was well disposed to us, and we had very little 
difficulty in keeping in touch with him and finding out a 
great deal of what he was doing. This may not be so easy 
with his eventual successor"(66). The creation of the Ab- 
teilung Blank, named after its newly appointed head, Theodor 
Blank, was in Kirkpatrick eyes merely a front for a kind of 
embryo Ministry of Defence: "I understand that he (Chancel­
lor) means before long to recreate under Blank a planning 
section which will carry on the work Schwerin has been 
doing."
Adenauer presented the High Commissioners with a whole 
catalogue of conditions for a German contribution to Western 
defence during their meeting on 16 November. The conditions 
ranged from a renewed wish to replace the Occupation Statute
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with a contractual agreement, a total stop to all disman­
tling, a review of the agreement on the limitation of in­
dustry, of the decartelisation programme and the restitution 
question, an eleviation of the restrictions on scientific 
research, to certain wishes in the legal area, for example 
on extradition. In his comments on this catalogue of wishes 
Kirkpatrick wrote: “The Chancellor's statement and request 
are capable of being interpreted as precisely what he says 
he means to avoid, i.e. the making of conditions for a 
contribution to defence and the bringing to bear of pressure 
on the occupying powers. I think it is unfortunate that he 
should have presented us with this large new catalogue of 
requests before we have even implemented the New York deci­
sions. Nevertheless I believe that he meant what he said 
when he declared that even if all his requests are rejected 
he will continue to urge German participation in Western 
defence. In fact I gathered in conversation with him after 
the meeting that he does not really expect full satisfac­
tion, but intended to make a list of all the items on which 
concession would be helpful to him in the coming 
struggle"(67).
The Foreign Office's reaction was expressed by Sir 
Donald St.Clair Gainer in a memo: "we may be forced to
concede the maximum of political equality in order to bring 
about even the minimum of military equality", implying that 
issue of sovereignty for the Federal Republic might have to 
be faced soon.(68) Mr. Mallet's memorandum of 16 November 
made this point even more graphic: "If rearmament will
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involve military equality, military equality will involve 
political equality. ... If we need Germany's help and want 
Germany to form part of our Western bloc, we must make her a 
full member of the club and reconcile ourselves to seeing 
her smoking a large cigar in a big chair in front of the 
fire in the smoking room. Otherwise, Germany will not pay 
the subscription we are asking; she may even join another 
club where she will be better treated. ... This means that 
we must recognise that the occupation regime will have to 
come to an end much sooner than we anticipated and that 
Germany will recover complete sovereignty subject only to 
such military arrangements as may be made within the Atlan­
tic Pact for stationing Allied troops on German soil. We 
must expect shortly to see Adenauer sitting at the conferen­
ce table with the Americans, the French and ourselves.”(69) 
At the beginning of December the German Chancellor 
became increasingly restless. During a meeting with the High 
Commissioners, he bitterly complained about being kept out 
of the discussions about a German contribution to Western 
defence: "Seit mehr als drei Monaten geht zwischen den
Westalliierten und den Atlantikpaktstaaten die Verhandlung 
darueber, ob Deutschland einen Beitrag zu leisten aufgefor- 
dert wird oder nicht, hin und her. Die Bundesregierung 
bekommt keine irgendwie offizielle Mitteilung darueber, 
sondern die Bundesregierung is lediglich darauf angewiesen, 
was in den Zeitungen veroeffentlicht wird. Das ist fuer die 
Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein voellig unmoeg-
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licher Zustand." Adenauer, a rhetorical and political mas­
ter, had painted a gloomy picture of German morale: the fear 
of the Soviet Union was aggravated by Communist successes in 
Asia and Western hesitation and inaction in Europe; the 
Germans, according to Adenauer, would be easy pray for the 
Social Democrates' propaganda, that peace could only be 
preserved by doing nothing, and would turn towards the 
Soviet Union, if the Western Allies would not take decisive 
action soon. The Chancellor's long speech served him to 
press his demand: "Meine sehr herzliche Bitte an Sie, meine 
Herren, geht deswegen dahin, legen Sie bitte Ihren Regie- 
rungen nahe, dass sie eine Erklaerung dahingehend abgeben, 
das Besatzungsstatut durch beiderseitige Sicherungsvertraege 
zu ersetzen"(70).
From now on Adenauer insisted on ultimate political 
equality and relations between the Western Allies and the 
Federal Republic on the basis of contractual agreements. He 
was under mounting pressure especially as the leader of the 
East German government, Grotewohl, had launched a new reuni­
fication initiative and Adenauer found it increasingly dif­
ficult to simply denounce it as propaganda. Public opinion 
was urging him to at least explore the offer to meet for 
discussion on reunification and Adenauer, in turn, was cle­
ver enough to use this public mood to his advantage in his 
negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners.
The British and especially Bevin increasingly disap­
proved of the Pleven Plan, "which he come to regard as 'a 
sort of cancer in the Atlantic body' and 'we must nip it in
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the bud'. British objections to the Pleven plan revealed the 
fundamentally Atlanticist outlook of Mr. Bevin and his advi­
sors. "(71) Looking for alternatives they adopted the Ameri­
can compromise solution, the Spofford Plan, "whereby the the 
U.S. plan for a unified force, now with a reduced level of 
German units, and the Pleven plan for a European Army should 
proceed in parallel."(72) At a meeting with the Secretary of 
State on 11 December in London, Kirkpatrick explained the 
German attitude towards rearmament. He was asked to write a 
memorandum for cabinet discussions on German opinion on 
German participation in Western defence:
"The idea of German participation in Western European 
defence is repugnant to large sections of public opinion.
... Dr. Schumacher and the Sozia1istische Partei 
Deutschlands (S.P.D.) have taken advantage of the present 
state of public opinion to wage a violent and successful 
campaign against German participation. ... The Chancellor 
himself is in advance of his own party but he realises 
that his political position is at stake and has autho­
rised the issue of an official statement to the effect 
that Germany can only participate if she is given a 
position of equality not only in a possible eventual 
European Army but also in any interim period. He has also 
said that it will be extremely difficult to secure par­
liamentary approval for a German contribution unless the 
Western Allies agree in principle to replace the Occupa­
tion Statute and the Occupation Regime by a Security 
Treaty and the grant of sovereignty to the Federal Rep­
ublic .
In the circumstances described above it is certain that 
the Chancellor, the coalition parties, the German 
Parliament and public opinion will be united in declaring 
the Spofford Plan to be unacceptable."(73)
Kirkpatrick's assessment of German opinion on a defence 
contribution supported Bevin's view that one should proceed 
more cautiously. Time was needed to bring the German public 
around to accept the idea of German rearmament. Time was 
also needed in another respect: the British had accepted the
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principle of German rearmament because the Americans had 
tied this to their promise of an increased military and 
economic commitment to Europe. Since this promise had been 
given at the New York Conference much time had been lost by 
persuing French plans for a European Army. Meanwhile the 
Americans had been weakened by reverses in Korea. There was 
therefore greater anxiety about running the risk of German 
rearmament. In addition, Allied resolve to rearm had been 
weakened by the relaxation of Western Europe's fear of the 
Soviet Union: the Soviet proposal for another meeting of
the Council of Foreign Ministers was interpreted as willing­
ness to achieve some degree of rapprochement.
At a meeting on 14 December the cabinet endorsed 
Bevin's plan for the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlan­
tic Council: he would reaffirm the British acceptance of the 
principle of German rearmament, but would suggest that this 
principle should be implemented in stages . The first stage 
would be to inform the German Government that the plan had 
been adopted but not to ask them to either accept or reject 
it. Secondly the United States should be urged to proceed at 
once with the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the 
creation of an integrated force for the defence of Western 
Europe. In the event that a meeting of the Council of Fo­
reign Ministers was arranged, the Western Powers would then 
be able to discuss the remilitarisation of Germany without 
having taken any irrevocable step towards the rearming of 
Western Germany. "This course would have the additional
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advantage that it would not be necessary to solicit German 
help in the defence of western Europe. It would create a 
place for Germany in the scheme of European defence; an 
informal effort could then be make to ensure that, when the 
time was ripe, the Germans would themselves offer to take 
their place in the scheme."(74)
With hindsight one can say that this last statement 
turned out to be wishful thinking: once again developments 
changed the scene so quickly that the next year would see 
the Western Allies bargain away most of their reserved 
powers in Germany in exchange for her contribution to Wes­
tern defence. At the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in December 1950 the British got what they wanted: 
the Council approved German participation in Western defen­
ce, but the timing and manner of an approach to the German 
Federal Government was left to the discretion of the Western 
occupying powers. The Council also approved proposals for 
the immediate establishment of an integrated force, where­
upon Mr. Acheson announced the appointment of General Eisen­
hower as Supreme Commander and the imminent increase of 
United States forces in Europe. This meant that the British 
had achieved the main aim of their European policy: to tie 
the United States and their resources to Europe, at least 
for the time being.
On the other hand the British were unable to prevent 
the French from proceeding with the Pleven Plan. It was 
decided that the French government would convene a con­
ference in Paris to begin negotiations on the establishment
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of a European Defence Community. Kirkpatrick described the 
results of the Brussels Conference in his autobiography as 
follows: "We registered a very meagre degree of progress in 
the sense that the French agreed to German rearmament pro­
vided German units were kept so small as to have no military 
value," in his opinion a "rather ludicrous conclusion"(75).
In tripartite talks on 19 December it was agreed that 
the A.H.C. should inform Dr. Adenauer of NATO Council deci­
sions on defence "with an indication that they were ready to 
discuss the matter with him further but without handing him 
any document and without conveying the impression that he 
was expected to take hasty decisions 7 (76) . Upon their 
return from Brussels, the three High Commissioners met 
Adenauer on 21 December, to inform him about the conference 
decisions, the up-coming negotiations on the Pleven Plan and 
on changes in the occupation regime. Everything would be on 
the table except for the principle of occupation, which for 
the moment was not negotiable.
The Chancellor was pleased about the fact that the 
future of Germany was to be determined by negotiations 
between the High Commissioners and himself, and not by a 
diktat; he also welcomed the appointment of General Eisen­
hower as Supreme Commander. He expressed his hopes that the 
implementation of the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan would 
form the basis of European unity and a European federation, 
and that eventually Britain would also take a more positive 
position towards it, which would be in accordance with
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common British and European interests. Then, however, 
Adenauer launched into a confrontation, first with Francois- 
Poncet and then with McCloy, on the Allied insistence that 
the principle of occupation had to be maintained. Adenauer 
had hoped that the stationing of Allied troops in Germany 
would be based on contractual agreements and not on rights 
resulting out of the unconditional surrender of Germany. 
Kirkpatrick intervened when the confrontation became too 
acute: he mediated between Adenauer and McCloy, turning 
from one to the other clarifying their points of argument; 
in the end he produced the compromise: they would start 
negotiations on the easier problems and work their way 
towards the most difficult, the principle of occupation; 
eventually even that could be based on contracts(77). He was 
obviously in his element as a negotiator and mediator. 
Kirkpatrick gave an interesting account of the meeting to 
the Foreign Office:
"The Germans are in a nervous, suspicious and almost 
hysterical temper. They expect us to woo them and behave 
like a woman scorned if we do not approach them as 
suitors. In these circumstances when the German experts 
get to grips with our military proposals we may expect 
them to drive a hard bargain on every detail. The 
Chancellor has not yet apprehended that under our 
proposals Germany will have no representation on the 
Council of Ministers. This is likely to be a sticking 
point. On the political side the Germans will continue to 
press for the abandonment of the basis of the occupation 
as a primary condition of participation. With the passage 
of time their insistence will become greater and they 
will be less willing to accept a provisional half way 
house. ... When, if ever, we succeed in squaring the 
Chancellor and his minions, it will be necessary to 
square the Bundestag. It is too early to make any 
prediction on our prospects but we may assume that the 
opposition will fume and rage whilst the Chancellor's 
parties, if they endorse his policy will do so without 
enthusiasm. In short we have a long row to hoe."(78)
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These words proved to be prophetic, if one considers 
the long and protracted negotiations, which lead up to the 
General Treaty, signed in May 1952, and the long process of 
ratification; both will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Considering the year 1950, Kirkpatrick's role in the develo­
pment of the Western defence strategy for Europe and the 
decision in favour of a German participation in this defence 
was considerable. Among his High Commission colleagues he 
seems to have been most in tune with German wishes on the 
matter: for example his championing of the cause of a fede­
ral police force and later his recognition of German re­
luctance to rearm. This is quite surprising for a man who 
was known to be anything but a friend of the Germans.
Kirkpatrick was also highly successful in influencing 
his own government. He was more than an ambassador consulted 
by the Foreign Office; he was his government's foremost 
expert on Germany and his recommendations were adopted as 
policy as far as they fitted in with Britain's global mili­
tary and political interests. Kirkpatrick greatest contrib­
ution was that of a skilful negotiator striking trying to 
find a fair balance between safeguards to reassure the 
French and conditions to persuade the Germans to participate 
in Western defence.
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REVISION OF THE OCCUPATION STATUTE
In his answer to Kirkpatrick's telegram, quoted at the 
end of the previous part of this chapter, Gainer expressed 
his concern the work towards a revision of the Occupation 
Statute and the Charter of the Allied High Commission might 
go by default because it had been overtaken by the Brussels 
decisions. He reminded the High Commissioner of Bevin's 
summing up speech on 19 December, in which he had said that 
account should be taken of the progress made in carrying out 
earlier decisions when approaching the question of any new 
arrangement for Germany; for instance, Bevin had said, our 
attitude towards Adenauer's proposal for a contractual rela­
tionship would inevitably be influenced by his action in 
implementing the New York decisions. Gainer hinted at the 
possibility of a concession: "I think that we should be 
prepared to tell the Chancellor that we are ready to accept 
a personal assurance from him and would not insist on appro­
val by the Bundestag of the debt agreements before putting 
the rest of the New York agreements into force."(79) At the 
New York Conference the Foreign Ministers had promised a 
substantial revision of the occupation regime, if, in 
return, the Federal Republic took on the obligations of the 
former Reich, including its debts.
The New York Conference had not been the first occasion
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when the revision of the Occupation Statute had been dis­
cussed. It was instead the culmination of a long preparatory 
process. Its timeframe had been laid down in paragraph 9 of 
the Occupation Statute itself, which called for its review 
between 12 and 18 months after its promulgation, i.e. bet­
ween September 1950 and March 1951; paragraph 9 also stated 
that the review should be undertaken "with a view to exten­
ding the jurisdiction of the German authorities in the 
legislative, executive and judicial fields."(80) 
Long before the New York Conference, in April 1950, 
discussions started between the Allies about the devolution 
of their powers to the Federal Government. McCloy, the 
American High Commissioner, on a visit to London, met 
Kirkpatrick, who was already designated to succeed General 
Robertson as British High Commissioner. Kirkpatrick informed 
the General afterwards that he had suggested to give the 
German Government control of foreign affairs: "McCloy rather 
boggled at this. He did not oppose it but said that he was 
against giving the Germans too much too quickly. On the 
other hand he said that he thought the safest field in which 
to give them increased powers was foreign affairs; and 
indeed he would be quite pleased to have more power to 
intervene in internal affairs, particularly against the 
recrudescence of nationalism. I told him that the Occupation 
Statute would not have to be revised until the end of the 
year and that we obviously could not make up our minds now 
exactly what should be done. But I still thought that pro-
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vided German behaviour justified it we should take a step 
forward in the direction of foreign a f f a i r s (81)
At the London Conference in May a revision of the 
Occupation Statute was deemed to be premature. It was de­
cided, however, that the progressive re-entry of Germany 
into the community of free people of Europe should be fos­
tered. Inofficially the Foreign Office asked the British 
High Commission in Germany to give their opinion on the 
Occupation Statute and areas of improvement. The Deputy High 
Commissioner's answers to these inquiries provide a unique 
insight into the British opinion on the working of the 
Occupation Statute after nine months. Mr. Steel had two main 
criticisms:
"(a) The definitions of reserved powers in Article 2 are 
so wide that any Ally who feels sufficiently deeply 
about almost anything can stretch the Statute to cover 
it. In fact we alone have not been guilty of this prac­
tice which is expressly contrary to the whole spirit of 
the Washington documents of April 1949. Both the French 
and the Americans have not hesitated to twist the reser­
ved powers and one of the most important tasks of the 
forthcoming conference will be to curb this habit. ...
(b) The High Commissioners have not worked the machinery 
of the Tripartite Controls Agreement properly. There has 
been infinite haggling and shilly-shallying and neither 
the French nor Americans have ever been anxious to take 
matters to a vote as prescribed in the Agreement. 
Basically trivial questions, such as the German exchange 
rate, the trade licensing laws, etc., have been suffici­
ent to provoke a threat of appeal to Governments and the 
time honoured expedient of avoiding a vote by putting a 
question to them. If the High Commission is to function 
effectively in the peculiar supervisory role alloted to 
it it must act with speed and decision. This it has not 
done. It has taken often weeks to settle matters within 
itself and has in consequence lost much face."(82)
With this letter Steel sent a detailed article by article
commentary on the Occupation Statute. This list accorded
closely with the Foreign Office own preliminary considera­
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tions and it was decided that it should serve as a brief for 
the United Kingdom delegation in the Study Group. This Study 
Group was to convene in London to compile recommendations 
for the Foreign Ministers on the subject of revision of the 
Occupation Statute. In an accompanying paper it was laid 
down that "the Occupation Powers should be ready to take a 
marked further step forward in the direction of the transfer 
of authority to the Germans, and the revised Occupation 
Statute should be as different as possible in form as well 
as in content from the present instrument." Nevertheless the 
Statute should remain a unilateral instrument, despite the 
intention to deal with as many of the reserved powers as 
possible on a contractual basis. The supreme authority had 
to be retained, but its purpose could maybe be redefined. 
The reserved powers should be limited to those essential for 
the maintenance of security and the furtherance of democra­
cy. The voting procedure in the Allied High Commission was 
to be adhered to as strictly as possible(83).
Steel, in a later letter, expressed his misgivings 
about the Foreign Office's mention of the term "furtherance 
of democracy": "While the Americans can be relied on to work 
for the use of some such language, and while of course, 
given the terms of the recent London Declaration, it will be 
extremely hard to avoid its use, we feel that it would be a 
mistake for us to put forward this sort of vague and indefi­
nable phrase which has led to so much controversy here, and 
could still do so in the future. Many of our disputes in the
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High Commission (e.g. over the Civil Service Law or Licen­
sing of Trades and Professions) derive from a difference of 
view as to what practices and traditions are essential to 
democracy, and therefore to be imposed on the Germans"(84). 
The Study Group began its work on 3 July, 1950.
On 2 9 June, the three High Commissioners met the German 
Chancellor to tell him that the Foreign Ministers had agreed 
in principle to a measure of consultation and to suggest 
that he should embody the German views in a memorandum for 
transmission to the London Working Party. Adenauer hesi­
tated, pointing out that this procedure had the disadvantage 
that the Germans might ask for too little or too much and 
thus involve themselves either with their own public opinion 
or the Western Powers'. The conversation took a bad turn and 
the French High Commissioner, Francois-Poncet, accused 
Adenauer wishing the High Commissioners dead. The Chancellor 
tried to disclaim any such intention and said that like 
caterpillars they might turn into butterflies.
Kirkpatrick, who during the discussion had supported 
Adenauer' wish for informal and non-committal contacts in­
stead of or at least before any German submission to the 
London Working Party, wrote to the Foreign Office: "I can 
see considerable advantage in our ascertaining the points on 
which they set the most value, which may well be matters of 
prestige rather than of substance, and in our being able to 
convey to him without the shock of any formal exchange of 
documents where insistence on the German side would be 
liable to encounter strong opposition and involve him in
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loss of face"(85). Kirkpatrick's recomendation was accepted: 
the Inter-Governmental Study Group at a Plenary Meeting on 5 
July agreed that the three High Commissioners should be 
instructed by their respective governments to establish an 
informal and non-committal contact with representatives of 
the Federal Government in order to permit it to voice its 
opinion informally on matters on the Agenda of the Inter- 
Governmental Study Group.
Together with the Occupation Statute, the Tripartite 
Controls Agreement and the Charter of the Allied High Commi­
ssion were supposed to be revised. Steel's comments on the 
latter are very revealing: "The most important object, in 
our opinion, in a revision of the Charter should be to 
provide a statutory limitation on the size and complexity of 
the High Commission machinery. The original Charter named in 
Section 111(4) the Committees and some of the Sub-Committees 
of the High Commission, and left it open to the Council to 
establish such additional Committees or groups as it might 
approve. I suggest that the opportunity might be taken of 
cutting down the present excessive number of Commit­
tees" (86). The original Charter had called for the establis­
hment of five committees and the Military Security Board; by 
the time Steel wrote his letter, July 1950, their numbers 
had grown to eight committees with thirty sub-committees and 
the Military Security Board, which also had 4 divisions. For 
every problem the High Commission had encountered a sub­
committee or working group had been established and over the
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year an administration had developed which rivaled the exe­
cutive organisation of Whitehall. The machinery of the Al­
lied High Commission, however, had grown in parallel with 
the new Federal German executive, and the more power was 
desolved to the Germans and their governmental organisation 
grew, the more the High Commission's size had to shrink. The 
British were especially conscious of the costs of maintai­
ning a large administration in Germany and had reduced the 
personnel of the British Element of the Control Commission 
from over 21,000 in July 1947 to about 5,500 in July 1950.
On 7 July Kirkpatrick, as Chairman of the Allied High 
Commission, received a letter from Sir Donald St.Clair 
Gainer, as Chairman of the Study Group, requesting the High 
Commission to furnish the Study Group with certain informa­
tion to assist it in formulating recommendations to the 
Foreign Ministers. In it, Gainer repeated the fundamentals 
of the revision of the Occupation Statute: "In accordance 
with the decisions of the Foreign Ministers no modification 
of the principle of supreme authority nor of the basis of 
the occupation regime can be contemplated. This regime re­
mains based upon the unconditional right of the Allies to 
retain occupation troops in Germany and to ensure their 
security, prestige and requirements. The Study Group is not 
contemplating any change in the provision of the Occupation 
Statute affecting the essential elements of security. The 
Study Group also recognises that the principle of Allied 
responsibility in regard to "fundamental democratic issues 
of real importance" and in regard to the "just liberties of
the individual" must be safeguarded"(87).
The information provided by the High Commissioners on 
the request of the London Study Group provides a unique 
insight into the supervisory functions of the Allied High 
Commission and the gradual devolution of these functions to 
German authorities. By 1950 the Allies still carried out 
supervisory functions in the area of German economic policy 
and legislation. One of the powers reserved to the Allies 
under the Occupation Statute was control over foreign trade 
and exchange. Since November 1949 the Federal Government had 
been empowered to conduct direct negotiations for trade 
agreements, subject to the presence of Allied observers and 
to approval of the agreements by the High Commission. 35 
trade discussions had taken place so far, at 28 of which 
Allied observers had been present, and had intervened in 
negotiations with 10 different countries. Despite the fact 
that executive responsibility for export controls had been 
assumed by the Federal Government in May 1950, the High 
Commission had found it necessary to intervene on several 
occasions to ensure the proper administration of security 
restrictions; Allied observers also sat in on the Inter- 
Ministerielle Einfuhrausschuss (Import Committee) and still 
held several executive functions. The management of foreign 
exchange had been progressively transferred to the Bank 
deutscher Laender and the Federal Government; the High Com­
mission had nevertheless maintained a close watch in order 
to avoid any necessity for an increase in foreign assistan-
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ce. The High Commission also had intervened on six occasions 
in regard to unauthorised changes in the customs tariff and 
manipulation of the rates and to ensure non-discriminatory 
treatment.
Although the Occupation Statute also called for the 
control of internal action to reduce the need for external 
assistance, the High Commission and the Federal Government 
had arrived at a substantial degree of co-operation: the 
High Commission had accepted a more limited control, parti­
cularly in fiscal and budgetary matters. To the greatest 
extent possible it avoided publishing its observations. For 
its part the Federal Government sought the advice of the 
High Commission before publishing its decisions or submit­
ting its drafts to Parliament. Thanks to this procedure 
official and therefore embarrassing intervention was ren­
dered almost unnecessary.
The second area in which the Allied High Commission 
carried out supervisory functions was German legislation and 
its consistency with the Basic Law and Laender constit­
utions. Up to mid July 1950, 966 items of Federal and Land 
legislation had been submitted to the Allied High Commis­
sion, of which 2 0 had been disapproved, provisionally disap­
proved or annulled. It was the general policy of the High 
Commission not to act as a substitute of a constitutional 
court: for example, the Allied High Commission did not 
disapprove the Schleswig-Holstein constitution, although it 
expressed serious doubts; in the opinion of the High Commis­
sion the matter should be dealt with by the Federal Consti­
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tutional Court, when it came into existence. Flagrant viola­
tion of the Land constitutions were the principle ground for 
disapproval: for example, the Rhineland-Palatinate Law on 
Provisional Budgetary Arrangements for the Fiscal Year 1950. 
In the great majority of cases laws were disapproved because 
of their incompatibility with Allied laws and directives or 
because the matter fell under the Allies' reserved powers. 
With the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court the 
Allies' supervisory function with regard to German legisla­
tion was supposed to end. In fact, it was not until 12 March 
1951 that all the legislation necessary for the establish­
ment of such a court had been passed and not until 28 
September of that year that the court had been set up and 
started to operate.
The London Study Group also asked the High Commission 
to provide information on the actions it had taken with 
regard to German war criminals sentenced and imprisoned by 
the Allies. On this subject there had always been close co­
operation between the Occupation and German authorities and 
no complaints had been received from the German authorities 
in regard to the exercise of this reserved power. The High 
Commissioners, however, received numerous appeals for cleme­
ncy, which meant that the issue remained a contentious issue 
throughout. Each High Commissioner was individually respon­
sible for war criminals sentenced and imprisoned in his zone 
and when Kirkpatrick arrived in Germany there were 242 war 
criminals in the prison in Werl in the British Zone. In his
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autobiography he wrote: "My personal responsibility for the 
custody of these men was absolute. I, and I alone, was empo­
wered to review their cases and to remit sentences, if this 
seemed right on health or other grounds. I was naturally 
under constant pressure to exercise clemency"(88).
In the spring of 1951 at a press conference at the 
British Press Club in Berlin, Kirkpatrick was asked whether 
he was prepared to review the case of Rudolph Hess, who had 
been sentenced at the Nuremberg Trials to life imprisonment 
in the Spandau Prison in Berlin: "bearing in mind the provi­
sions of Article II of the Nuremberg Charter I said that 
this was a matter for the four powers collectively but that 
I personally would be ready to make a review. I added that 
hatred and revenge were bad counsellors. In saying this I 
meant, of course, that sentiments of hatred and revenge 
should not inspire a refusal to make a review"(89).
This was not, however, the way his statement was inter­
preted in London, where it caused alarm among Government 
supporters. The matter was discussed in the Cabinet, where 
agreed that Kirkpatrick's statement had been badly worded 
and rather unfortunate. The Attorney-General's criticism was 
the strongest: "he did not feel that the Cabinet had yet had 
an adequate explanation of the High Commissioner's reference 
to 'hatred and revenge as bad counsellors,' which had been 
widely interpreted as a reflections on the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and on the British military courts. Moreover, in 
dealing with the heinous crimes which many of the German war 
criminals had committed, he found it difficult to understand
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in what resprects 'circumstances had changed/' a phrase 
which, according to Press accounts/ the High Commissioner 
had used in his remarks".
This very strong criticism might have been inspired by 
the Attorney-General feeling personally offended/ as he had 
been one of the prosecuters at the Nuremberg Trials. Some of 
his Cabinet colleagues displayed much greater understanding 
of High Commissioner. In the discussion the point was made 
that "the Foreign Secretary had signed an instrument of 
delegation which placed responsibility on the High Commis­
sioner to review cases and remit rentences when he thought 
it proper to do so. ... Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick considered 
that he had been given a personal responsibility/ in the 
exercise of which he must be guided by his conscience. He 
had assumed that he should no seek ministerial guidance on 
the exercise of this duty. ... The United Kingdom High 
Commissioner in Germany might, on one view, be regarded as 
an official responsible to the Foreign Secretary while, on 
another view, he might be regarded as more akin to the 
Governor of a Colony who advised on the prerogative of mercy 
without reference to the Colonial Secretary"(90).
In his autobiography Kirkpatrick described the affair 
as follows: "There was quite a fuss and Mr. Attlee rebuked 
me in Parliament. I thought of resigning, but two considera­
tions restrained me. First, to resign on this issue would 
have roused opinion in Germany; and it would have been 
damaging at that particular juncture to provoke Anglo-German
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friction. Secondly, Mr. Bevin, who told me I was quite 
right, asked me not to do so. I was not only devoted to him 
personally, but I had great respect for his judgement. I 
arranged with him, however, that in view of the political 
flavour this problem had acquired I should at once divest 
myself of all responsibility for War Criminals and transfer 
it to the Foreign Secretary"(91).
It took the High Commission over three weeks to respond 
to the questions of the London Study Group. This delay was 
caused by differences of opinion between the three Allied 
High Commissioners. These differences provide a unique 
insight into their different interpretation of their role 
and the future scope of the occupation regime in Germany. 
They were especially acute on the last question of the Study 
Group: "what would be the effect on the working of the High 
Commission of the establishment of direct diplomatic rela­
tions between the Federal Republic and foreign countries?" 
The main controversy was over the question whether the 
Federal Republic should be allowed to establish diplomatic 
missions in the capitals of the three Occupying Powers.
Kirkpatrick, who chaired the Council meeting when this 
question was discussed, pointed out that, in his opinion, 
the establishment of diplomatic relations would not impinge 
on the theory of supreme authority. To illustrate his point 
he used the example of Austria, where the Austrian Govern­
ment had established these diplomatic relations despite the
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fact that the quadripartite control council in Vienna still 
possessed supreme authority in Austria. He also made the 
theoretical point that only the sovereign had the power to 
delegate. He told his colleagues that he would opt for the 
establishment of German diplomatic missions in the capitals 
of the Occupying Powers: "I think the conception we should
have is of an Allied Supreme Tripartite organ her with 
diplomatic representations broadly confined to inducing the 
home government to instruct us as the Germans would have 
it. -
Francois-Poncet was adamantly opposed to German ambassa­
dors in Paris, London and Washington: "I feel that the day 
when there will be ambassadors in our capitals, there will 
be awful confusion between their powers and ours, ... I 
believe that by the time the supreme authority of the Al 
lies, especially the authority of the High Commissioner, 
would only be a word. My government can see very well that 
there might be diplomatic representation in our capitals, 
but representation of a special nature, so long as the 
High Commission remains." Mr. McCloy, the American High 
Commissioner, agreed with the French: "Well, I think that 
the introduction of ambassadors in the capitals does 
produce, as I say, a very serious and new factor in the 
relationships of the Commission and the status of the 
Commission. If those ambassadors operated as ambassadors 
normally do, I think the position of the Commission here 
would be very seriously embarrassed and deteriorate. That
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would be by-passing the Commissioners here and confusion 
of authority and the situation would be very awkward, I 
should say.(92)"
In the end the three could only agree to disagree and 
to express this disagreement in three different versions of 
an answer to the London Study Group. The French version 
opposed the establishment of regular diplomatic missions 
headed by ambassadors in the three capitals as this "could 
create an element of confusion in the relations between the 
Federal Republic and the three Occupying Powers." The Ameri­
can demanded an additional agreement in the case that diplo­
matic representations were to be established: "Closer coor­
dination among the three Elements and closer definition of 
relations in this field with the Germans would be necessary 
to enable the Allied High Commission to have current knowl­
edge of German operations in order to discharge its own 
responsibilities." The British alone believed that the 
introduction of German diplomatic representations in the 
three capitals would not impair the status or the working of 
the Allied High Commission, but only "import a new factor 
into the relations between the Federal Government and the 
three Occupying Powers", by giving the it the opportunity of 
"reinforcing representations made to the High Commission in 
Bonn by seperate demarches in the respective capitals."(93)
When the High Commissioners'answers to the questions of 
the London Study Group were dispatched, Steel wrote an 
accompanying letter to the Foreign Office. In it he pointed
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out that throughout the discussions the French had taken a 
rather more restrictive view than they had done in London in 
May. According to Steel, it was only thanks to British 
insistence that interference with German life and habits 
under the blanket clause about the "the basic purposes of 
the occupation" had been slight. He had a word of warning 
for the Foreign Office: "McCloy is hot on this particular
trail at the moment and is loud in his assertions that now 
is our last chance by paternal action to turn the Germans 
into a big, clean, liberal community (by implication on the 
American model). It is clear that he is thinking in this 
matter very much of decartellization and "freedom to engage 
in a trade". I feel and so does Ivone that this recrudes­
cence of crusading zeal represents a real danger. If to the 
existing economic controls we add a whole lot of new ideo­
logical ones, the Occupation Statute in its new form will 
leave the Germans with less rather than more freedom of 
action than they had before. If in addition the French block 
any real transfer of competence in foreign affairs I cannot 
imagine the Chancellor and his Government retaining any 
prestige at all, let alone building themselves up as we 
intend."(94)
As one can
see from Steel's letters and Kirkpatrick's statements, the 
British element of the Allied High Commission was much 
more forward looking than their American and French coun­
terparts and were deeply worried when this did not come
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across to the Germans: on 7 September Kirkpatrick com­
plained to the Foreign Office that "these reports convey 
the impression that the French and Americans are ready for 
far-reaching concessions to Germany and that Britain is 
lagging behind. The positive interpretation of French 
policy, which we know to be the most restrictive of all, 
is somewhat galling, and there is danger that the blame 
will fall on us if the results of the Foreign Ministers 
conference should not come up to expectation."(95)
Foreign Affairs continued to be a sticking point; even 
the Intergovernmental Study Group in London could not agree 
on a common recommendation on this issue in their final 
report, which it approved at the eighth Plenary Meeting on 4 
September. It was agreed that the Federal Republic could 
establish regular diplomatic relations with countries other 
than the Occupying Powers, subject to the High Commission's 
right of previous disapproval, which would only be contem­
plated in rare cases. There was, however, insurmountable 
disagreement between the British representatives on the one 
hand and the American and the French on the other on the 
question of establishing diplomatic relations between the 
Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic: the United King­
dom would receive diplomatic representatives, who would not 
deal with matters affecting the powers of the High Commis­
sion, but would not appoint diplomatic representatives to 
the Federal Republic, as the High Commissioners would act in 
this capacity in matters which did not call for tripartite
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action. The Americans and the French reiterated that the 
High Commission had to remain the only channel for the 
negotiation of matters of a diplomatic and political nature 
between the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic and 
that they would only contemplate receiving official agents 
of the Federal Republic, whose task would be limited to 
matters of a non-diplomatic nature, including informing 
their Government.(96)
Up to the beginning of the New York Foreign Ministers 
Conference the Foreign Office increased the pressure on the 
Americans to come around to the British point of view. Bevin 
wrote to Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Wash­
ington, asking him to arrange to arrange a meeting between 
himself and Acheson before the start of the tripartite 
talks: "I have the impression that he may well be more
responsive than his officials and whould be inclined to see 
things as I do." Bevin was doubtful if the recommendation of 
the Study Group went far enough "to enable us to achieve our 
object of assuring the Germans that we mean to have them on 
our side and we intend to treat them as one of our company." 
The main point which the Foreign Secretary wanted to make to 
his American counterpart was on foreign affairs: "I think 
the American reservation as to holding back this power but 
delegating it to the Germans in certain fields is psycholog­
ically a mistake. The prestige of the Federal Government 
will be closely bound up with the authority they have in 
foreign affairs and the idea of delegation will be hard to
swallow; whilst it does not add anything to our effective 
control. Similarly, the American unwillingness to accept a 
German ambassador at this stage is unfortunate. I do not 
see how we can ask other countries to receive Ambassadors if 
the United States does not. No doubt there may be difficul­
ties in Washington, as elsewhere, but these are just the 
risks of a secondary order which we must take." Bevin wanted 
Acheson to know that he was "prepared to make very great 
sacrifices from our original view point to bring about an 
agreement."(97)
As described before in this chapter, the New York 
Conference was the first instance, when a German contribu­
tion to the Western defence was discussed officially, and 
although the Allies could not come to a full agreement on 
this issue, it brought about a change in the thinking on the 
subject of the revision of the Occupation Statute. The 
Intergovernmental Study Group was to re-convene to consider 
"a further revision of controls to be put into effect when 
satisfactory progress has been made towards a common defence 
with which Germany is associated. ... Meanwhile, the High 
Commissioners are to be instructed to prepare immediately on 
their return to Germany the draft of a document amending the 
statute, on an interim basis, on the lines of the Study 
Group's recommendations." On foreign affairs the United 
States/French proposals were accepted, despite Bevin's 
reservations, but only "for the duration of this next inter­
im phase"(98).
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The net
result of the New York Conference was, like on the defence 
issue described earlier in this chapter, the British had 
been roped in by the American proposal of a "package 
deal", and had given up their forward lookingaspirations 
for a new Occupation Statute and had settled for a much 
less ambitious reform with the promise that more would 
follow the eventual agreement on the incorporation of the 
Federal Republic into the Western Defence. It was a curi­
ous situation in which the High Commissioners were to 
return to Germany and deploy all their energy in the 
implementation of the New York decisions, only to render 
the revision of the Occupation Statute obsolete by its 
successful completion; in other words, once the Occupation 
Statute had been revised the Western Allies and the 
Federal Republic would move on to a much more fundamental 
review of their relations in connection with the question 
of a German contribution to Western defence. The British 
High Commissioner was in the forefront of pushing the 
process along to achieve the liberalisation, which he had 
aimed for all along.
During the first meeting with the Chancellor after the 
New York Conference, Kirkpatrick tried to impress on Adenau­
er the importance of implementing the conference decisions, 
especially of getting a satisfactory assurance about Germa­
ny's financial obligations: "I drew attention to the Secre­
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tary of State's conviction of the importance of the present 
stage in our relations and told the Chancellor how much Mr. 
Bevin hoped that the Federal Government and all concerned 
would devote themselves wholeheartedly to the success of the 
policy on which we were now embarking. The Chancellor re­
plied that we could rely on him and the Federal Government 
to make a success of the present stage."(99)
While the Germans expressed their willingness to co­
operate with the implementation of the New York decisions, a 
disagreement developed between the three High Commissioners 
about the instrument of revision of the Occupation Statute. 
During the Council meeting on 13 October Francois-Poncet and 
Kirkpatrick wanted to accept the draft submitted to them by 
their experts, but McCloy expressed doubts about its form 
which he considered inartistic and imprecise: "He argued in 
particular that it was inappropriate to include in a legal 
document statements of the High Commission's intention in 
connexion with the powers to be relaxed upon fulfilment of 
conditions or programmes. He wondered whether we should not 
instead convert the instrument into a memorandum which would 
be handed to the Chancellor as an indication of our future 
programme for the relaxation of controls. The controls could 
then be relaxed one by one, and when the process was com­
plete, a legal instrument definitely relinquishing our 
powers could be promulgated." The French Government reacted 
strongly and urged the British to join them to make repre­
sentations in Washington, complaining that McCloy was out of
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line with the decisions taken on 18 September in New York. 
Kirkpatrick resisted as he saw no objection to accepting a 
shortened instrument of revision and a memorandum or decla­
ration of intention to relax other controls upon the fulfil­
ment of conditions or completion of programmes; he only 
objected to the delay which this procedure would cause. In 
his comments to the Foreign Office on the whole affair, 
Kirkpatrick deemed McCloy's remarks to reflect the dislike 
of a lawyer -- the American High Commissioner's learned 
profession -- of a legal document, which included hypotheti­
c a l  . Kirkpatrick explained the strong reaction of his 
French counterpart: "I understand that Poncet has been taken 
to task by Paris for permitting the inclusion of any refer­
ence to the prospect of future revisions"(100).
Bevin agreed with Kirkpatrick that it was very unsatis­
factory that the High Commissioners should be arguing about 
a question of this nature: "the Germans would soon get to 
hear about it and would feel that they could play off one 
against another"(101). The High Commissioner had come to 
London on 20 and 21 October to discuss the situation with 
the Secretary of State and others and it was agreed that the 
British should decline to join the French protest in Wash­
ington and should endeavour to reach agreement on the lines 
of the compromise proposed by Sir Ivone: they would accept a 
shortened instrument of revision and a declaration of inten­
tion to relax other control. One week later Kirkpatrick was 
able to cable to London that "at a private session following
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Council meeting on 26th October Francois-Poncet agreed to 
seek a revision of his instructions which would permit him 
to accept the short instrument of revision"(102) and on 2 
November the French Political Adviser returned from Paris 
with instructions to that effect.
The only condition which the French Government attached 
to the agreement was that both the instrument of revision 
and the declaration of intention were issued in a manner 
which made it quite clear that they represented the unilat­
eral acts of the occupying powers acting in the exercise of 
their supreme authority. "This arrangement finally disposes 
of the French attachment to the long instrument," Kirkpat­
rick wrote, "and I consider that we should accept it" (103). 
When the two documents came up for discussion in the Council 
on 9 November they were accepted without alteration and 
forwarded to the governments for final approval.
In the meantime Kirkpatrick was urging Adenauer to give 
the two assurances required before the revision of the 
Occupation Statute could be put into force. Although the 
Chancellor.undertook to proceed with all possible haste, "he 
pointed out that since he was required to put the matter to 
the Bundestag it would be necessary to secure his own party 
and if possible the opposition. This would necessarily take 
a little time"(104) . Despite his assurances it seems like 
Adenauer was stalling: he knew that his bargaining position 
was improving with the Allies getting closer to an agreement 
on a German contribution to Western defence. On 16 November
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he handed the High Commissioners a memorandum in which he 
urged the early realisation of his proposal to put the 
relations of Germany to the Occupying Powers on a totally 
new basis and to regulate them progressively by a system of 
contractual agreements; he had first made these proposals 
before the New York Conference, but now he felt in a strong­
er position to reach this aim.
At a lunch on 20 November Kirkpatrick discussed the 
memorandum with Adenauer: "I told the Chancellor that His
Majesty's Government was committed to an evolutionary policy 
which would lead to German membership of a western system. 
But the pace and character of this evolution required very 
careful consideration. In particular I emphasised the danger 
that if we suddenly terminated the occupation regime we 
might prejudice our right to maintain troops in Berlin. ... 
The Chancellor took the point and agreed that the problem 
should be carefully studied before any step was taken which 
might adversely affect our situation in Berlin"(105). At 
this lunch the Chancellor also mentioned to Kirkpatrick that 
he found the tone of the allied draft of the communique 
altogether too unforthcoming and that he hoped that it would 
be possible to improve it. Kirkpatrick replied that "it made 
the same impression on myself." He therefore agreed to 
receive German suggestions for a change of appearance of the 
document. When Dittmann, the Chancellor's representative, 
finally communicated the text to the British, it turned out 
to be a complete German redraft. In his comments to the
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Foreign Office Kirkpatrick wrote:
"I consider that we must do our best to help the 
Chancellor over this fence and we have accordingly rep­
lied to Dittmann that there would be no British objection 
to the submission of a German counter draft. We have at 
the same time suggested that various passages should be 
differently put. The use of the title "protocol” , the 
rehearsal of much of the content of the instrument of 
revision, the suggestion that the arrangements are merely 
a first step and the mention of a contractual settlement 
will no doubt arouse the opposition of the French. It 
would be best not to tell the Americans of this approach. 
It should have been made to them as they are in the 
chair, but Dittmann, somewhat embarrassingly claimed that 
the Chancellor was anxious to know the view of the Bri­
tish Element before formally putting forward his counter­
draft ."(106)
The Foreign Office agreed with Kirkpatrick that it was 
important to support Adenauer, as his rival Schumacher would 
raise the price of German participation in Western defence 
still higher. "It is in fact clear that the Germans are 
getting uppish," Mallet wrote in a Foreign Office minute; he 
was convinced that concessions would be necessary, but 
suggested that it should be made clear to the Chancellor 
"that he must settle the present proposals in regard to the 
Occupation Statute, claims, etc. before asking for more, and 
to show him that, if he wants the Allies to advance further, 
he must avoid giving the impression of pushing us or of 
driving bargains and must be content to move step by 
step."(107)
The German Chancellor, however, was not at all content 
to move step-by-step; instead he "showed signs of being 
somewhat rattled by developments in internal politics here 
and by events in the Far East," Kirkpatrick wrote about the
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meeting between Adenauer and the High Commissioners on 1 
December. During that meeting the Chancellor and McCloy had 
had some very sharp exchanges; "I confined myself to assur­
ing the Chancellor that I well understood the political 
difficulties he was in and adding, in order to bring the 
discussion back to a more concrete issue, that we therefore 
appreciated the efforts he had made to change, by redrafting 
it, the character of the communique we had proposed for 
joint signature by himself and us when the Occupation Stat­
ute is revised"(108).
These were
only Kirkpatrick's public utterances; in a secret telegram 
he urged the Foreign Office to grant Adenauer' request: 
"On the whole I think that the Western Powers would be 
well adviced to tell the Chancellor that we always had it 
in our mind, if Germany joined us in the defence of Eu­
rope, to replace the occupation statute by a regime which 
would give Germany the status of freedom compatible with 
her new responsibilities. Accordingly they would be pre­
pared in principle at the appropriate moment to make a 
public declaration to this effect and to authorise the 
High Commission to discuss with him the timing and terms 
of such a declaration"(109). The Foreign Office, however, 
hesitated: "I am quite clear in my mind that it will be
wellnigh impossible to get them (the French and the 
Americans, explanation of the author) to agree to any such 
assurance to the Germans as Sir I. Kirkpatrick suggests,"
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Gainer wrote in the minutes to the High Commissioner's 
telegram; "I feel quite sure that we must go slow on this 
pending developments on the Washington, NATO and CFM 
fronts. We should explain to Sir I. Kirkpatrick and see if 
we can't get a message to Dr. Adenauer to comfort him if 
there is to be any long delay in reaching a decision about 
German rearmament," Mallet added. On these lines an answer 
was sent to Germany: "I well understand the desirabilitiy
from the point of view of the situation in Germany of some 
such assurance to the Chancellor," Sir Donald St.Clair 
Gainer wrote, but "in all these circumstances it hardly 
seems possible for us to take any initiative at the moment 
towards raising with the French and Americans your sugges­
tion for talks with Adenauer. But, as soon as it is decid­
ed to authorise you and your colleagues to start discus­
sions with Adenauer on a plan for German participation in 
defence, then you will clearly have to be empowered at the 
same time to discuss the future form of the 
occupation."(110)
In fact the Foreign Office was wrong to assume that 
both the French and the Americans were unwilling to contem­
plate anything on the lines suggested by Kirkpatrick; in 
fact Sir Oliver Franks informed the Foreign Office that the 
American State Department had been giving very active con­
sideration to the subject of further constitutional changes 
in Germany and that they appeared to have come to the con­
clusion that to terminate the regime of the Occupation
154
Statute as such and to negotiate a new regime on a contrac­
tual basis was the only practicable course(111). And at a 
meeting on 7 December, the Allied High Commissioners were 
united: "I said that the first thing to be done was to
execute the decisions which the Foreign Ministers had taken 
in New York. Once the New York decisions were in force I 
personally, should favour a statement to the effect that 
Germany was advancing progressively to full membership of 
the western community and that with each advance the atti­
tude of the Western Powers towards Germany would be adjusted 
to meet the changed conditions. If Germany were to make a 
contribution to Western defence the relationship of the 
Western Powers to Germany would have to be adjusted to this 
circumstance. My colleagues agreed that they could recommend 
to their Governments a statement on these lines once the New 
York decisions had been put into effect. McCloy was anxious 
that in such a statement our governments should explicitly 
refer to the Chancellor's idea of a Security Treaty, and 
state that they were prepared to study it in consultation 
with the Germans; Francois-Poncet and I did not 
dissent."(112)
A curious situation had developed: what had been envis­
aged as a major alleviation of controls, namely the revision 
of the Occupation Statute, now stood in the way of a further 
removal of controls; in other words, the revision of the 
Occupation Statute had to take place before it could be 
abolished or replaced by contractual agreements. The High
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Commissioners pointed out to the Chancellor that the imple­
mentation of the New York decisions was essential before 
further arrangements for the future could even be consid­
ered. This point was also stressed by Bevin, when he dis­
cussed the general line to be taken at the forthcoming 
Brussels Conference with Mr. Allen and Mr. Mallet on 16 
December. Once the New York decisions were implemented, the 
Secretary of State was prepared to tell the German Chancel­
lor that the three Governments had taken note of his sugges­
tion that the Occupation Statute should be replaced by a 
contractual arrangement: "as a first step towards the study 
of the constitutional question, it would be desirable to get 
the joint recommendations of the Allied High Commission. It 
would be desirable that the discussions should proceed as 
far as possible in consultation with the German Federal 
Government from an early stage. The approach should be 
different from that adopted in the past when the three 
Occupation Powers had worked out their plans and then pre­
sented them to the Federal Government."(113)
At the Brussels Conference it was decided that the 
failure of the German Federal Government to implement the 
New York decisions need not preclude discussion of further 
changes with the Federal Republic, but that these should 
not be brought into force until the New York decisions had 
been implemented. The Occupation Powers finally agreed to 
accept a declaration by the Federal Chancellor, without 
the backing of the Bundestag, on Germany's foreign debts
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and the provision of raw materials. The revision of the 
Occupation Statute was eventually promulgated on 6 March 
1951: the Allied High Commission relinquished the supervi­
sion of Federal and Land legislation, restored almost 
complete foreign exchange control to the Federal Govern­
ment and considerably expanded Federal control over for­
eign affairs. The British therefore succeeded in swaying 
their allies over the supervision of legislation, but were 
in the end not able to carry the Americans and the French 
with them on foreign affairs, at least not as far as the 
British had been prepared to go. The Federal Republic of 
Germany was to be represented in the capitals of the three 
Occupying Powers only by charge d'affairs.(114)
Considering
the episode of the revision of the Occupation Statute one 
can not help but notice the forward looking attitude of 
the British. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was the first to sug­
gest the transfer of power in foreign affairs to the 
German Federal Government and it is he who later on 
argued in favour of accepting German ambassadors in the 
Allies' capitals. The British also resisted the American 
fervour towards influencing internal German affairs. Later 
on, Kirkpatrick tried to persuade his own government to 
accept the replacement of the Occupation Statute by "a 
regime which would give Germany the status of freedom 
compatible with her new responsibilities."
This forward
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looking attitude, however, has to be put in perspective. 
The British never had the same degree of missionary fer­
vour as the United States towards shaping Federal Republic 
in the American image. Nor did they have the same anxie­
ties as the French concerning the Germans. The British 
were willing gradually to relax their powers in order to 
persuade the Federal German Government to make a firm 
commitment to the West. At the same time they were never 
willing to endanger their military and political objec­
tives in Germany and that meant that they were never 
willing to go as far as giving up the principle of the 
Allies' supreme authority in Germany. This forward looking 
attititude up to the last, crucial point continues during 
the negotiations of the contractual agreements.
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THE CONVENTIONS ON GERMAN-ALLIED RELATIONS
The negotiations
leading up to the Contractual Agreements were long and 
arduous and prove why Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick deserves the 
epithet "The Negotiator": 31 official meetings between the 
Allied High Commissioners and Dr. Adenauer, 13 of them in 
the last two months before the eventual signing of the 
treaties on 25 May 1952; especially in the last phase of 
the negotiation the sessions became longer and longer, 
turning into marathon meetings: there were 11 all-day 
meetings; the longest lasted from 10 a.m. on 15 May until 
5.30 a.m.the next day. There were countless meetings 
between members of the Allied High Commission's Special 
Committee and German representatives and other, mostly 
unofficial, meetings on various levels.
In the negotiations the High Commissioners were guided 
by instructions from their Governments. These instructions, 
however, were shaped as far as possible in accordance with 
recomendations by the High Commissioners. Kirkpatrick wrote 
innumerable letters to keep the Foreign Office informed and 
several times flew to London, as he himself put it, to 
"induce Government departments to drop demands which were 
excessive or which were acceptable neither to our Allies nor
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the G e r m a n s (115) Three times, in Paris in November 1951, 
in London in February 1952, and in Bonn during the days 
before the signature, the Foreign Ministers met to settle 
outstanding points and for the last two of these conferences 
the German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, was present, negotiat­
ing directly with the Foreign Ministers. This is a point to 
prove how times had changed: the High Commission was not the 
only channel of communication between the Allied Governments 
and the German Federal Government any more. The atmosphere 
of the negotiations had changed, too: the Chancellor was not 
ordered to the Petersberg any longer, as he had been for the 
negotiations for the Petersberg Agreement in 1949; the four 
met at the residence of the Chairman of the Allied High 
Commission, rotating monthly. But even though the atmosphere 
had changed, Kirkpatrick wrote in his autobiography: "I have 
never known so punishing an ordeal."(116)
At the very start of the negotiations, one week after 
the official start of the exploratory talks on 10 May 1951, 
the British High Commissioner told his men: "The truth is
that we have gaily undertaken to perform a fabulous tour de 
force - squaring the circle would be relatively child's 
play. And nobody knows how to tackle it. And so we hope that 
the passage of time will enlighten us."(117) Almost exactly 
one year later, during a meeting between Adenauer and the 
Allied High Commissioners on 1 May 1952, Kirkpatrick repeat­
ed this metaphor of the squaring of the circle. His state­
ment then could almost serve as his resume of the signifi­
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cance and the scope of the task they had been given by the 
Foreign Ministers at the Brussels Conference in December 
1950. He pointed out that there was no precedence in history 
for such a set of agreements and outlined the intricacies: 
first, the Four Power Agreements on Berlin and the unity of 
Germany were still binding; second, it was necessary to 
station troops in Germany for defensive purposes, which 
undoubtedly would entail certain burdens for the Federal 
Republic, but on the other hand also bring her economic 
advantages. From this necessity to station troops a unique 
situation would result: public opinion would have to made to 
agree with the task which the troops were there to perform. 
Thirdly, the uniqueness of the historic situation resulted 
from the fact that the state of war and the occupation was 
to be liquidated before the conclusion of a peace treaty. 
This was why a large number of seperate regulations were 
necessary.
In Kirkpatrick's view, the purpose of the set of agree­
ments was to reconcile the aims and intentions of Allied 
policy with the greatest possible freedom for the Federal 
Republic. The problem of squaring this circle had to be 
resolved in three ways: first, the Federal Republic's
sovereignty had to be restored without imparing the restora­
tion of German unity. Second, the freedom of manoeuvre of 
the Federal Republic should suffer as little as possible 
through the presence of Allied troops. And finally, the 
state of war was to be liquidated without imposing too heavy
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a burden on the Federal Republic. Kirkpatrick at that point 
added that public opinion had to be informed that the nego­
tiations had been totally free and that both sides had made 
concessions in view of the great common task. It was clear 
that the people in all four countries paid special attention 
to the concessions made by their respective government and 
tented to ignore the concessions made by the others. All 
parties concerned had to try to convince public opinion that 
every one had made concessions and that all four of them had 
made great sacrifices(118).
The Contractual Arrangements must be one of the longest 
and most intricate set of agreements ever negotiated. In the 
end it consisted of: The General Convention on Relations 
between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germa­
ny, which contained the text of the General Convention and 
eight other papers; The Convention on the Settlement of 
Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, which 
consisted of 12 chapters, which had themselves 25 subordi­
nate parts; The Convention on the Rights and Obligations of 
Foreign Forces and their members in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, made up of the text itself plus two annexes; The 
Convention on the Economic and Financial Contribution of the 
Federal Republic to Western Defence; five letters signed by 
the Chancellor to the three Allied Governments on security 
controls; and finally one agreement on archives. All in all 
54 texts. In his autobiography Kirkpatrick wrote: "On many 
of the issues it was hard to obtain Allied agreement. On
some the military were in conflict with the civilians. In 
Germany all the political parties were seeking to intervene 
in the negotiations. For a long time it seemed as if the 
treaty must founder on an accumulation of technical snags. 
If at last we reached port/ it was because all the parties 
were resolved to succeed. In an elegant little speech about 
the treaty M. Schuman referred to the role of the High 
Commissioners and remarked that never in history had men 
worked with such zeal to abolish themselves."(119)
The general success of this set of agreements/ is best 
brought out by Kirkpatrick himself, who pointed out that 
"the treaty has stood up fairly well to the scrutiny of 
time. Contrary to expectation there has been no move in 
Germany to secure its revision. Nor has there been any 
substantial manifestation of dissatisfaction in any Allied 
country."(120) This has held true until 1990, 38 years after 
the set of treaties were first signed, when the two parts of 
Germany were unified and the four World War II allies signed 
an accord with representatives of the two parts of Germany, 
which settled all outstanding issues and granted the unified 
Germany her full sovereignty.
It was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter that 
General Robertson was the British High Commissioner in 
Germany who exercised all the powers connected with this 
unique role and that his successor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 
was the one who surrendered these powers in negotiations
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with the Germans. Evidence in support of the claim that 
Kirkpatrick was a good negotiator is the fact that, in 
return for this transfer of power, he got what the British 
wanted: the Federal Republic's firm integration into the 
Western bloc and its participation in Western defence. He 
also never gave up all the powers: as long as most of the 
British forces were stationed on the Continent, their posi­
tion and prestige had to be secured and for this reason some 
of the powers had to be retained; outstanding quadripartite 
issues also demanded the retention of some powers. In the 
negotiations Kirkpatrick also achieved a financial settle­
ment with the Federal Republic which was essential for 
Britain, still weakened by the economic after-effects of the 
war. He was a very skillful negotiator with a great ability 
to persuade, mediate and to find a compromise. He was able 
to do this because the British were more concerned with the 
end result of the negotiations than the details. Kirkpat­
rick's role in these negotiations will be described in this 
part of the chapter.
The beginning of the negotiations was hampered 
by differences of opinion among the Western Allies and 
between the High Commissioners and their own governments on 
the speed of progress and the scope of the negotiations. At 
the Brussels Conference, the Foreign Ministers held a meet­
ing the High Commissioners on 19 December. The French, Andre 
Francois-Poncet, summed up the opinion of all three High 
Commissioners on the German Chancellor's repeated requests 
for the re-placement of the Occupation Statute by some
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contractual arrangement: "The High Commissioners thought it 
important to meet the Chancellor as far as reasonably possi­
ble over such matters because of the increasing signs that 
German opinion was becoming attracted by the idea of the 
possible neutralisation of Germany as a result of Dr. Schum­
acher's policies, the pronouncements of Pastor Niemoeller, 
Grotewohl's recent letter and the prospect of a four-Power 
meeting."(121)
In the previous part of the chapter a secret telegram, 
which Kirkpatrick sent to the Foreign Office on 2 Decemen- 
ber, was quoted. In it he had expressed the same opinion as 
Francois-Poncet. The Foreign Office, however, decided to 
take a more cautious line than the one recommended by Kirk­
patrick and in Brussels Bevin said: "We should go along
stage by stage taking each case on its merits. We could not 
at once promise the Germans full equality in everything. 
Nevertheless we must recognise that the process of continual 
evolution made necessary adjustments in our attitude. For 
instance the Potsdam Agreement had been based on the idea of 
the repression of Germany. The Schuman Plan was based on 
that of equality. If the Schuman Plan succeeded it would 
mean that the basis of our approach to many German problems 
had been changed and that a further step had been taken away 
from the original Potsdam conception. But we could not give 
any promise of immediate and complete equality."(122)
It was decided that the High Commissioners should
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embark on the first phase in the development of a new rela­
tionship between the occupying powers and Germany, namely 
exploratory talks, at the conclusion of which they were to 
report to their Governments and await instructions before 
embarking on the real negotiations. In their work the High 
Commissioners were to guided by four general principles: 
firstly, the entry of Germany into Western defence arrange­
ments would logically entitle her to substantial freedom; 
secondly,the final plan of the new relationship should be 
mutually satisfactory; thirdly, the arrangements should 
cover all aspects of these relations, except such problems 
as could only be resolved in a peace settlement; and fourth­
ly, the possibility should be explored whether commitments 
made by Germany to her adherence to international statutes 
or organisation would render possible the relinquishment of 
occupation controls.(123)
Returning from Brussels the three elements of the 
Allied High Commission found it difficult to come up with a 
common approach: Kirkpatrick informed London that these 
divergencies of view "will very seriously complicate the 
High Commissioners7 task when informal discussions with the 
Germans begin. If no agreed view can be expressed, it may 
prove impossible to express a view at all; and we may find 
ourselves reduced to a position where we cannot negotiate, 
but are confined on some of the most important issues in­
volved to registering German views in order to record them 
in the High Commission's eventual recommendations to Govern­
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ments."(124)
This disagreement amongst the three elements of the 
Allied High Commission was especially embarrassing as the 
German side was making considerably more progress and was 
going to be ready to present concrete proposals. The Politi­
cal Director and Head of Chancery of the United Kingdom High 
Commission, Mr. C.D.W. O'Neill, complained to the Foreign 
Office that "they have of course two advantages over us. 
First, that they have only their own minds to make up and do 
not have to concert their line with others. Second, that 
their Government is close at hand and can endorse their 
recommendations and give them current instructions. Armed 
with these advantages, they have apparently not merely (like 
us) churned out a great quantity of paper on all conceivable 
subjects representing the views of all their Ministries; but 
also, unlike the High Commission, they have succeeded in 
distilling this mass of paper down to a smaller compass of 
precise proposals. We learn that they are prepared to dis­
cuss most of the subjects on our list of thirty-nine 
points(125); but probably as I told you in my last letter 
they will still wish to begin with those subjects which are 
most important for them and most awkward for us. They have 
apparently, for example, drafted a complete 
"Truppenvertrag", or Convention on Troops; and I suppose 
they will confront us with it."(126)
The differences of opinion between the High Commission­
ers were fundamental: The first concerned the Allies' supreme
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authority in Germany: they all agreed that they could not 
forgo it completely as it represented the basis for their 
position in Berlin, for their powers to act in Germany in 
the event of an external emergency, and for their dealings 
with the Soviet Union on subjects which concerned the whole 
of Germany. The German Federal Government was prepared to 
accept the Allies' retaining supreme authority provided that 
the latter were prepared to regard the contracts entered 
into as binding, meaning "to regard the exercise of supreme 
authority as irrevocably suspended in the fields in which 
contracts were concluded." In Kirkpatrick's opinion "the 
intentions of the Ministers at Brussels can best be achieved 
by a system of contracts freely negotiated, binding both 
parties, and founded upon a common purpose and on the as­
sumption of mutual good faith". He was therefore prepared to 
go along with his American colleague and accept the German 
proposal. The French approach was radically different and 
their argument was very similar to the one they had made 
during the discussions over the revision of the Occupation 
Statute: "In the French view, the agreements and declaration 
of 1945 invest the Allies with the right to be in Germany 
and with 'sovereignty' in German affairs. The French there­
fore argue, that (i) the presence of the Allies in Germany 
is something about which no contract can be made and (ii) 
possessing the attributes of sovereignty the three powers 
are in a special position vis-a-vis the Federal Government 
and any agreements we make with that government must reflect
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the special character of this relationship."
Although Kirkpatrick stated that the effectiveness of 
the system contemplated would depend upon the good faith of 
the contracting parties "to a greater or lesser degree all 
elements at various levels desire somehow to retain the 
powers necessary to ensure that the Germans comply with 
their bargain." He proposed his own parameters for the 
negotiations with the Germans: "any fields in which we are 
determined to retain powers of control and enforcement must 
lie outside the scope of a contractual system 'on the widest 
possible basis'. It follows that we must envisage the 
present field of Allied activity in Germany divided into two 
areas in one of which our powers will be abandoned and 
replaced by contracts, while we retain our supreme authority 
in the other and act by virtue of it." Kirkpatrick realised 
that it would take the greatest power of persuasion to make 
the Germans swallow this pill.(127)
On 1 May Kirkpatrick went to London for consultations 
in the Foreign Office. He pointed out certain incompatibili­
ties between safeguards in connection with West Germany's 
participation in Western defence and the planned new rela­
tionship between the Allies and the Federal Republic on a 
contractual basis: "High Commissioner believed that it was 
desirable to make a start with the negotiation of contracts 
as soon as possible, and for this purpose suggested that a 
division should be made between those contracts which were 
inseperable from the German defence contribution, and those
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which could be concluded irrespective of the creation of a 
German army or not. The High Commissioner's view was that it 
should be possible to proceed nevertheless to the negotia­
tion of both categories of contract, a clause being inserted 
in the former making it clear that the resultant agreement 
agreement was 'dormant' until the German contribution mate­
rialised. " (128)
Although the Foreign Office acknowledged 
Kirkpatrick's views it was still holding back: "If the
Western Powers seriously want an early German defence con­
tribution, a revision of the N.A.T.O. safeguards referred to 
in the previous paragraph will have to be sought and such a 
revision would involve the smoothing out and reconciliation 
of Allied differences. But this step raises fundamental 
issues which can only be settled at governmental level and 
at a later stage." But it was pointed out that the momentum 
of the political discussions in Germany should be main­
tained. Mr. Bevin had expressed the view before "that the 
process of transferring authority to the Federal Government 
should continue whatever form the association of the Federal 
Republic in Western defence might take, and indicated his 
belief that the Occupying Powers had more to gain by bring­
ing the inevitable changes about gracefully and rapidly 
rather than grudgingly and too late"(129). Kirkpatrick was 
therefore to proceed in the way he himself had proposed in 
London on 1 May. The Foreign Office, however, adopted only 
parts of his recommendations: it did not share the High
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Commissioner's sense of urgency over the need to come to a 
final decision on West Germany's contribution to Western 
defence, which he deemed essential to tackle the incompati­
bilities which he had pointed out.
The Office of the High Commissioner concluded that it 
had been almost too successful in winning the Foreign Office 
over and that the instructions would be difficult to trans­
late into action: "The French and the Americans have given 
at best but a grudging and partial consent to our concept 
that certain contracts should be concluded ahead of the 
German decision to contribute to defence; and this concept 
is reflected very faintly, if at all, in the Aide Memoire 
given to the Germans on 27th February which sets the stage 
for the forthcoming discussions"(130). O'Neill recommended 
in his minute on the instructions to the High Commissioner 
that the British element should not expose the dilemma, 
which it had recognised to exist between the contracts and 
the NATO safeguards, in tripartite discussions, and defi­
nitely not in discussions with the Germans: it would "merely 
give comfort to the French and lead them to agree with our 
conclusion without accepting our (necessarily unexpressed) 
view that what is really needed is a revision of the NATO 
safeguards. I think therefore that on these subjects we 
should, while avoiding the expression of very firm views, 
incline towards support of the American case, which is that 
contracts should be conculded in these fields by which the 
Germans would accept our right to continue legislating,
prosecuting, imprisoning and inspecting. We know well that 
the American view is an optimistic one, and that the Germans 
are very unlikely to enter into contracts of this kind. But 
I think we must leave it to the Germans to teach the Ameri­
cans this lesson rather than try to teach it to them our­
selves" (131) .
In the middle of May the British element of the High 
Commission was expecting a visit by the Secretary of State, 
Herbert Morrison, who amongst other matters wanted to find 
out first hand, how long the solution of the dilemma could 
be postponed, in other words, "how long we can afford to 
postpone effective decisions regarding the defence contribu­
tion without the risk of the Germans going sour on us." T.W. 
Garvey, who had become the chief doctrinaire in the British 
element of the High Commission in matters concerning the 
negotiations, was instructed to write a minute for the High 
Commissioner on the brief the Foreign Office had prepared 
for the Secretary of State.
"I submit that the lesson, if any, that we can teach Mr. 
Morrison during his visit is that we have already fully 
insured, if not over-insured, the freedom of action of 
H .M.Government by the caveats we have already put in as 
to the nature of the current conversations. If, within 
the framework of these caveats, we are enabled to have a 
full and frank exploration with the Germans of the whole 
field of our relations, the danger of the Federal 
Government going sour is not serious.
If on the other hand the Ministers insist on construing 
despatch No. 185 in the light of paragraph 12 of the 
present brief (which says that you have been instructed 
to centre the current discussions upon the relaxations 
of safe-guards in fields not directly related to 
defence), and if it becomes known, as it will, that the 
Allies are insisting on discussing unimportant matters, 
the situation will have serious potentialities in terms
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of German disillusionment(132)
Kirkpatrick wrote a short "I agree" on Garvey's minute.
On 3 August 1951 the exploratory talks ended 
and ten days later the High Commissioners sent their report 
concerning the new relationship between the Allied Powers 
and Germany to their Governments. With this report Kirkpat­
rick sent three letters in which he criticised his own 
Government and in which he expressed his frustration about 
the instructions given to him: "the report now transmitted 
to the three Governments represents the result of eight 
months' discussions which might have been concluded sooner 
but for the desire of His Majesty's Government and the 
French Government to defer a decision." He made it clear 
that such a decision, in his opinion, had to be taken: "I do 
not believe that the Allies can with safety defer for much 
longer a decision in regard to German participation in 
Western defence ... If they wish Germany to contribute, they 
must consent to accord her that degree of military and 
political equality which is essential if a Military Service 
Bill is to pass through the Bundestag."
He complimented the Special Committee of the High Commis­
sion for the thoroughness of their work in producing the 
report and in outlining the complexity of the issues and the 
differences which still seperated the Allies . In his opin­
ion, however, it did not and could not succeed in satisfying 
the Germans on the issue of political equality whilst meet­
ing the differing requirements of the three Powers. "If the
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Western Governments decide to dispense with a German defence 
contribution, most of the problems raised in the report will 
require no solution. But in the contrary event it will be 
necessary for the Western Powers to resolve to place their 
relations with Germany upon a basis comparable to that of 
normal intercourse between free countries, retaining only 
those powers which are demonstrably vital to the security of 
our troops, to the defence of the West, to the maintenance 
of our position in Berlin and to safeguarding our responsi­
bilities in respect of all Germany and of the peace treaty. 
The report in its present form does not meet the require­
ments of the situation"(133).
In his second letter on 14 August Kirkpatrick communi­
cated a unilateral report by the American High Commissioner, 
which sought to draw together in one single document the 
salient characteristics of the new relationship to be estab­
lished between Germany and the Allies. "My initial impres­
sion is that it presents the contractual arrangements in a 
manner both intelligible and attractive to the man-in-the- 
street and that, if Governments decided to proceed on the 
basis of the report, the American draft might represent a 
satisfactory basis of discussion, " Kirpatrick commented and 
added that the British should not be deterred by French 
antipathy to the American draft: "The French clearly desire 
to keep down the tone of the contractual arrangements and to 
make them appear as a series of conventions of an adminis­
trative character between the Federal Government and the
174
three Governments as holders of supreme a u t h o r i t y (134)
Never before had Kirkpatrick expressed his differences 
with the Foreign Office so clearly: already in December he 
had expressed the view that if the Western Allies wanted a 
German contribution to Western defence, they must be willing 
to pay the price of awarding the Federal Republic the status 
of equal partner. From the beginning he had been held back 
by the Foreign Office, which was not ready to make this 
decision yet. Just when the first steps towards this incor­
poration of West Germany had been taken, fears of the Soviet 
Union had receded and with them the willingness to pay the 
price of West Germany's military and political emancipation. 
In addition, the British Government was at best half hearted 
about the idea of a European Defence Community, which had 
become the framework of the Federal Republic's contribution 
to Western defence. The British High Commissioner was there­
fore placed in the position of implementing a rather half- 
baked policy. Knowing the situtation on the ground in 
Germany better than anybody back in London, he urged his 
government to make up its mind on the issue of a German 
defence contribution and the connected issue of German 
political emancipation.
From 10 to 14 September 1951 the Foreign Secretaries of 
the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France 
met in Washington to discuss the Federal Republic's partici­
pation in the European Defence Community and the resulting
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reorganisation of their relations. The British were in an
t-
uncomfortable situation: they were still sceptical about the 
military practicability of the French plan and had no inten­
tion of becoming a full member of such a tightly integrated 
organisation. On the other hand they wer unable to suggest 
any satisfactory alternative to the EDC/ given the refusal 
of France to agree to the NATO solution favoured by the 
British. In addition they did not want to endanger their 
"special relationship" with the United States, who were now 
fully supporting the French plan. Consequently, in Washing­
ton in September 1951, the British Government abandoned its 
previously non-committal attitude and promised Britain's 
"closest possible association" with the Community (135). 
This was finally the decision, whose deferment Kirkpatrick 
had denounced in his letter in August. With this decision on 
defence come a commitment to the reorganisation of the 
Allies" relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.
A declaration issued on 14 September stated: "The three 
Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments aim at the 
inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, 
in a Continental European Community, which itself will form 
a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community. ... 
The participation of Germany in the common defense should 
naturally be attended by the replacement of the present 
Occupation Statute by a new relationship between the three 
Governments and the German Federal Republic"(136). The 
declaration must have pleased Kirkpatrick because it ex­
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pressed the Allies' final decision on a German defence 
contribution, which he had called for in his letter of 13 
August. In addition, the first draft of a general convention 
between the Federal Republic and the three Western Powers, 
which resulted from this meeting of the three Foreign Minis­
ters, resembled the American draft, which Kirkpatrick had 
backed, and corresponded very closely with his views, which 
he had expressed in that letter.
This first draft clearly stated that the Federal Repub­
lic was to be given full control of her internal and exter­
nal affairs; the Three Powers were only going to reserve 
rights in respect to Germany as a whole (i.e. the peace 
treaty and German re-unification) , to Berlin and to the 
protection of Allied troops to be stationed on German soil; 
these reservations are identical with those suggested by 
Kirkpatrick in his letter. The Occupation Statute and the 
Allied High Commission was to be abolished and the Three 
Powers were to be represented by ambassadors, who would act 
jointly through a Council of Ambassadors in matters of a 
tripartite nature. The draft also included articles on 
Berlin, cases of emergency and a tribunal, which was to 
adjudicate over matters arising out of the treaty.
This marked the end of the phase during which Kirkpat­
rick had mainly been concerned with convincing his own 
Government and achieving a common Allied line; from then on 
his main task was to convince the Germans. This task did not 
get off to a very promising start: on 24 September 1951, the
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three High Commissioners presented the Allies' first draft 
of a general convention to Adenauer, the German Chancellor 
complained that in his opinion the proposals were not based 
on the principle of equality and reciprocracy: "Der vorlie- 
gende Vertragsentwurf gehe zwar davon aus, dass man uns als 
Partner hinsichtlich der zu erfuellenden Leistungen be- 
trachte, dass man uns aber, abgesehen von gewissen Konzes- 
sionen, letzten Endes doch nicht traue. Eine Gemeinschaft 
gebe es aber nur bei gegenseitigem Vertrauen." The High 
Commissioners tried to calm Adenauer's fears. According to 
Sir Ivone, the truth was that the Foreign Ministers wanted 
to find with this settlement a place for Germany which was 
based on freedom and equality. Maybe this intention had not 
been clearly enough expressed, but this could be the start­
ing point for the negotiations and he was convinced that the 
difficulties were not insurmountable. He showed his willing­
ness to consider concessions, for example on the proposed 
Council of Ambassadors. He saw the greatest difficulties 
concerning the security guarantee which the Germans had 
demanded in their version of a General Treaty, which had 
been submitted on the same day. At the end of the meeting, 
Kirkpatrick said that he had taken part in many negotia­
tions, but none which had started with more 
difficulties.(137)
When the High Commissioners met Adenauer again on 1 
October, Kirkpatrick was in the chair. The main discussion 
centred on the question of the Allies supreme authority in
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Germany. Adenauer wanted to see the reserved rights of the 
Three Powers based on contracts. The High Commissioners, on 
the other hand, insisted on them being based on the declara­
tion of 5 June 1945, in which the four war-time allies had 
assumed the supreme authority in Germany; the adherence to 
this declaration, according to the three High Commissioners, 
was especially important with regard to dealings with the 
Soviet Union and to Berlin. During this meeting, Kirkpatrick 
displayed one of the main characteristics of a good negoti­
ator: his ability to bring out the common ground in the 
arguments of both sides and to reduce the differences to a 
minimum. He pointed out that everybody agreed that the 
Allies' rights, which arose from the international situa­
tion, had to be secured. The only question now, according to 
Kirkpatrick, was whether or not these rights were derived 
from the declaration of 5 June 1945: "Stimme man soweit
ueberein, so sei er wohl zu der Feststellung berechtigt, 
dass die Abweichung der Auffassung nur hinsichtlich der 
Rechtsquelle, naemlich das Abkommen vom 5.Juni.l945, be- 
stehe"(138) .
A good negotiator also tries to show his willingness to 
compromise, in some areas, especially if he is less willing 
to yield in others. During the next meeting two days later. 
Kirkpatrick therefore signaled a certain degree of flexibil­
ity on the Allied part regarding the German demand of a 
security guarantee. He expressed understanding for the 
Chancellor's position in the Bundestag, but also pointed to
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the difficulties which this question would create in his own 
parliament. He recounted the long negotiations over the 
question of a security guarantee when NATO was founded; at 
that time Danemark had also pressed for a security guaran­
tee. Kirkpatrick predicted serious difficulties in the 
Houses of Parliament, if Germany was now going to be granted 
more than a war-time ally like Danemark. McCloy suggested 
that the New York declaration on security could be reiterat­
ed or the NATO pledge could be extended to Germany.
On the question of the supreme authority, the High 
Commissioners were less yielding: in addition to the legal 
reasons already advanced during the previous meeting, Kirk­
patrick put forward practical ones, namely the security of 
the Allied forces to be stationed in Germany. The United 
Kingdom was to transfer almost the entirety of its forces to 
the continent and their protection through certain reserved 
rights based on the supreme authority was paramount: "Dieser 
Wunsch entspringe nicht aus der psychologischen Schwierig- 
keit, Deutschland als Bundesgenossen zu behandeln. Das 
gleiche Beduerfnis wuerde auch gelten, wenn die Truppen in 
Norwegen staenden." All parties agreed to search for a 
commonly acceptable form of words, which would reconcile 
special rights of the Allies with the concept of contractual 
arrangements.(139)
Accordingly, the Special Committee and the German 
representative, Professor Hallstein, exchanged draft texts 
on reserved powers on 14 October. O'Neill wrote in his
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minute on the Special Committee meeting on 16 October: "All
members of the Special Committee this morning felt that it
was important that the High Commissioners should make clear
to the Chancellor tomorrow that the formula put forward by
Hallstein makes it evident that no agreement in principle on
this subject has been reached; and that we cannot accept the
present German position and must insist on maintaining our
own position."(140) Kirkpatrick described the discussions
with Adenauer in telegram to London as follows:
"I began by expressing disappointment at the progress made 
since our last meeting; I had hoped we had reached 
agreement in principle, but this was clearly not the case. 
I could not agree that it was either legally correct or 
practicable to make a distinction between the rights we 
possessed in the Federal Republic and those we possessed 
as between ourselves or vis-a-vis third parties. Our 
rights were indivisible."(141)
Adenauer argued that the Allies had assumed the supreme 
authority in June 1945 to avoid a state of chaos in Germany 
in the absence of competent or democratic German authori­
ties; this was no longer the case. The Chancellor went on to 
say that the right to station troops in Germany assumed 
jointly with the Russians as a measure of protection against 
Germany could not still be employed to station troops in 
Germany as a measure of protection against the Soviet Union. 
He emphasised that the Allied insistence on basing their 
rights in respect to the stationing of troops on the decla­
ration of 1945 was in flat contradiction to their repeated 
declarations that their troops would cease to be occupation 
troops. He was not to be shaken by the High Commissioned'
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arguments designed to demonstrate the necessity of main­
taining the present right: "One of these arguments was
that we must be free to reinforce our troops without 
German consent; to which the Chancellor replied he would 
be happy to give us such a right by treaty. He would 
moreover give us whatever rights were proved necessary for 
action in emergency to protect the security of our forces. 
Our discussion concluded with agreement that the experts 
should continue their work."
Ten days later, however, Adenauer showed himself to 
be anxious to get ahead and the High Commissioners decided 
"to take advantage of his anxiety": "Adenauer has good
reason to fear that if we do not get on the whole project 
may stick and eventually collapse. Moreover, he has a 
tactical interest in concentrating on the general agree­
ment without too much regard to our other requirements, 
but we shall all ensure that he is not allowed to lose 
interest in the other agreements when the General Agree­
ment has been nearly completed. But we shall never make 
any progress at all if we cannot come to some conclusion 
on the General Agreement,"(142) Kirkpatrick told the 
Foreign Office.
The British High Commissioner was able to induce his 
superiors to agree to the omission of the reference to a 
Council of Ambassadors from the treaty, which he had 
already hinted at on 24 September. Only the French were 
hankering after this Council in order "to demonstrate that 
Germany has not altogether escaped tutelage"(143). In the
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end, however, Kirkpatrick was able to persuade his rel­
uctant French counter part to abandon his insistence on 
the Council of Ambassadors with an assurance by the 
British and the Americans that they would agree with the 
French on a procedure for joint action in matters of 
common concern. "We have always contemplated it might be 
necessary and desirable to have something in the nature of 
a 'Charter of the Council of Ambassadors'. I think it 
remains in our interest to do so. If the French attempt to 
make it too detailed, formal and elaborate, we and the 
Americans should be able to resist them, and see that it 
is confined to essentials"(144). The Foreign Office agreed 
to Kirkpatrick's proposal, but insisted that this agreed 
procedure should not become a public document like the 
Charter of the High Commission.
On emergency powers the British were also willing to 
compromise: "there must remain in Germany some authority
able to exercise the normal powers of a national gover­
nment in the event of an external attack or threat of such 
an attack. The three Powers must be that authority: but we 
consider that we can safely come some way towards meeting 
the Chancellor's difficulties by agreeing that the three 
powers will only in such circumstances declare a state of 
emergency at the request of the Supreme Commander."(145)
The next month of negotiations, November 1951, star­
ted out very promisingly. After a meeting which lasted 
until midnight on 2 November, Kirkpatrick wrote a quick
183
note to the Foreign Office: "the Chancellor was in a more
accommodating mood than his experts on the drafting commi­
ttee had been. It seemed clear that he was anxious to 
reach quick agreement, partly in order to confound his 
critics who had accused him of being too optimistic. 
McCloy, who was in the Chair, took advantage of this 
circumstance to press him very hard and with some good 
effect, on the problem of our reserved rights and the 
emergency. The upshot of this marathon meeting was that we 
reached agreement on a draft which we could recommend to 
the favourable consideration of our Governments"(146).
In his more detailed comments on the meeting, which 
were sent two days later, he expanded on one point in the 
discussion which should remain a bone of contention 
throughout the negotiations: emergency powers. On 2 Novem­
ber Kirkpatrick demonstrated his ability as a good nego­
tiator to find a compromise on this issue: "McCloy's
firmness on this point led the Chancellor to make an 
impressive and effective statement that it was against 
the conception of human rights and impossible for him to 
ask the German people to accept that their democratic 
liberties should be suspendable at the arbitrary whim of 
three Foreign Powers without any recourse whatever to an 
independent authority for a review of their decision. 
McCloy was clearly impressed, and embarrassed by his in­
structions. He intimated to me that he would welcome any 
suggestion I could make, as he himself was precluded from 
making one. I accordingly threw out the idea that if the
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German Government at any time considered that circumstan­
ces warranted an end of the emergency regime they should 
be able to refer their request to the N.A.T.O. Council. 
This appealed to Adenauer, and I think to McCloy also. I 
am, however, inclined to think it would be more satisfac­
tory to press the Americans to adopt our proposal about 
the Arbitration Tribunal which would, I think, satisfy 
Adenauer."(147) On 6 November, however, Kirkpatrick re­
ceived instructions from the Foreign Office, that a German 
appeal to NATO was out of the question and that they 
should only be allowed to make representations to SACEUR. 
An appeal to the Arbitral Tribunal could neither be con­
templated: "the Federal Government should be satisfied
with the consultation clause."(148) This is the other side 
of Kirkpatrick's ability of finding a compromise: some­
times these compromises were throttled by his superiors in 
the Foreign Office.
The next meeting between Adenauer and the High Com­
missioners on 2 6 November was far less successful than the 
previous one; after six hours "very little progress was 
made and we parted in an acrimonious atmosphere", Kirkpat­
rick wrote in a telegram the next day. The Foreign Office, 
responding to Kirkpatrick's telegram, told him: "we feel
that it would not be tactically wise to give away further 
points to the Chancellor at a stage when he has evidently 
been led by the prospect of this Paris meeting into taking 
a generally unaccomodating line. We hope therefore that
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you may be able to persuade your colleagues to concentrate 
at tomorrow's meeting on working through those articles 
which were not discussed at the 8th meeting"(149). Kirk­
patrick, however, wrote back that developments in Germany 
had made that impossible: "McCloy has been turning the
heat on the Germans, apparently with some effect." The
American High Commissioner had produced revised texts of 
disputed articles, which Kirkpatrick deemed as "on the 
whole satisfactory. They do not in every respect meet all 
our original requirements, but I am satisfied we cannot 
hope to do better. The text reserving our rights is
entirely satisfactory."(150) Negotiating means finding and 
accepting compromises without giving up what is most 
important. Kirkpatrick as a good negotiator was able to 
achieve these compromises without ever giving up all the 
Allies' reserved rights.
During their meeting on 14 November the High Commis­
sioners and Adenauer managed to agree provisionally on a 
text of a General Treaty, except for Article V on emergen­
cy powers. "We did, however, run into one very serious 
snag on which we spent nearly four of our five hours in 
bitter controversy and without reaching a solution. This 
point concerns the interpretation of our text rather than 
the text itself. The matter at issue is our attitude
towards the former German territories East of the Oder- 
Neisse line"(151). Before the Chancellor's arrival, the 
High Commissioners had agreed to make it clear to him 
that, when the Three Powers referred to a unified Germany,
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they were referring only to the unification of the Eastern 
Zone and Berlin with the Federal Repbulic. "Adenauer reac­
ted very sharply, and throughout a long discussion main­
tained that this statement of our position was entirely 
new and unexpected from his point of view.■ He also poin­
ted out that this would have a profoundly unfavourable 
effect on German opinion and would destroy all chance of 
the treaty being ratified by the Bundestag.
"In the early stages of the discussion, before 
Adenauer had committed himself too deeply, I pointed 
out that he himself, no doubt for good political rea­
sons, had refrained until a very few months ago from 
publicly taking up the position that the Oder-Neisse 
territories must be reunited to Germany. He could har­
dly be surprised if our Government, for equally good 
reasons, proposed to continue their policy of remaining 
uncommitted on this issue. ... I also insisted that the 
new element in the situation was not our refusal to 
admit that a unified Germany must include these terri­
tories but the Chancellor's insistence that we should 
agree to include them. Our Governments had made 
repeated statements over the last six years making 
their position on this point absolutely clear; and 
there was no warrant for the Chancellor 's supposition 
that that position had ever been changed or would be 
changed by our treaty."
Throughout the discussion, Adenauer refused to be pinned 
down as to what he regarded as a satisfactory Eastern 
frontier; he did not rise to rather provocative statements 
by Kirkpatrick, "Sind wir etwa verpflichtet, Ihnen den 
polnischen Korridor wiederzugeben?"(152), or by McCloy on 
Koenigsberg, or even Francois-Poncet angry remark, that 
"French public opinion would certainly conclude that the 
Chancellor's aim in contributing to European defence was 
to the waging of a war of revenge to recover the Eastern 
territories." Instead, "he recognised throughout that we
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must reserve the position that a final frontier could only 
be established at the peace settlement; but he could not 
see why we could not now commit ourselves to the proposi­
tion that Germany must recover the Oder-Neisse territories 
at the peace t r e a t y (153)
There is an important and interesting point which 
should be added to the report on this controversy: the
British position on the Oder-Neisse line was not at all as 
clear cut as Kirkpatrick had suggested. The day after his 
telegram had been received in London the Prime Minister 
sent a note to the Secretary of State: "It is curious that 
in this long telegram the Oder-Neisse Line is several 
times mentioned without any apparent distinction being 
drawn between the Western and the Eastern Neisse. At 
Potsdam our position was to concede to Poland the 
territory up to the Eastern Neisse in compensation for 
their adopting the Curzon Line on the Russian Front; but 
we made it perfectly clear that we would not agree to the 
Western Neisse. The matter was shelved by being adjourned 
for the Peace Treaty. There were over three million Ger­
mans between these two tributaries of the Oder." The 
Foreign Office, however, recommended to the Secretary of 
State that "we must continue to maintain vis-a-vis the 
Germans the position that, pending a final settlement in 
the a Peace Treaty, we cannot be committed to any partic­
ular solution of the problem."(154)
Back to 1951: on 16 November the agreed report of
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the Allied High Commissioners on the position they had 
reached in their negotiations with the German Federal
Government was despatched for consideration by the respec­
tive Governments. Last minute attempts to amend or change 
the text of the General Treaty were unsuccessful: e.g.
Kirkpatrick received instructions to bring about the dele­
tion of the words "or the creation of a European Federa­
tion" from Article X paragraph 1; the British request, 
however, was met unfavourably and, like so many other 
points, it was reserved for discussion by the Foreign
Ministers in Paris.
In preparation for the Paris meeting of Foreign 
Ministers to be held at the end of November, Kirkpatrick 
was asked by the Foreign Office to supply a summary of the 
position reached in the negotiations. He wrote two letters 
in response: in the first, he listed three points of
special difficulty in the negotiations, which in his opi­
nion could conceivably prove breaking points, namely emer­
gency powers, possible security controls on German in­
dustry and the German financial contribution (in a later 
letter he added a fourth point: war criminals). The second 
letter is especially interesting as Kirkpatrick gave his 
opinion on the Germans at that time. On the whole, he
wrote, the German people want to reach agreement with the
Western Powers and to make a contribution to defence. "The 
difficulties we are encountering derive principally from 
the weakness of Adenauer's political position."
The Chancellor, according to Kirkpatrick, was proba-
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bly willing to accept much more readily solutions satis­
factory to the Allies, "but he is not a free agent." His 
slim majority in parliament depended on a coalition, which 
had proved far from reliable to back him up all the time. 
"The Chancellor has, properly and necessarily from his 
point of view, determined that he must keep parliament 
closely informed of the progress of our negotiations. For 
this purpose a special sub-committee of the Bundestag For­
eign Affairs Committee has been established", in which the 
two SPD members appeared to be far the most active "and 
the Chancellor's advisers undoubtedly defer to them to a 
considerable extend." In Kirkpatrick's opinion, however, 
the Chancellor was not totally blameless for the current 
difficulties. He was all too hasty to make short-term 
political capital out of situations: "he is a spendthrift
of his political credit, far too prone to consume the iron 
rations he should keep in store for tight corners." Also 
"he is all for having a General Agreement ... but he is 
very reluctant to swallow the full dose of medicine we 
have prepared for him in the shape of the supplementary 
Conventions."
Kirkpatrick delivered a damning description of the 
German character:
"The Germans have a tendency to regard foreign relations 
both from a very formal point of view, and with great 
suspicion of the goodwill and intentions of those with 
whom they negotiate. On the one hand, they are inclined 
to believe that good relations can be established by 
treaty, quite ignoring that they can only in fact be 
established by a habit of fair dealing, by mutual 
confidence and good faith. On the other hand, they are
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inclined to prejudice the chances of that mutual 
confidence developing by assuming that every proposal 
make by their negotiating partners is made with the 
intention of doing them down. This may be because many 
of their own proposals have this intention; but it is 
principally because their whole history has left them 
without experience of the possibility of honest co­
operation on an equal basis with other powers, and with 
a cynical belief that in every relationship one partner 
must be dominant and the other dominated, with no room 
left for compromise."
In the current negotiations that meant that the Germans 
stressed formal equality far too much, in Kirkpatrick's 
opinion, seeking "to get every aspect of it documented and 
prescribed in advance of embarking on the course which can 
earn it for them.■ Equality of consideration could only be 
the consequence of equality of responsibility; this should 
be evident to the Germans, wrote Kirkpatrick, "and to do 
him justice I think it is evident to the Chancellor, 
almost alone among them."(155)
These letters illustrate Kirkpatrick's attitude to­
wards the Germans and his negotiations with them. Ever 
since his time at the British Embassy in Berlin before the 
second World War he had held a rather anti-German view and 
even when he became British High Commissioner in Germany 
he was still suspicious of them. Lord Palmerston had 
once said that Britain had no eternal enemies or perpetual 
friends but only eternal interests. The anti-German 
Kirkpatrick was convinced that it was in the interest of 
the British to tie the Federal Republic of Germany firmly 
to the West. The German Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, 
had many short-comings, but he was the one German politi­
cian who, in Kirkpatrick's opinion, could deliver what the
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British wanted. It was therefore important to keep him in 
his present position as Chancellor and Kirkpatrick was 
often willing to compromise in his negotiations with 
Adenauer in order to help him fight his internal political 
battles.
The Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris in November 
1951 was important in two respects: first, the German
Chancellor was invited to Paris and took part in the 
discussions between the Foreign Ministers on the final day 
of the conference, 22 November. This was a novelty and 
marked the beginning of a new phase in the relations 
between the four countries. Second, on that day the Gene­
ral Convention, which settled the fundamental questions of 
the future relations between the Federal Republic of Ger­
many and the Three Powers, was initialled by Acheson,
Schuman, Eden and Adenauer. Although it was agreed that
the Convention was not to be published until the related 
conventions had been worked out, and the communique of the 
conference only spoke of the reaching of an agreement on 
the General Convention, this agreement also marks the 
beginning of a new phase in the negotiations between
Adenauer and the Allied High Commissioners: the general
principles had been agreed, now the work on the details 
had to begin. As Kirkpatrick had pointed out in his let­
ter, Adenauer was far less keen on the details in the 
related conventions and proved very obstinate, but so did 
the Allies: while it had taken nine official meetings
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between them to get to an agreement on the principles in 
the General Convention, it took a further 22 meetings and 
two Foreign Ministers conferences to come to a total 
agreement on all the details and all the conventions. In a 
letter to Frank Roberts at the Foreign Office on 21 
January 1952, two months after the Paris Conference, 
Kirkpatrick gave three reasons why, in his opinion, the 
negotiations were rather slow:
"First of all, we are conducting not one negotiation but 
two, for whenever a difference of attitude arises 
between the Three Powers, and they are very frequent, 
that has to be ironed out before we can get on with the 
Germans. Second, the various levels at which the 
negotiation has to be conducted here do not make for 
speed. To hoist a point up from the Rapporteur's Group 
through the Steering Committee to the High Commissioners 
and the Chancellor is likely to take ten days or a 
fortnight at least; and if it is a point to which 
importance is attached neither side is likely to give 
way before the top level. Third, the negotiations are 
being conducted on both sides (and this perhaps affects 
the British more than anyone) by people with a great 
deal of ordinary work to do."(156)
This last point became more and more pressing until 16 
April when the High Commissioners and the Chancellor de­
cided that from 22 April their experts would go into 
seclusion, freed from all other duties or obligations, at 
the American Headquarters in Mehlem, and work uninter­
ruptedly until all the conventions and related papers had 
been agreed; a British official, Con O'Neill, was to 
become a kind of 'whip' of the experts; the High Commis­
sioners and Adenauer also agreed to meet if necessary 
every day at short notice for one or two hours to solve 
problem, on which their experts were unable to reach an 
agreement. This, however, was the final spurt in April/May
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1952. It was proceded by three months of long negotiations 
filled with moments of hope and frustration, with new 
initiatives and new instructions.
In the previously quoted letter of 21 January, 
Kirkpatrick had given a progress report of the negotia­
tions since the Paris meeting. Only one of the four prob­
lematic points, which he had described in his November 
letter, namely emergency powers, had been settled in 
Paris. Since then "we have been making reasonably good 
progress here, in so far as the thoroughly refractory 
nature of the material permits. The Status Convention, 
concerned with the Allied Troops in Germany, was "taking 
shape", although there were at least three stubborn points 
still outstanding: jurisdiction over offences against the
security of the Allied forces, the status of the depen­
dants of Allied forces and the G.S.O. One large chapter on 
the rights of the forces had scarcely been discussed yet; 
it was to loom large in the later stages of the negotia­
tions and to produce such curious but nevertheless long 
and complicated discussions, for example those on the 
American demand for hunting and fishing rights for their 
soldiers. Only on one of twelve parts of the Programmes 
Convention, Refugees and Displaced Persons, had complete 
agreement been reached by January 1952. The Charter of the 
Arbitration Tribunal was nearing completion, but talks had 
not even started on Security Controls or the Financial 
Convention; the latter would contain very detailed provi-
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sions governing procedures for provision of logistic and 
material support for the Allied forces, on some of which 
Kirkpatrick rightly expected strong German opposition; the 
negotiations would also be complicated by the question 
whether French troops, which were supposed to join German 
troops in the EDC as equal partners, were to be different
from then on from the British and American troops.
After the meeting with the Chancellor on 22 January, 
Kirkpatrick made an interesting observation: "I think that 
the Chancellor is very anxious to reach early agreement 
and is prepared to take a broader and more tolerant view 
of the individual problems than any of the three Western 
Governments who all have their pet hobbies viz. protection 
of the Jews and deconcentration in America, control of 
industry in France, etc. Kirkpatrick ommited to mention 
that the British had "pet hobbies" as well, one of them
was the Finance Convention: "on finance we made some
progress," he wrote. "I think the Chancellor has been 
beating Schaeffer and Blank on the head. In any event they 
accepted relatively tamely the conditions under which we 
agreed to access to the Wise Men. In fact they agreed so 
tamely that I could not believe that it was true; and I 
tried to pin Schaeffer down and to make him say speci­
fically that the division would appear in the contract, 
etc. etc. The Chancellor gave me satisfactory replies to 
these questions, but I had the impression that Schaeffer 
will need careful watching if he is not to run out again. 
Anyhow it seems to me that yesterday's proceedings do mark
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a step in a d v a n c e (157)
In fact, one month later, when the Wise Men had fixed 
the financial contribution of Federal Republic towards the 
common defence, a very acrimonious debate took place bet­
ween Kirkpatrick and the German Finance Minister, Schaef­
fer, about the fixing of the occupation costs in this 
framework: the Germans wanted to pay 500 Million DM, the
High Commissioners insisted on 600 Million or the possibi­
lity of a supplementary budget. Kirkpatrick tried to in­
fluence the Chancellor by quoting Britain's precarious 
financial situation: "Ich fuerchte, dieser Vorschlag wird
keinen guten Eindruck machen, denn waehrend wir in England 
ein Not-Budget machen und die oeffentlichen und sozialen 
Ausgaben senken, erklaert Deutschland, dass es eine solche 
Ausgabensenkung nicht vornehmen will." Adenauer countered 
this by quoting the enormeous expenditure needed for 
reconstruction and the settling of refugees. They finally 
agreed, like they did on so many of the issues in these 
negotiations, on a mutually agreeable form of words: "Es
wird vereinbart, dass die Bundesregierung in einem Brief- 
wechsel mit der AHK die Erwartung ausspricht, dass die 
Besatzungskosten in der Uebergangszeit 500 Millionen nicht 
ueberschreiten und dass die AHK in einem Bestaeti- 
gungsschreiben versichert, dass man sich bemuehen werde, 
eine solche Ueberschreitung zu vermeiden." One day later 
the agreement was finalised: in the fiscal year 1952/1953
8.8 billion DM was to be paid; 2 billion the first four
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months and 6.8 billion during the next 8 months.(158)
A Bundestag debate on the negotiations in February 
went rather badly; when McCloy saw the Chancellor after­
wards he seemed tired and dispirited, but had said that he 
saw no reason why the Bundestag resolutions should arrest 
the negotiations. When the High Commissioners discussed 
the debate at a private meeting on 11 February, Francois- 
Poncet claimed that the Bundestag's resolution VI (3) vir­
tually demanded that "we should abandon our programme 
conventions. But McCloy and I argued," Kirkpatrick teleg­
raphed to London, "that, although the Bundestag might be 
putting us on notice that they would be reluctant to 
ratify the programme conventions, the text of the resol­
ution itself did not proclude the perpetuation of allied 
legislation by an agreement to which the Federal Gover­
nment was a party." McCloy, during this meeting, told the 
other two that he had received a telegram from Mr. Acheson 
which betrayed extreme exasperation: "In fact he had never 
received a similar telegram form Mr. Acheson. When 
Francois-Poncet innocently asked why, Mr. McCloy replied 
that Mr. Acheson was irritated by his correspondence with 
M. Schuman as well as by the Germans who were demanding 
too much. Mr. McCloy added that Mr. Acheson had said in 
his telegram tha but for the King's funeral he would not 
have come to Europe at all in present circumstances"(159).
Both the Americans and the British were becoming 
increasingly fed up with French tactics: on 7 February
Francois-Poncet had declined to approve a recommendation
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by the High Commissioners to their Governments on the 
invitation of Adenauer to London; the American and British 
High Commissioner then decided to despatch the text never­
theless as representing at least their joint view. 
Kirkpatrick told the Foreign Office that "We are clearly 
in a critical phase and we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the whole negotiation will collapse." He saw no way 
to complete the negotiations before the conference. "Neve­
rtheless I do not think this situation should necessarily 
rule out a visit by Dr. Adenauer to London to join the 
three Foreign Ministers for a conference after they have 
completed their own preliminary conference ... Such a 
meeting would in fact accelerate progress if it could 
lead to decisions on half-a-dozen disputed points. But if 
it takes place it should be made clear, both in the invi­
tation to the Chancellor and in accompanying publicity, 
that its purpose is not the conclusion of our negotiations 
but a general review of the position they have reached and 
the settlement of a certain number of outstanding points 
now ripe for decision at Ministerial level. It would 
certainly help the Chancellor if he could be invited to a 
conference even with this limited purpose. If he is not 
invited the omission, after all the publicity this matter 
has had here, will be interpreted as a deliberate 
slight"(160).
With this statement of unequivocal support for an 
invitation to Adenauer, Kirkpatrick had taken a position
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opposed to the opinion of his own Secretary of State. Eden 
had sent a telegram to the British Embassy in Washington 
on 2 February in which he had made his feelings clear: "I
notice that Acheson seems to take it for granted that 
Adenauer will join the three Foreign Ministers. I am by no 
means sure that this would be wise and my talks with the 
French this afternoon confirm me in this. I thought that I 
had made it clear when I first suggested the meeting in 
London that we would only ask Adenauer to join us if the 
progress of the contractual negotiations made this propi­
tious" (161) . The Foreign Secretary, however, could finally 
be persuaded that Adenauer's participation in at least 
some of the meetings in London would be useful after all.
The three High Commissioners did agree on a joint 
report to the Foreign Ministers on the status of the con­
tractual negotiations. Their assessment of the Bundestag 
resolutions was that they showed concern over equality of 
rights, but that they were "worded in terms sufficiently 
moderate and general or have sufficient escape clauses to 
leave the Chancellor reasonable free to meet the Allied 
requirements"(162). The points which they submitted for 
resolution by the ministers were divided into two groups: 
firstly, subjects on which tripartite ageement was needed 
before any further discussion with the Federal Chancellor, 
namely on war criminals and on security controls; and 
secondly, subjects on which there was disagreement between 
the High Commissioners and the Federal Chancellor: compo­
sition of the Supreme Restitution Court and obligation of
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the Federal Republic to satisfy restitution judgements 
against the former Reich; exemption from the equalisation 
of burdens levy (Lastenausgleich); compensation for German 
external assets taken in safehaven countries; and the 
Convention on Economic and Financial Participation. 
It had been hoped that the meetings in London would give 
the negotiations a new impetus. That hope was shattered, 
however, on 10 March 1952, when the Soviet leader, Joseph 
Stalin, proposed to conclude a peace treaty with an all- 
German Government; Germany was to be reunified in the 
borders "agreed" at the Potsdam Conference and also neu­
tralised after the withdrawal of all foreign troops; she 
was to be given a national army for defensive purposes; 
there was to be ban on all anti-democratic or militaristic 
organisations, but democratic rights and parties should be 
guaranteed. Although the High Commissioners and the German 
Chancellor agreed during their meeting on 11 March that 
the Stalin Note should not influence the progress of the 
negotiations, Kirkpatrick noticed on 3 April that "prog­
ress has been conspicuously slow for the last three 
weeks"(163) .
On the other hand, the new Soviet initiative seemed 
to unite the Western Allies and the Germans in the common 
purpose at a time when their negotiations had been bogged 
down by details. On 17 March, the igh Commissioners and 
Adenauer devoted their whole meeting to the discussion of 
an Allied answer to the Note. Adenauer made it clear that
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the Federal Government was opposed to a Four Power confe­
rence, but that a complete 'No' as an answer would not be 
right either; he was under immense pressure from the 
opposition over the Stalin Note and he proposed that the 
Allied answer should expose the real intentions of the 
Soviet Union by posing precise questions on the content of 
Note. Even the French, faced with the Soviet initiative 
and its appeal to certain sections of the French and the 
German public, now seemed in a hurry; Francois-Poncet said 
during the meeting: "Ob es eine Konferenz gebe oder nicht, 
ob die Frage in einem Notenaustausch mit der Sowjet- 
regierung weiter behandelt wuerde oder nicht, ist gleich- 
gueltig. Die Arbeiten an der europaeischen Integration 
(Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, Generalvertrag) muessten be- 
schleunigt zu Ende gefuehrt werden."(164)
Kirkpatrick was getting extremely frustrated that so 
little progress had been made recently in the contractual 
negotiations, even on questions where agreement had been 
thought to have been reached in principle. He therefore 
suggested in a letter to the Foreign Office on 19 March 
that a special conference should be called to speed up the 
process. On 2 April he received a reply from Frank Roberts 
at the Foreigh Office: "While we want to get on as fast as 
possible with the contract its timing is dependent on that 
of the E.D.C. negotiations. The latest news on this is 
that the E.D.C. treaty is unlikely to be ready for 
signature before May. We are not, therefore, under imme­
diate pressure on this account. ... While, therefore, we
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share your anxiety less any excessive delay might lead to 
the collaps of the structure we have been building, we 
also agree with you that the time has not yet come to make 
a supreme effort to bring the negotiations to an end in 
the immediate future. We do not, therefore, feel that we 
need now consider calling a special conference somewhere 
other than in Bonn with instructions to the delegates to 
finish the whole negotiation within a stated time limit. 
But we shall not overlook this suggestion"(165). His 
suggestion rebuffed, Kirkpatrick therefore battled on in 
the regular negotiations and used his chairmanship in the 
month of April to try to settle as many outstanding points 
as possible.
The first meeting in April produced only partial 
success: in an eight hour marathon session, ending at mid­
night, they were only able to cover 16 out of the 28 
points on the agenda. A few minor points were agreed, as 
for example the exemption of UN nationals from the German 
equalisation of burden laws (Lastenausgleich); some ques­
tions were brought nearer to a solution, as the question 
of Restitution Claims against the former Reich; "on other 
questions we met real difficulties largely owing to the 
fact that they were fresh to the Chancellor and he had 
been inadequately briefed", Kirkpatrick wrote in his tele­
gram to the Foreign Office. "Thus on Reparations he showed 
great indignation at everything his experts had previously 
accepted and virtually destroyed the existing partly ag-
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reed draft. But he clearly did not know what he was tal­
king about and the damage may be patched up by the ex­
perts. He also waxed very indignant over proposals for 
limiting the freedom of the Federal Government to repeal 
certain Allied legislation, including Control Council
Laws, affecting our future reserved powers, but here again 
I think a solution will be possible if we adopt a slightly 
different but harmless tack"(166).
This last point was in a way a return to an old
argument: Adenauer was opposed to mentioning the 1945
Declaration in the list of Allied legislation which could 
not be repealed. Kirkpatrick repeated his old argument: 
"die Aufrechterhaltung dieser Proklamation sei den Russen 
gegenueber notwendig. Ihre Aufhebung mache Verhandlungen 
mit den Russen unmoeglich." The Chancellor very acrimone- 
ously declared that "mit der Erwaehnung der Proklamation 
Nr.l werde er sich niemals einverstanden erklaeren," and 
quoted the General Convention; Kirkpatrick replied that 
the Allies had signed this treaty with the condition that 
the Federal Republic would not question the Allies' posi­
tion in Germany, to which the Chancellor retorted: "Das
passt doch zum Generalvertrag wie die Faust aufs Auge!" 
The British High Commissioner, however, succeeded in the 
end in getting a statement out of the Chancellor that he 
had no intention of repealing the proclamation.(167)
The next meeting turned out to be very much more 
harmonious and Kirkpatrick sent an enthusiastic report to 
London: "Our meeting with the Chancellor on 9th April was
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probably the most successful in the whole long series we 
have had with him. He was obviously out to get agreement, 
and proved ready to accept compromise solutions, which 
secure our requirements, on a variety of subjects. The 
absence on leave of Schaeffer and Hallstein probably con­
tributed to the ease of the proceedings. We reached agree­
ment on some nine points, the most important of which 
were: (a) Restitution Claims against the Reich; (b) Proce­
dure for the Provision of Goods, Services and Accomodation 
for the Forces; (c) Powers of the Arbitration Tribunal; 
and (d) Pre-emergency clauses"(168). His optimism, how­
ever, was not entirely justified: for example the ar­
guments over the pre-emergency clauses were not settled 
completely until after the meeting on 28 April. In 
Kirkpatrick's opinion the Germans deserved a pat on the 
back for good behaviour and he therefore asked the Foreign 
Office for authorisation to propose to his colleagues that 
the Federal Republic should be granted the privilege of 
having the instruments of ratification deposited in its 
archives: "To do so will involve the paying of a slight
compliment to the Germans which they will appreciate and 
will avoid the difficulty of choosing among the three 
Allied Governments."(169)
At this stage, when the negotiating partners were 
starting to discuss seriously a timetable for completion 
of the treaties, a subject which had complicated the 
process at the very beginning of the negotiations was
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raised again by the Americans: the security guarantee for
Germany. The Americans proposed to scrap the guarantee as 
it was redundant in view of more recent proposals such as 
the EDC/NATO link up agreed at the NATO Council meeting in 
Lisbon, the proposed treaty between the United Kingdom and 
the EDC, and the planned tripartite declaration in which 
the British and American intention to maintain forces in 
Europe was to be expressed. In a telegram to the British 
High Commissioner the Foreign Office pointed out that 
Berlin was not explicitly covered by these agreements, but 
that it seemed hardly conceivable that an attack upon 
Berlin would not involve an attack on the Allied Forces 
there and thereby bring NATO into play: "On the other hand 
it is most important that both the Russians and Berliners 
should be aware of our commitments with regard to Berlin 
and should not gain the impression that we have weakened 
the force of the New York declaration of 1950. Any miscon­
ception in this respect might tempt the Russians into rash 
action, as in Korea, with incalculable results. It is also 
important to sustain Berlin morale. It would also be 
unfortunate at this delicate stage in our German negotia­
tions if Dr. Adenauer derived the impression that we were 
going back on an important point of principle previously 
agreed"(170).
The Foreign Office asked Kirkpatrick for further 
comments before making a decision on whether he should 
join his American colleague in putting the proposal to 
scrap the guarantee to the Germans. Kirkpatrick made his
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opinion very clear in a telegram two days later: "I do not 
at all like the U.S. proposal to scrap the German Security 
Guarantee agreed on by the four Foreign Ministers in Paris 
last November." He gave two main reasons for his opposi­
tion. The first was that it would have a very bad effect 
on the Chancellor: "You will recollect that the Chancellor 
was originally anxious that our guarantee should be in­
cluded in the General Convention ... and was only with 
difficulty persuaded to accept instead a guarantee by 
declaration of the Three Powers. I have no doubt he would 
be very reluctant to agree to abandon this declaration 
now; and we should have a hard job in persuading him that 
it is equally well covered in other documents. The guaran­
tee if maintained will represent an important element in 
the whole contractual package as presented to the German 
public and Bundestag, and will be a considerable induce­
ment to the latter to proceed to ratification." The second 
reason was the negative effect on the morale of the 
Berliners; they were bound to seize on the absence of a 
specific and special guarantee for the city against at­
tack: "and I cannot but feel it is possible that any overt 
diminution of the guarantee now in force for Berlin would 
be noticed by the Russians and might induce them to draw 
dangerous conclusions."(171)
The French, however, supported by the Americans, 
expressed strong objections to the idea of retaining the 
security guarantee. They argued that the Germans should
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manifestly be threatened with the loss of all guarantees 
if they seceded from the European Defence Community; if 
they were granted a security guarantee independent of the 
protection they would enjoy under the EDC and the related 
treaties, they would not loose anything or be penalised if 
they seceded from the Community. In the French view, the 
German Chancellor could be persuaded to accept the scrap­
ping of the security guarantee by demonstrating to him the 
value of a treaty over a guarantee enshrined in a unila­
teral declaration. They proposed that Berlin should be 
protected by a declaration made approximately in the terms 
of the draft "German Security Declaration", but relating 
only to Berlin.
Kirkpatrick was alone in his unequivocal support for 
the maintenance of the security guarantee. On 1 May he 
received a secret message from the Foreign Secretary: "I
agree generally with arguments in your telegram No. 408 
against scrapping the draft agreed last November. I should 
still prefer to avoid reopening the matter with Dr. 
Adenauer if possible. However, my chief preoccupation 
relates to Berlin and this would be met by French proposal 
in paragraph 2 of Paris telegram under reference. 
Accordingly if your French and U.S. colleagues receive 
instructions to discuss the matter with Dr. Adenauer, you 
should agree to this being done, but on the condition that 
a suitable statement is made in the form of either a 
declaration or of a letter to Reuter on the subject of 
Berlin"(172) .
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During a meeting on 8 May, the American High Com­
missioner finally raised the matter officially with 
Adenauer, chosing a very clever and outwardly successful 
line of argument: "it had become desirable," McCloy repor­
tedly stated, "to consolidate the various guarantees and 
declarations under consideration to avoid a multiplicity 
of texts. Therefore there was much to be said in favour of 
abandoning the text agreed on in Paris and relying on the 
guarantees exchanged between NATO and the EDC." The Chan­
cellor replied that he would welcome such a consolidation 
and was presented with an American draft security declara­
tion to cover Berlin. Kirkpatrick betrayed surprise at the 
Chancellor's reaction, especially after having stood up 
for what he had thought to be a vital German interest: "We 
must now await the Chancellor's further reactions after 
studying this text but his initial reaction was certainly 
less critical than I had anticipated"(173).
The draft declaration which the American High Commis­
sioner presented to Adenauer had not been agreed upon 
tripartitely and O'Neill complained to the Foreign Office 
that "the Americans rather bounced us here (not I am sure 
from any calculation of advantage but simply in a general 
desire to rush ahead rapidly) by giving the Germans the 
text contained in our telegram No.480. I have since taken 
an opportunity to make it clear to Blankenhorn that the 
various amendments indicated in this text were American 
proposals only and that the whole text must be regarded as
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incomplete as it is still under consideration between the 
Three Powers. As we anticipated, the Germans have already 
spotted the reference to 'their forces in Berlin' and are 
telling the Americans that it will make an extremely 
unfortunate impression if the New York guarantee for Ber­
lin is diminished in this way"(174). On this point the 
opinion of the British element of the Allied High Commis­
sion was supported by Foreign Office: "since the U.S.
Government were able in the New York Declaration of Sep­
tember 1950 to guarantee Berlin as such," the Foreign 
Secretary wrote, "I do not understand 'Congressional rea­
sons ' for referring now only to an attack upon their 
forces in Berlin. The change, as you say, is bound to be 
disliked by the Germans and, as you have seen from Paris 
telegram No.267 we shall have French support in resisting 
it"(175).
Although Kirkpatrick had started the month of April 
in an optimistic mood, he wrote in a letter to Roberts on 
3 May that the situation had deteriorated. The Finance 
Convention still had not been finished; Adenauer was get­
ting anxious about expected difficulties in getting the 
treaties ratified by the German Upper House, the Bundes- 
rat; and several points, on which an agreement seemed to 
have been reached before, were raised again. The Allied 
High Commission was under increasing pressure especially 
from the American Government to bring the negotiations to 
a successful conclusion. Although Kirkpatrick told Roberts 
that the Germans were mainly responsible for the delay, he
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also imparted some of the blame to the Western Powers, who 
could not "bring themselves to pay regard to the great 
issues at stake and insist on holding out over some point 
which is not of capital importance. And here curiously 
enough the worst sinners are the Americans themselves."
As an illustration of this point he included a list 
of 2 0 points which he divided into three groups: impor­
tant, significant but not vital, and minor points. Amongst 
the important points he counted maintenance of Allied 
legislation, expression of Germany's continuing financial 
obligation, reparations and the waiver of claims, which 
had all been yielded by the Germans; the other two impor­
tant points, prohibited weapons and war criminals, were 
still not settled. There were six points in his second 
group: two, the liquidation of the DKV (Deutsche Kohle
Verkaufsorganisation) and customs exemption for the Allied 
forces, had been yielded by the Germans; on two, the 
German Service Organisations and pre-emergency powers, a 
compromise had been reached, on the latter in the Allies' 
favour; the remaining two points in this group, priority 
of military requirements and free use of Laender property 
and facilities, were not settled yet; of the eight points 
in the last group of minor there were five, in which only 
the Americans were interested. This stood in stark con­
trast to only one point, the GSO, which the British were 
solely interested in and on which they had accepted a 
compromise, and thirteen points which had been either
210
proposed by all three Allies or at least by a combination 
of two of the three.
"On the American side the worst offender is General 
Handy, who is a veritable Chinese war lord, who de­
mands for his troops a situation out of harmony with 
the whole conception. For example, we have discussed 
at three meetings General Handy's demand that an Ame­
rican soldier should not have to pay the normal German 
contribution for a hunting trophy; and the point is 
still not settled. As you will see there are other 
minor American points, some of them not settled whilst 
others have wasted hours of our time. It is difficult 
to reconcile the tenacity on these points with a 
desire to finish quickly. Secondly, if the Americans 
want rapid signature they should not reopen the Gene­
ral Convention. I forsee delays owing to the scrapping 
of the Security Guarantee."(176)
This list proves the point that the British, in contrast 
to the Americans and the French, were mainly concerned 
with the ultimate goal of the negotiations and were there­
fore more willing to make concessions on details.
One of the main aims of the British in the negotia­
tions was the need to share the burden of the defence of 
Europe with the Federal Republic of Germany. Kirkpatrick 
himself had made a note in his diary during his trip to 
Washington in September 1951 on that subject: "I saw Hugh
Gaitskell, Plowden and Rowan who were in Washington on 
Treasury business. I tried to impress on them that we 
could not indefinitely afford to allow Germany to escape 
the burden of armaments. Otherwise we should by an act of 
our own volition be placing Germany in a position to 
compete unfairly in overseas trade. Germany would capture 
our markets, we should then be unable to sustain our 
effort and the consequence would be that whilst Germany 
was not allowed to make armaments, we should not have the
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resources to make them. But the collapse of Western defen­
ce would not be the only consequence. More serious still 
would be the circumstance that we had hoisted Germany into 
a position of economic preponderance in Europe. A Germany 
in that situation would be a greater nuisance and indeed a 
greater danger to us than a Germany with an army and an 
armaments industry limited by treaty and by her own econo­
mic and manpower capacity"(177). Britain's precarious 
financial situation at that time meant that one of the 
main prerogatives during the contractual negotiations was 
to keep Britain's financial commitment to Germany and 
Europe as small as possible; it is therefore not surpri­
sing that Kirkpatrick listed the expression of Germany's 
continuing financial obligation as one of the important 
points and as one in which mainly the United Kingdom and 
the United States were interested.
Kirkpatrick went to some length to point out to the 
German Government the advantages of reaching this final 
goal: "The end of the occupation regime will bring massive 
economic advantage to Germany. On the date of the entry 
into force Germany will receive about D.M. 1 milliard in 
foreign exchange through troops expenditure here. This 
figure will rise gradually to some D.M. 5 milliard about 
2 0 months after entry into force." He also pointed out the 
sacrifices which his own government was willing to make: 
"The commitment to station troops for the defence of 
Germany is an unprecedented political, military and finan-
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cial burden. For example this commitment at present prices 
is likely to cost Britain, who already has a defence 
budget of about D.M. 17 milliards an additional expendi­
ture of 1.5 milliards in foreign exchange. The cost to 
Britain of the forces in Germany (4 1/2 Divisions and a 
large Air Force) is already about D.M. 3 milliards (equip­
ment, pay, rations, transportation, etc.). In order to 
maintain this force in Germany, in addition to the neces­
sary forces in Austria, Trieste, Middle East, Africa, 
Malaya, Hong-Kong, and Korea, Britain must: (a) maintain a
total strength of 830,000 men; (b) denude Britain of 
troops; and hazard the flower of her European army on the 
continent"(178).
The month of May 1952, the final month of negotia­
tions, was going to demand the utmost perseverance and 
energy, the ultimate characteristics of a good negotiator, 
from all the negotiating partners: 6 official meetings
between the Chancellor and the High Commissioners, 66 
hours of negotiations on 106 items of the agenda, were 
necessary to get the set of treaties ready to be finalised 
and signed by the three Foreign Ministers and the German 
Chancellor.
On 1 May Adenauer presented the Allied High Commis­
sioner with a memorandum. He emphasised that the parlia­
mentary situation of the Federal Government had become 
extremely difficult with regard to the General Treaty and 
the Related Conventions. Kirkpatrick acknowledged these 
difficulities when he wrote to the Foreign Office: "I have
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discussed the position and our prospects with McCloy and 
Berard, and we are all agreed that it is unlikely that the 
coalition parties will allow the Chancellor to sign unless 
he can say that he has secured some concessions. We are 
also agreed that we should not recommend concessions in 
those matters in which our Governments have a vital inte­
rest. We also agree that before selecting possible conces­
sions in the other matters we should see what amendments 
the Germans propose, both in regard to making the Conven­
tions more palatable in appearance and in regard to the 
elimination of those items likely to create difficulties 
in the Bundesrat"(179).
This last point, the expected difficulties in the 
Bundesrat, provoked some of the most bitter exchanges 
between Adenauer and the High Commissioners during their 
meeting on 8 May. The Chancellor urged the exclusion of 
certain clauses, which would require the consent of the 
Upper House, because he feared that otherwise its rejec­
tion of some of these could endanger the whole set of 
agreements; he proposed that two sets of agreements should 
be drawn up. McCloy was very doubtful whether the Allied 
Governments would accept such an arrangement: "Der Kon-
gress werde einwenden, dass er einen Vertrag ratifizieren 
solle, der alle alliierten Leistungen bzw. Zugestaendnisse 
enthalte, ohne dass er die im zweiten Vertrag enthaltenen 
deutschen Gegenleistungen kenne. Er muesse befuerchten, 
vom Capitol gestuerzt zu werden"(180). Equally problematic
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was the Chancellor's proposal that the Contractual Agree­
ments should come into effect before ratification of the 
EDC Treaty; throughout the whole negotiation the premise 
had been made that both were to be linked. "In short, a 
great deal of recasting of our agreements would be neces­
sary. I am therefore at present inclined to recommend that 
we should not meet the Chancellor's proposal;" Kirkpatrick 
wrote to the Foreign Office. "I doubt whether on further 
reflection the Americans will want to either. But if we 
are to overcome the many other difficulties which still 
exist and are arising we may have to make some considerab­
le concession; and this one might therefore be worth at 
least considering further." The ratification issue indeed 
remained on the agenda until the signing of the agree­
ments .
Kirkpatrick was more willing to make concessions on 
minor points such as the Chancellor's proposal on the 
issue of war criminals: “I should see some advantage in
meeting him here. I think it is in the interest of the
Occupying Powers as well as of the Germans that present
responsibilities in respect of war criminals should be
superseded as soon as possible by the new regime. Moreover 
the proposal would constitute an incentive to ratify
quickly in view of the importance attached by all parties 
to this question."(181) The Allies did accept the German 
proposals on war criminals during the meeting with the 
Chancellor on 13 May. Adenauer asked for more concessions, 
but Kirkpatrick was not worried: "I believe that they are
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susceptible of solution and that if we show elasticity we 
can give the Chancellor enough to satisfy the parties 
without serious damage to our interests"(182).
Their next meeting was the longest in the whole se­
ries: starting around 11 o'clock on 15 May it lasted until 
the early hours of the morning of the next day. "On the 
whole we made progress. A number of minor and some impor­
tant issues were solved. There is no doubt that the Chan­
cellor is extremely anxious to push on rapidly and is 
ready to surrender small points"(183), Kirkpatrick wrote 
in an interim report, which he sent to London when they 
had been in session for about 12 hours. All three High 
Commissioners had agreed before the meeting that 
Adenauer's proposal for entry into force of the contrac­
tual agreements before the ratification of the EDC Treaty 
was unacceptable; when they made this clear "the Chancel­
lor took this calmly, but asked whether we could not agree 
instead to have an exchange of letters in which our Gover­
nments would undertake, after the Contractual Agreements 
had been ratified by all parties to them and the EDC 
Treaty had been ratified by the Germany and France, to 
meet together to consider and establish by mutual agree­
ment what parts of the Contractual Agreement might be 
brought into force before the period provided under their 
provision. McCloy accepted this proposal and I did like­
wise. It seems to me perfectly reasonable, even in this 
form should constitute a valuable incentive to more rapid
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ratification by Germany"(184); on 19 May Kirkpatrick re­
ceived a telegram from London saying that the Foreign 
Secretary agreed with this proposal.
The other tricky point that was discussed again was 
the latest Allied draft of a security guarantee. The Chan­
cellor raised two main objections: firstly, the 1951 gua­
rantee had spoken of the stationing of troops within the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin; 
the new draft only covered Berlin and otherwise spoke of
maintaining armed forces on the continent of Europe.
Secondly, while the reciprocal guarantees covered the 
Federal Republic, the new draft said only that the Allies 
would treat as an attack upon themselves any attack 
against their armed forces in Berlin. As before, 
Kirkpatrick was unequivocal in his support for Adenauer: 
"I very much hope the points the Chancellor objected to 
can be put right. The second point seems to me of very 
great importance"(185).
For the discussion of the first point on the agenda 
of the meeting on 21 May the secretaries who normally kept 
the minutes were mysteriously excluded and Kirkpatrick's 
telegram to London seems to be the only record of it. At
first it seemed that the Chancellor wanted to reopen
discussions on Article 7(3) of the General Convention 
which dealt with the rights and obligations of a unified 
Germany.
"After much explanation the point the Chancellor was dri­
ving at emerged as follows. Some of his most influential 
supporters feared that our reserved right relating to
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Germany as a whole (Article 2(1)) might be interpreted by 
us as including the right to take any action we chose in 
the Federal Republic, in spite of the provisions of the 
General Convention and the related Conventions, i.e. as 
amounting in fact to the same thing as the general 
reserve under paragraph 3 of the present Occupation 
Statute. My colleagues and I assured the Chancellor that 
we neither intended to nor in our view could properly 
take action of his general kind under this reserved 
right. The right after all related to Germany as a whole, 
and could not be exercised in relation only to a 
particular part of Germany, unless to prevent prejudice 
to it by German action in that part. For the rest, it 
was clear that the provisions of the Conventions would 
bind us; and it seemed rather absurd to say so 
specifically. The Chancellor while agreeing with our 
interpretation said that his supporters feared that the 
relations between the Three Powers and Russia might 
perhaps change for the better over the next few years, 
and that conceivably as a result future Governments of 
the Three Powers might wish to use this reserved right to 
the prejudice of the Federal Republic, not in the process 
of establishing German unity which was sufficiently 
covered by Article 7(3) but, for instance, as a 
preliminary step to such unity."
The Chancellor urged the three High Commissioners that 
Article 2(1) should be amended or to exchange letters to
the effect that the Allies did not interpret the right in
this article as permitting the three powers to derogate
from their undertakings to the Federal Republic in the
Contractual Agreements. The three High Commissioners ag­
reed to such a letter and a mutually agreeable text was 
prepared: "We made it clear our acceptance of this text
was subject to approval by our Governments. I have no 
doubt it is superfluous; but since apparently it meets a 
serious political difficulty of Kirkpartick wrote to
London.
On 22 May, Adenauer and the High Commissioners had
their last meeting before the arrival of the Foreign
Ministers in Bonn. "We made good progress to-day. Chancel-
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lor seems determined to reach agreement,■ Kirkpatrick 
wrote. "There are, however, a number of points for settle­
ment by Ministers. Two are important. First the financial 
question: on this we are recommending a small concession
to the Germans in which the War Office representative 
concurs. Secondly the question of applicability of the 
Rights and Obligations Convention to the French troops. 
Here I have the impression that the Chancellor will yield 
before a united front of the three Allied Ministers"(187).
With the arrival of the Foreign Ministers in Bonn on 
24 May and the signing of the treaties two days later, 
Kirkpatrick's work as negotiator ended. The British got 
what they wanted: the Federal Republic had been firmly
integrated into the Western bloc. Kirkpatrick had been
willing to make concessions to achieve this aim, but only 
as long as they did not impare Britain's vital interests: 
they were the security of their forces in Germany, the 
reduction of Britain's financial obligations in Germany to 
a berable minimum and the upholding of her political 
position in Germany vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. To secure 
these interests, certain rights from the era of the Allied 
occupation of Germany had be retained. It had been 
Kirkpatrick's task to find a compromise between thes re­
quirements and the German demands for total sovereignty 
put forward in connection with the Federal Republic's
integration as an equal partner into the Western
community.
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Kirkpatrick and his negotiating partner were suc­
cessful in reaching this compromise and the treaties were 
signed on 26 May 1952. The compromise was put to the test, 
when the treaties were presented to the parliaments of the 
four signatory coutries for ratification. The fact that 
this process of ratification was long and protracted in 
the Federal Republic and unsuccessful in France does not 
reduce the significance of the achievement of the negotia­
tions: the compromise, which Kirkpatrick had helped to
achieve, held up well; only because they were coupled to 
the EDC Treaty, which failed to be ratified by the French, 
that the set of agreements signed in Bonn had to be rene­
gotiated in 1954.
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE TREATIES
Although there was already a certain rumbling on the 
horizon when the set of agreements were signed by the 
three Foreign Ministers and the German Chancellor on 26 
and 27 May 1952, nobody foresaw the actual difficulties 
their ratification would bring: in the Federal Republic
they brought about a constitutional crisis, while succes­
sive French governments procrastinated until 1954 only to 
see the Assemblee Nationale refuse to ratify the EDC 
Treaty, despite the fact that the European Defence Com­
munity had been the brainchild of a French government in 
the first place.
During the meetings in Bonn before the signing of the 
treaties the Foreign Ministers agreed that they would 
address a letter to the Chancellor about the possibility 
of earlier entry into force of certain provisions of the 
Conventions; this would depend on the ratification of the 
Conventions by all parties to them and the ratification of 
the EDC Treaty at least by the Federal Republic and 
France. There also seems to have been a tacit agreement 
between the Three Powers to conduct their relations with 
the Federal Republic on the basis of the Agreements des­
pite the fact that they had not been ratified; Kirkpatrick
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later wrote in his autobiography: "Meanwhile we antici­
pated the treaty so far as we were able and began to treat 
Germany as a sovereign state"(188). This state of affairs 
was acknowledged by Adenauer: "Wir standen noch immer
unter Besatzungsrecht mit alien sich daraus ergebenden 
Konsequenzen. Wir hatten noch immer Industriebeschraen- 
kungen, wir waren noch immer Objekt in der auswaertigen 
Politik. Und wenn man auch im Hinblick darauf, dass von 
den beteiligten Regierungen der Deutschlandvertrag und der 
Vertrag ueber die Europaeische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft 
unterschrieben waren, uns dies nicht immer fuehlen liess 
und uns in Fragen konsultierte, die das Verhaeltnis
Deutschlands zu Sowjetrussland betrafen, so hatten wir
letztlich noch keinen Anspruch auf solche Konsultation- 
en"(189).
The Deputy High Commissioner, John Ward, described 
the situation in Germany after the signing of the treaties 
in a letter to Sir Anthony Eden as follows: "The signature 
of the agreements was followed, inevitably, by a feeling 
of anti-climax. ... the attitude of the public is usual­
ly friendly but unenthusiastic, the opposition centring 
still round the Communists, the extreme right-wing par­
ties, the Refugee Party and the Social Democrats." These 
groups claimed that the raising of German troops under the 
EDC Treaty was unconstitutional and, apart from this 
point, the present Bundestag did not have a mandate to 
decide on the Treaties. Opposition in the Bundesrat, the
Upper House whose members are representatives from the
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Laender, centred on the anxiety that they might be engi­
neered out of having their say on the Treaties: if their
content did not directly effect Laender matters, the
Bundesrat could not veto the ratification; or if matters 
which did concern the Laender did not form part of the 
Treaties, but were included in the affiliated letters and 
declarations, they did not even have to be ratified by the 
Upper House. Ward commented: "Skilful as the Chancellor
has been with his tactics in the pre-signature stage, he
thereby made enemies who may be more difficult to pacify
now that the ratification process has commenced." By far 
the most serious obstacle in the path to ratification was 
the Constitutional Court: it had been asked to deal with
two submissions, firstly a petition by 144 Bundestag mem­
bers (in practice the Social Democrats and the small 
Centre Party) to declare that the law ratifying the EDC
Treaty represented a constitutional amendment and there­
fore required a two-thirds majority to pass; and secondly, 
a request by the Federal President to the Court for an 
advisory opinion on the competibility of the EDC Treaty 
with the Basic Law.(190)
In Britain was there was strong pressure from the 
Labour opposition to postpone the parliamentary debate on 
ratification until after the summer recess. However, Eden 
was not about to change his mind: "My present feeling is
that we must proceed as arranged. I gave Mr. Acheson to 
understand that we would ratify before the summer recess.
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It seems to me that European opinion expects us to give a 
lead and that failure to do so might have adverse effect 
on the action of the French and German Parliaments"(191). 
Although Kirkpatrick agreed that postponing the debate 
would certainly have a depressing effect on the Chancellor 
and his supporters, he was much more cynical about the 
effect on the German Parliament: "The coalition parties
would be more encouraged by early British ratification 
than they would be discouraged by evidence of Labour 
opposition. And the SPD will fight the Treaties, whatever 
is done in London. Strong Labour opposition might possibly 
prejudice the position in the Bundesrat ... but the Trea­
ties will not get to the Bundesrat for a long time and 
once we have ratified, the circumstances attending our 
ratification this month may well be forgotten by 
then"(192).
On 1 August the House of Commons approved the Con­
tractual Arrangements, but 253 members voted against it; 
for the first time since the end of the war the opposition 
had voted against the Government on foreign affairs. The 
Labour Party had pleaded for negotiations with the Soviet 
Union before the ratification of the treaties and Eden 
found it necessary to stress in the information sent to 
H.M. representatives abroad that "approval of these trea­
ties has not decreased the desire of Her Majesty's Gover­
nment for a satisfactory solution of the German problem to 
which the Russians would agree. Ratification will not 
preclude the possibility of securing the unity of Germany
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through Four-Power talks. Indeed, as I indicated in the 
House of Commons on 1st August, it will be more likely to 
facilitate our efforts to this end."(193)
Meanwhile, Kirkpatrick was keeping a close watch on 
the Germans, to see whether they were fulfilling their 
obligations under the Treaties; the anticipation of the 
Conventions before their ratification, in his opinion, 
worked both ways. In a letter to Eden on 14 July, for 
example, he described what had been done so far in the 
field of compensation of victims of Nazi persecution. nI 
shall as opportunity affords, exert influence (a) in 
support of the move to establish a special Senate of the 
Federal High Court to deal with compensation cases. This 
could only do good, although the diversity of the laws 
will probably prevent the Senate from achieving a great 
deal in the way of harmonization; (b) in support of the 
proposal made, with reference to the Lastenausgleich law, 
for setting aside funds for use to assitst in payment of 
compensation. Moves of this sort may get around the Fede­
ral Government's unwillingness to meet any of its obliga­
tions until it can meet them all; (c) in support of the 
Federal Government's view that legislation should take the 
form of first completing the pattern of Land laws, and 
then supplementing and improving it by a Federal law on 
principles"(194). Eden fully supported the High Commissio­
ner on this subject and pointed out that this was "a 
matter to which I attach considerable importance, and I
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shall be glad if you will exert your influence as oppor­
tunity offers on the lines proposed"(195).
On the occasion of the first reading in the Bundestag 
of the draft laws for the ratification of the Conventions 
and the Treaty regarding the European Defence Community, 
Kirkpatrick was optimistic about the progress of ratifi­
cation. Everbody agreed, he wrote to London, that the 
debate had gone well for the Federal Government and he 
complimented Adenauer and Franz-Joseph Strauss, the leader 
of the CSU, on their performance.
"The SPD voted together with the Coalition Parties for 
the first reading and the reference of the Ratification 
Laws to the various Bundestag committees. This does not 
imply a change of heart on the part of the SPD, but it 
does perhaps amount to a recognition that Germany as a 
whole is in favour of integration with the West and 
that the issue in dispute is rather that of the means 
by which such integration is to be achieved."
If the danger from the Bundestag had receded, in Kirkpat­
rick's opinion, that from the Constitutional Court had 
increased: the 144 Bundestag members had preplaced their
petition with a new one, which called upon the Court to 
declare that not only the law ratifying the EDC Treaty, 
but also that ratifying the Bonn Conventions were incompa­
tible with the Basis Law.
"The Court is only too aware that it is being used by 
the SPD as a possible means of delaying or of annulling 
legislation which that party is unable to frustrate in 
Parliament. ... It appears to me unlikely that the 
Court, even if it sees, on legal grounds, some justice 
in the petition's arguments, would wish to frustrate 
the implementation of the Chancellor's foreign policy 
at a time when that foreign policy appears to be fin­
ding increasing support in public opinion. ... Obstac­
les remain and new ones may arise, but as things stand 
at present I do not believe they will prove insuperab­
le. " (196)
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However, by the beginning of November Kirkpatrick was far 
less optimistic: a majority of the judges of the Federal
Constitution-al Court were believed to be against the 
Federal Government's position on the constitutionality of 
the treaties and a feeling of depression had gripped 
Government circles. While Kirkpatrick deemed it unwarran­
tably pessimistic that the outcome would such as to "bring 
the policy of the three Western Governments and the German 
Federal Government to an inglorious fullstop", he wrote 
that there was only an even chance for a favourable out­
come. He considered it time to consider what action should 
be taken if the Court's opinion was adverse: "My purpose
in writing is to suggest that you should consider the 
desirability of consulting with the French and American 
Governments as to what is to be said and done in the 
unhappy circumstances I am postulating." In these cir­
cumstances, according to Kirkpatrick, a formal enquiry 
should be made with the Federal Government as to whether 
it would or would not be possible to pass and promulgate 
the laws approving the treaty; also some general action 
would have to be taken: for example, if the present trea­
ties were doomed by the Court, a highly publicised Three 
Power meeting should take place which would make the 
announcement that the situation in Germany would remain 
unchanged until something else had been put into the place 
of the failed agreements(197).
Kirkpatrick's proposals sounded very harsh and very
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different from the moderate stance he had adopted all 
through the contractual negotiations. He must have rea­
lised this himself, was he ended the letter with this 
paragraph: "I am sorry to write you so depressing a let­
ter. But it is a sound principle of strategic planning to 
prepare always for the worst case. Please do not think I 
am saying that this worst case is going to occur. But it 
seems to me sufficiently likely to occur for it to be our 
duty now to give thought to what we must do if it does." 
The Foreign Office went along with his first suggestion of 
a formal enquiry in that worst case. However, Frank 
Roberts, who wrote the Foreign Office answer to 
Kirkpatrick's letter, expressed doubts about the second 
suggestion of an early and publicised Three Power con­
ference and an announcement of the return to the status 
quo ante. He wrote that "we have now gone too far simply 
to put the clock back"; it would also provide a "very 
convenient let-out for the French, where opposition to the 
Agreements is based on a much more fundamental considera­
tions"; thirdly, such an announcement would be detrimental 
for Adenauer and his pro-Western policy, and his position 
should rather be strengthened in view of the German elec­
tions in 1953: "We should handle our initial announcements 
in the way which seems most likely to promote the emergen­
ce of a German Government more rather than less inclined 
to carry out policies of cooperation with the Western 
Powers." The Foreign Office was thinking on much more 
general and far-reaching terms; alternative policies were
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being considered for the case when the EDC scheme had to
be abandoned because of ineradicable opposition in France:
"Our general thinking has been that German entry into 
N.A.T.O. would then be the only possible alternative and 
that we should work for this. We have assumed that the 
S.P.D. opposition in Germany might then disappear because 
this would really mean equality of rights. Thus if a two- 
thirds majority were still required, it could be obtained. 
Clearly however the abandonment of the E.D.C. might have a 
very serious effect upon other schemes of European 
integration , e.g. E.C.S.C., the main purpose of which has 
been to end the Franco-German quarrel. It is likely that 
French opposition to German membership of N.A.T.O. , 
although apparently weakening a little as dislike for the 
E.D.C. tie-up grows, will remain strong. In that case the 
French will presumably try to devise some half-way 
solution between the E.D.C. and full German membership of 
N.A.T.O. We ourselves cannot at first blush see how 
anything of this sort could work or be made acceptable to 
the Germans. In E.D.C. at least the Germans have full 
equality of status. Presumably they would insist upon 
having this also in N.A.T.O. We should be grateful for 
your comments, however provisional, on this long-term 
problem."(198)
In his letter on 19 November, Kirkpatrick agreed that it 
would be impossible simply to turn the clock back, not 
least because the staff of the Allied High Commission had 
been considerably reduced. However, he pointed out that 
"there is an obvious risk that the Germans will believe 
that the collapse of the treaties will merely mean that 
they are freed from the military, reparations, restitution 
and other burdens imposed in the treaties, whilst the 
Allies remain the concessions embodied in the treaties. 
Already these concessions are beginning to be regarded as 
acquired"; Kirkpatrick thought that it would help the 
Chancellor, if the Allies made it clear that their conces­
sions depended on the assumption of unpleasant obligations
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by Germany, as this was the justification of his policy so 
far. On the future relationship between the Three Powers 
and Germany if it came to the crunch, he supported the 
Foreign Office line whole heartedly: "if the Court rules
that the E.D.C. treaty requires a two-thirds majority, 
then I agree with you that German entry into N.A.T.O would 
be the only alternative for which we should work. ... I 
would, however, be rash to assume that the S.P.D. would 
vote for the N.A.T.O. solution. They might and they might
not. ... I think you are right in believing that a half­
way solution between E.D.C. and full N.A.T.O. membership 
would not be acceptable here. The S.P.D. would certainly 
reject it; and so would the Chancellor also, I believe.
Meanwhile I fully agree that we should in public 
continue to take the line that the E.D.C. is the best
solution and that we are confident that present diffi­
culties can be overcome.■(199)
The High Commissioner's views on immediate action in 
the event of a negative decision of the Federal Constitu­
tional Court were incorporated in a Foreign Office brief, 
submitted to the Secretary of State by Sir Frank Roberts, 
for the up-coming NATO ministerial meeting to be held in 
Paris in the middle of December 1952. The Foreign Office 
had adopted Kirkpatrick's proposals of a formal enquiry to 
the Federal Government to be followed by discussion with 
the Chancellor and a public statement: as long as the
Allies were solely responsible for the defence of Germany 
they could not divest themselves of the extensive powers
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necessary to discharge that task and the Occupation regime 
therefore had to continue in force; but the Allies hoped
that means could be found of enabling the German people to
secure the benefits embodied in the Contractual Agree­
ments .
According to the Foreign Office brief, it would be 
primarily for the German people through their elected 
representatives to seek alternative means whereby those 
benefits could be secured through agreements with the
Occupation Powers and in a manner compatible with the
decision of the Constitutional Court. This last part of 
the statement ran contrary to Kirkpatrick's opinion that 
the Three Powers should jointly search for an alternative 
solution. Frank Roberts explained this disagreement: "our 
feeling is that we should not present the problem to the 
German people as one which it is primarily in our inte­
rests to solve, with the corollary that they could reaso­
nably sit back while we rack our brains for them. In other 
words, we should prefer to bring home to the Germans their 
responsibility for the setback and therefore for finding 
some quick way out of our mutual predicament"(200).
On the wider subject of alternatives if the EDC 
should fail, the Foreign Office made it clear that they 
did not expect the French would even begin the process of 
ratification before it had been completed by Germany; at 
the moment it seemed that the French Government would not 
be able to muster enough votes to secure ratification;
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although the Foreign Office was considering already the 
alternative of integrating Germany directly into NATO, it 
expressed the view that "the time has not yet arrived to 
give any hint to the French Government that we are consi­
dering such possibilities. The most helpful course now is 
to bring the French up against the hard fact that there is 
no generally acceptable alternative to the present Trea­
ties ." (201)
Two points are important to note about this corre­
spondence at the end of 1952: firstly, the British had
favoured a NATO solution at the beginning of the dis­
cussions about a German defence contribution in 1950 and
had only very grudgingly accepted the idea of the EDC; it 
was natural that they would return to their original point 
of view, when the idea of the EDC was seen to be in 
trouble. Secondly, Kirkpatrick's unequivocal support of a 
NATO alternative at this early stage is important to
remember when it was finally officially proposed in the
Eden Plan of 1954, which brought about in a very short 
time the successful re-negotiation of the General Treaty 
and Germany's integration into NATO. Kirkpatrick at that 
point had returned to London and had replaced Sir William 
Strang as Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who had 
headed the Foreign Office when the NATO alternative had 
started to be considered again in 1952. Sir Ivone kept the 
flame which was started under his predecessor burning and 
it is therefore not surprising that the Foreign Office had 
a contingency plan ready, when the French National Assem+
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bly failed to ratify the EDC Treaty on 30 August 1954. 
Within less than one month Eden was able to persuade the 
countries concerned to congregate in London, where the 
basis was laid for the signing of the Paris Treaties in 
October 1954, which were ratified by May of the following 
year.
The atmosphere in the middle of 1952 was further 
aggravated by the exchange of notes about the future of 
Germany between the Soviets and the Western Allies, which 
had started in March of that year. Although these notes 
did not prevent the signing of the treaties in May, the 
proposed Four Power Conference became an increasingly 
popular idea. The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, became 
increasingly worried about the fickleness especially of 
the British and the French; in his autobiography he wrote: 
"Im Zusammenhang hiermit gewann eine Aeusserung des bri- 
tischen Aussenministers Eden vom 10. Juni. 1952 an Inte-
resse. Eden hatte auf die Anfrage des Labour-Abgeordneten 
Noel Baker, ob eine Viererkonferenz die russischen Ansich- 
ten nicht rascher zutage bringen wuerde als eine Fortfueh- 
rung des Notenwechsels, erklaert: 'Dieser Gedanke ist von 
meiner Beachtung nicht ausgeschlossen.'"(202)
The three Foreign Ministers, when they discussed 
their response to the latest Soviet note in London in 
June, tried to calm Adenauer's anxiety: "It was agreed
that Dr. Adenauer should be told that full account had 
been taken of his views and that the three Powers had no
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intention either of retreating from any of their earlier 
proposals or of allowing any preliminary meeting, if held, 
to be spun out unduly.■(203) However, the Chancellor 
proved difficult to convince; as John Ward reported about 
the meeting between Adenauer and the High Commissioners, 
"although he kept calm the Chancellor was more obstinate 
and impervious to argument than I have ever known him, and 
his mood was not helped by the current heat-wave and by 
needling from the French High Commissioner." Adenauer 
welcomed the reassurance that the three Allies were 
against any return to Potsdam; but he regretted that there 
was still no specific repudiation of the idea of a neutral 
Germany.
"The United States and French High Commissioners are both 
very indignant in their different ways at the Chancel­
lor's attitude of suspicion and obstinancy and his inabi­
lity to see anyone else's point of view. Certainly his 
attitude (as we pointed out to him) is a poor return for 
the trust and consideration shown to him during the long 
months of negotiation of the contractual negotiations. 
But I venture to suggest that we should not allow our 
natural irritation to make us forget the very real diffi­
culties with which the Chancellor is having to wrestle 
inside his Government and in Parliament and his real 
concern lest the offer to meet the Soviets at this stage 
may tip the scale against ratification in the Bundestag. 
Nothing of course would really satisfy him except a radi­
cal change of course which I realise is out of the quest­
ion, and which would amount in effect to standing still 
on the note of 13th May until the Soviet Government had 
expressly accepted the complete Allied position set out 
therein. But to avoid the serious complications which are 
looming up here I hope it may be possible to make some 
further concession to his point of view. Maddening though 
his attitude is, it is in our interest to save his face 
at this time."(204)
The question of timing of the Allies' reply to the Soviet 
note on Germany was, in Kirkpatrick's opinion, much more
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important than the text itself. He pleaded that it should 
not be delivered or published before or during the big 
Bundestag debate on the Treaties on 9 and 10 July, as the 
Chancellor would see this as a deliberate manoeuvre by the 
French to upset the contracts and gain time to come to an 
understanding with the Soviet Union: "I should add that
the French High Commissioner (whose deputy has signifi­
cantly been in Paris this weekend) is exasperated by what 
he regards as the increasing presumption of the Federal
Government and makes no secret of his belief that the 
Allies should administer a sharp lesson by cutting short 
their deference to Adenauer's views in this matter. M. 
Francois-Poncet will shortly be leaving Germany and I do 
not think he troubles much about the effects on our future 
relations with the Federal Government(205)
It is very clear that a lot of manoeuvring went on on
all sides during the summer months of 1952: during a lunch
with Lord Henderson on 24 June, Adenauer had volunteered 
to talk about the "lost territories" east of the Oder-
Neisse line and had suggested that an eventual solution 
might place them either under a German-Polish condominium 
or alternatively under some form of international trustee­
ship. John Ward, who was present during this conversation, 
however, discounted the Chancellor's remarks: "My personal 
admiration for the Chancellor does not blind me to the 
fact that he can be as sly and tortuous as anybody when he 
wants to and I find it very difficult to believe that he 
was sincere when he spoke to Lord Henderson. I can only
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refer to the scene which Adenauer made at an early stage 
of the contractual negotiation when he challenged the High 
Commissioner's explanation that reference to a unified 
Germany meant unification of the Eastern Zone and Berlin 
with the Federal Republic and was not intended to refer to 
the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. I suppose that 
the Chancellor thinks that his soft words to visiting fo­
reign politicans is the best way at present of keeping 
German claims before the world. Although the Chancellor is 
much more reasonable than most Germans about the "lost 
territories", and as a Rhinelaender has no love for the 
people hailing from beyond the Elbe, he is certainly much 
too patriotic a German to renounce the hope of getting 
back those ancient German territories."(206)
There were in all four exchanges of notes between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies in 1952: the first
Soviet note of 10 March was answered on 25 March; it was 
followed by the second on 9 April and the second Allied 
answer of 13 May; in the third and fourth exchange (24 
May/10 July and 23 August/23 September) both sides contin­
ued to insist on their respective standpoint: the Western
Powers, in agreement with Adenauer, did not want to take 
up the Soviet offer; they insisted on free all-German 
elections and negotiations for a peace treaty with the 
government emerging from these elections and on the free­
dom of association for a reunited Germany. The Soviet 
proposals, in contrast, insisted on the reverse order of
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events and on the neutralisation of Germany. The Soviet 
initiative was seen by both the Western Allies and the 
Federal Republic as a manoeuvre with the sole aim of 
harassing and delaying the process of the Federal Repub­
lic's integration into the Western block. After the last 
exchange the problems lay dormant until March 1953, when 
the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, died. The subsequent 
events will be discussed in the next chapter.
Another issue hampered the ratification process at 
the beginning of 1953: on the orders of Sir Ivone Kirkpat­
rick seven ex-Nazis were arrested in clandestine circum­
stances. They were accused of being the ringleaders of a 
group plotting to seize power in Germany and were held for 
two months without even been allowed to see a lawyer. This 
was the act of an occupying power and upset many Germans 
especially when they realized that eight years after the 
war the Allies could seize German citizens in dawn raids 
and hold them at their pleasure and that these immense 
powers could still be applied within the reserved powers 
to be retained by the Allies under the Conventions. It 
also ran flatly contrary to the protestations of Kirkpat­
rick in his autobiography that he was treating Germany as 
far as possible as a sovereign state. Nor did it boost the 
prestige of British justice in a country where it had been 
a declared British aim to establish an impartial and 
democratic judical system.
The secrecy which surrounded the whole affair is 
brought out in a telegram, which Eden sent to Churchill in
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New York: it is marked top secret and strictly personal
telegram; no other copies were made and it was to be 
destroyed after the P.M. had read it: "You will remember I 
mentioned to you action we might have to take against 
certain people in Germany. Principal Cabinet colleagues 
and I today saw Kirkpatrick and discussed whole matter 
with him. We have reached conclusion that action should be 
taken as soon as possible and it may be done next week. We 
have taken full account of the effect on Dr. Adenauer's 
position. There are of course risks, but we think the 
effect in Germany will be salutary and it should be well 
received here."(207)
In the early hours of the morning of 15 January 1953 
seven men were arrested. The principal was Dr. Werner 
Naumann, who had been second-in-command to Goebbels in the 
Propaganda Ministry and had been designated as his succes­
sor in Hitler's last testament. The other six included the 
former 'Reich Studenten Fuehrer' and Gauleiter of Salz­
burg, Dr. Gustav Scheel, and the former Gauleiter of 
Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann. The British seized material which 
filled 30 crates measuring 4 ft. by 2 ft. and the men were 
locked up in Werl prison incommunicado until the few 
British security officers still left in Germany had ma­
naged to sift through all this information. The whole 
operation had been planned in such a clandestine fashion 
that the US and French High Commissioners and the German 
Chancellor had only been informed about it a few hours
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before the arrests were due to take place and after the 
orders had already been issued. In his diaries, Eden's 
Private Secretary, Evelyn Shuckburgh, made this entry on 
15 January: "Arrests went off well last night. Adenauer,
warned a few hours before, was favourable. A.E. very keen 
to take responsibility for the action, more so in fact 
than last night before the results were known"(208).
In the eyes of Alistair Horne, at that time the 
correspondent for the 'Daily Telegraph' in Germany, "the 
first official statements on the arrests were somewhat 
woolly. In the Commons, Mr. Eden explained that the ar­
rests had been carried out by the British rather than by 
the German authorities, on the grounds that the Occupation 
Statute gave Britain wider powers than the Germans. In his 
first Press conference in Bonn, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the 
British High Commissioner and the man who had advised the 
Cabinet of the necessity for the arrests, commented that 
the arrested men had bad political pasts and were obvious­
ly still 'in cahoots together'. They were also in touch 
with 'dubious Germans abroad'. Their aim, said Sir Ivone, 
was to gain power by infiltrating existing political par­
ties. They were like 'Chinese pirates', he thought, who 
'entered ships in the form of harmless-looking passengers, 
and later stormed the bridge and put the captain in 
irons'. But he added, 'We really don't know what Mr. 
Naumann and his friends are up to. We've arrested them to 
find out.' Beyond this there was little more to be gleaned 
from the British High Commission, which for months main­
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tained a schoolboyish secrecy on the precise activities of 
the Naumann group long after the details had appeared in 
the German P r e s s (209)
Naumann, at the end of the war, had made his way out 
of the already encircled Berlin at the last minute and 
then had escaped the net of Allied denazification by 
working as a bricklayer in Tuebingen and Frankfurt. Ending 
up in Duesseldorf, he joined up with old friends and 
colleagues and founded the secret "Gauleiter Group" whose 
aim was to infiltrate the existing parties of the right, 
the Free Democrats, the German Party and the Refugees" 
Party, and eventually to achieve the old National Social­
ist aims. He was quite successful in infiltrating the Free 
Democratic Party of North Rhine Westphalia, which meant 
that his activities were centred in the British Zone. 
Kirkpatrick was later to write in his autobiography: "If
Naumann's attempt to enter politics had been an isolated 
phenomenon I might have taken a different view. But there 
had been disquieting signs of the resurgence of Nazism, 
particularly in Lower Saxony where Major-General Remer and 
his Neo-Nazi party had been much in the public eye. At the 
moment power to act resided in the High Commission, and if 
I failed to use it, we should never be in a position later 
to complain to an independent German Government of toler­
ance towards a revival of Nazism. Moreover, with the 
passage of time Naumann"s political activities would be­
come more widely known and supine acquiescence on the part
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of the British authorities would be a source of dangerous 
discouragement to the democratic forces in Germany.n(210) 
One of the many unresolved points about this affair 
is how reliable the information was, on which the British 
based their action. They received most of this information 
from Dr. Otto John, who at that time was the chief of the 
West German security service. In July 1954 John defected 
to the East and his subsequent confessions revealed his 
extreme Nazi-mania. It is likely that John found in 
Kirkpatrick a man of kindred spirit, as the latter never 
forgot his experiences with Germany before and during the 
war and had never made a secret of his loathing of the 
Nazi regime. It is hard to tell, because of the lack of 
available sources, how far this deep-seated suspicion
provoked the High Commissioner to fall preay to John's
manipulation and to take over-hasty actions.
In his weekly personal report to the Secretary of 
State on 20 January, Kirkpatrick wrote: "The arrests of
seven Nazis had raised a lot of dust here. My fan mail is 
not large enough to enable scientific conclusions to be 
drawn, but it is remarkable that about one half of rny 
correspondents have approved our actions. In view of the 
fact that people are usually only moved to write when they 
are dissatisfied the circumstances that a number has writ­
ten to express their approval is encouraging"(211).
Alistair Horne's impressions were rather different: "The
lamentable handling of publicity throughout the Naumann 
affair by the British High Commission provoked the weird-
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est and most dangerous miscontructions in the German 
Press. The reasons for the arrests given out by the Brit­
ish were almost universally not accepted at their face 
value. The fact that business documents of Naumann"s firm 
had been seized in evidence at once gave rise to the theme 
of "British commercial jealousy" - a favourite one in most 
Anglo-German disputes. ... Far and wide other anti-Nazi 
voices were highly critical of the net effect the "martyr­
dom" of the seven men by the Occupation Powers might have 
in Germany. Paul Sethe in the Frankfurter Allgemeine of 
22nd January scoffed: "Kirkpatrick has created more Nazis
in eight days than Naumann and the seven have been able to 
do by the sweat of their brow for years." The Duesseldorf- 
er Nachrichten refused to believe that the Naumann plot 
was more than a "political tea party" until "hard proof" 
could be produced."(212)
Naumann's lawyer finally succeed in gaining access to 
his client on 15 March, after a habeas corpus hearing had 
been held in Bielefeld on 20 February and appeal by the 
British High Commission had been overruled. "Ten days 
later, on 1st April, the seven men were unexpectedly 
handed over to the German authorities, at the "request" of 
Dr Adenauer. The immediate German reaction was to see in 
the British move a tacit admission of defeat," Horne 
wrote. "A German lawyer commented to me that day: "You
have put us in the gravest embarrassment; we want to 
prosecute Naumann, but you have not given us enough evi-
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dence; and if a German Court acquits him for lack of
evidence, just imagine what your Daily Express will
say"(213). This was exactly what happened: Naumann was
held in custody until the end of July and charged the 
following year with being "ringleader of an organisation 
whose aim was hostile to the constitutional order of the 
Federal Republic". On 3 December, however, the proceedings 
were broken off: although the Supreme Court was convinced
that Naumann had National Socialist and anti-constitution­
al ideas, it had been impossible to prove how successful 
he had been in putting these ideas into action.
His arrest definitely spoiled Naumann"s political 
aspirations in the election of 1953. What it did not
achieve was to cure the nationalist aspirations of the 
Free Democrats in North Rhine Westphalia and to convince 
the German public that their security was really threat­
ened by the Gauleiter Group.
The establishment of a new relationship between the 
Western Allies and the Federal Republic was the most
important development during Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's ten­
ure as British High Commissioner in Germany. The fact that 
his role in the shaping of this new relationship was that 
of a negotiator is the clearest sign that Allied policies 
as well as circumstances had changed: the end of the
occupation of the Federal Republic was not a unilateral 
act of the Western Allies but a negotiated settlement. It 
has been proven in this chapter that Kirkpatrick was a
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very good negotiator as he succeeded in achieving an 
arrangement which corresponded totally with the British 
post-war European policy: the United States continued
involvement in Europe was assured; the Federal Republic of 
Germany had been firmly integrated into the Western bloc 
and its contribution to Western defence would reduce the 
financial burden on Britain; first steps had been made 
towards a lasting peace in Europe through Franco-German 
rapprochement, fostered by Britain; and Soviet aspira­
tions, for the moment, were held in check.
In conclusion it is interesting to note that through­
out his tenure Kirkpatrick took a position in support of 
German aspirations, opinion and requests. This seems to be 
surprising as he was known before he went to Germany to be 
anything but a friend of the Germans. There are two rea­
sons for this: firstly, this chapter has proven that
Kirkpatrick was very aware of the politically vulnerable 
position of the German Chancellor and at that same time of 
the fact that Adenauer was the one German politician most 
likely to be able to deliver what the British wanted; it 
was therefore vital to maintain him in his present posi­
tion and for that purpose Kirkpatrick was willing to make 
concessions which would help Adenauer fight his internal 
battles. Secondly, Kirkpatrick seems to have been willing 
to grant German requests or demands, because he was more 
interested in the final aim than in details on the way of 
reaching it. In a minute, written in 1948 and quoted at
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the beginning of this chapter, Kirkpatrick had stated:
"There is no doubt that the Germans have an inherent 
dislike and contempt for the Slavs and that 
association with the Westerners would flatter their 
self-esteem. If we can play upon this foible, we can 
bamboozle the Germans by roping them in and 
eventually making them so dependent economically, 
politically and militarily on the Western world that 
they cannot afford to break away and join the East."
This chapter has proven that Kirkpatrick's rather anti- 
German language and attitude changed and softened. He
never, however, gave up his perception that the final aim
of British policy should be the Federal Republic's firm 
integration into the Western bloc and he was very success­
ful in achieving this final aim.
Maybe his greatest failure was that he did not support 
an even closer relationship between the two countries. 
Adenauer's autobiography is filled with the hope for the 
active participation of Great Britain in the integration 
of Europe; to quote just one statement, which stands as an 
example of many, he exclaims: "Waere der EVG-Vertrag wirk- 
sam geworden, welche Moeglichkeiten einer Bindung Gross- 
britanniens an Europa waeren gegeben gewesen"(214). 
Adenauer was deeply sorry that Great Britain stayed so
aloof and this aloofness was personified by Kirkpatrick. 
He was willing to foster the Franco-German rapprochment 
which he was convinced had to be the basis for peace and 
co-operation in Europe. However, he failed to see, like 
his Foreign Office colleagues, the benefits Britain could 
have gained from taking the lead in Europe.
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SIR FREDERICK R. HOYER MILLAR
THE AMBASSADOR IN WAITING
When Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar arrived in Germany in 1953 
he should have assumed the position of the first British 
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Bonn
Conventions, which had been signed in May of the previous
year, fundamentally changed the relations between the Wes­
tern Powers and the Federal Republic, terminated the occupa­
tion regime and consequently envisaged the High Commissio­
ners to be transformed into Ambassadors. Due to the delay of 
the ratification of the Conventions, however, these changes 
had not yet been put into effect and Hoyer Millar therefore 
became the third and, as it turned out, final British High 
Commissioner in Germany, assuming the powers defined by the 
Occupation Statute, which had been revised in March 1951.
Although the powers of the occupation authorities were 
substantially reduced in the revision of the Statute, they 
retained, for example, the right to repeal or annul legisla­
tion, if in their opinion it was inconsistent with the
povisions of the Statute, or with legislation or other
measures of the occupation authorities, or constituted a 
grave threat to the basic purposes of the occupation. In 
fact, the Allied High Commission exercised this right on 
only two occasions after the revision: on 29 June 1951 it
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annulled an article of a Federal law on the Turnover Tax; 
and on 17 January 1952 the Council annulled certain provi­
sions of the Federal law concerning the position of Land 
Berlin in the financial system of the Federal Republic.
Similarly, powers of the occupation authorities over 
the external affairs of the Federal Republic had been li­
mited by the revised Occupation Statute. Although the reser­
ved power relating to foreign affairs under paragraph 2(c) 
was retained, the Federal Republic was allowed to establish 
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conclude treaties and enter 
into diplomatic relations with friendly countries. This 
principle was tested to its limits when discussions began in 
1954 about the possibility of the Federal Republic establis­
hing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Certain 
treaties, which the Federal Republic entered into after the 
revision of the Statute, brought to an end institutions 
established under occupation rule: for example, the entry
into force of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
for Coal and Steel, which had been signed in 1951, brought 
about the dissolution of the International Ruhr Authority.
The revision of the Occupation Statute was another, but 
quite substantial step in the gradual transfer of power from 
the occupation authorities to the Federal Republic of Germa­
ny. Many smaller, but equally important steps followed. The 
opening of the negotiations leading up to the Bonn Conven­
tions clearly mark the beginning of the final period of the 
Occupation regime. However, Sir Maurice Bathurst, at that 
time legal advisor to the British High Commissioners, argues
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that:
"It was not marked by any obvious change of policy; 
certain concessions and relaxations of the occupation 
regime had already been granted and others were to 
follow but there was no notable acceleration of the 
programme. ... There was a general consciousness that 
the relationship between the occupants and the occupied 
was in a transitional stage, but the Western Powers 
found themselves forced, in order to retain their 
authority and not to prejudice their negotiating 
position, to adopt a conservative attitude and to make 
clear when granting concessions that these only applied 
within the limits defined and were not to be taken as 
precedents for a series of further concessions, which 
might be justified on grounds of analogy. Thus the years 
between the beginning of negotitations and the entry 
into force of the Bonn Conventions were marked by a 
series of limited concessions of greater and lesser 
importance but brought no fundamental change in the 
character of the Occupation regime."(1)
Examples for this progressive relaxation of the Occupation 
regime were the relinquishing of the power to ensure respect 
for the Basic Law and the Land constitutions in October 
1951; the surrender of this power was made possible by the 
setting up of a Federal Constitutional Court. At the same 
time it was announced that the occupation authorities would 
no longer control the administration of foreign exchange 
legislation subject, however, to the requirement that the 
Federal Government should obtain the approval of the Allied 
High Commission before introducing any change in its foreign 
exchange policies. On 22 October 1951, the Allied High 
Commission waived, subject to certain defined exceptions, 
its right to object to trade agreements entered into by the 
Federal Government. Other examples of concessions were the 
relaxation of industrial controls resulting from the Agree­
ment on Industrial Controls of 3 April 1951, which was
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further modified on 25 July 1952, and concessions progres­
sively granted in the field of civil aviation, which culmi­
nated in the granting of a licence to the Deutsche Lufthansa 
to own and operate eight aircrafts.
At the same time as these concessions were being gran­
ted some of the programmes instituted to achieve "the basic 
purposes of the Occupation" were nearing completion. Exam­
ples were the promulgation of a German law concerning the 
"Grossbanken" and the dissolution of the Allied Banking 
Commission on 29 March 1952, and the final division of the 
Krupp assets on 4 March 1953.(2) An outward sign of this 
reduction in the powers of the occupation authorities was a 
reduction of the workload of the Allied High Commission: 
while the Council held 10 official meetings in 1949, 39 in
1950 and 33 in 1951, the Allied High Commissioners met only 
27 times in the remaining three and a half years of their 
tenure.
Despite the gradual reduction in the power of the 
Allied High Commission just described, one should keep in 
mind that the supreme authority still rested in the hands of 
the High Commissioners. The most blatant example of this was 
Kirkpatrick's actions in the Naumann case.
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar's powers as British High 
Commissioner therefore have to be defined by four parame­
ters: they were based on the revised Occupation Statute;
they were progressively reduced by the Allied policy of 
gradual transfer of power to the Federal authorities; they 
were limited by the intentions of the Allies expressed in
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the Bonn Conventions to place their relations with the 
Federal Republic of Germany on a contractual basis; these 
Conventions, however, had not been ratified yet and there­
fore were not in effect yet.
Hoyer Millar was a very distinguished and senior pro­
fessional diplomat. By the time he became British High 
Commissioner in Germany he had behind him some 30 years of 
diplomatic experience, notably in assignments in wartime and 
post-war Washington, in key posts in London and as Permanent 
Representative to the NATO Council(3). In contrast to his 
two predecessors he had no previous experience or special 
knowledge of Germany. The British Government obviously wan­
ted to make the point that the special circumstances of the 
occupation were about to end and to be replaced by normal 
diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In the words of Sir Frank Roberts: "the qualities of Brian
Robertson as a post-war Military Governor or the sharpness 
and brilliance of Ivone Kirkpatrick, who knew pre-war Germa­
ny and Italy well and had held an important war-time posi­
tion in charge of the British Information Services were no 
longer so appropriate for our first Ambassador."(4)
In an interview shortly before his death, Lord 
Inchyra(5) himself described his role when he came to Germa­
ny as that of an ambassador although he held the title and 
the powers of High Commissioner. In fact his main task was 
to oversee the transition from the one to the other role and 
he did that in his typical unobtrusive manner, most of the
260
times setting aside the powers which he still possessed and 
already assuming his future ambassadorial manner.
His staff in Germany also described him as a very 
popular "Chief of Mission": beneath his aristocratic looks
and a genial though somewhat lofty and detached exterior lay 
an acute mind. He was not given to intellectual nit-picking: 
he went straight to the heart of an important question and 
was a good and efficient administrator. He was also decribed 
as an example of how to keep an eye on everything while 
giving his subordinates plenty of responsibility. So much 
responsibility that he actually sent two of his men to the 
Anglo-American discussions on Germany in London in July 1954 
and did not go himself; one of them, C.H. Johnston, wrote to 
him on 6 July: "I hope that Maurice and I have represented
your views correctly so far. We will report again by next
bag"(6). Sir Maurice Bathurst was also instrumental in sha­
ping the Foreign Office's policy on the Saar question. Hoyer 
Millar's indirect way is quite different from the very 
direct way his two predecessors influenced British policy 
making. And this, in fact, is the main difference between 
the three: Robertson and Kirkpatrick were much more politi­
cal than Hoyer Millar; they actively shaped British policy 
towards Germany, launching policy initiatives, for example 
Kirkpatrick's Saar proposals, while he restricted himself 
to commenting on the implementation and the timing of poli­
cies developed by the Foreign Office, sometimes assisted by 
members of his own staff.
This is also one of the main differences between Hoyer
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Millar and his colleagues in Paris and Washington, Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb and Sir Roger Makins: they were much more vocal 
than the High Commissioner on questions effecting Germany 
and Europe at that time. Actually, Hoyer Millar sometimes 
felt left "at the margins" of these vital questions and 
complained that he was not sent all the relevant correspon­
dence on time or at all(7). It is unlikely that this was a 
conscious snub by the Foreign Office; after all, Hoyer 
Millar's comments were still sought and appreciated. His 
main role, however, was that of messenger and rapporteur, 
which again are the functions of an ambassador. His two 
predecessors, of course, also performed these functions, but 
their main fields of activity were running the tripartite 
administration and shaping the future relationship between 
Great Britain and an independent Federal Germany, which were 
much reduced by the time Hoyer Millar came to Germany.
One reason for Hoyer Millar's reduced role in the 
shaping of British policy for Germany was the fact that his 
predecessor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, returned to London to 
assume the very influential position of Permanent . Under­
secretary of State at the Foreign Office. He not only accor­
ded Germany the attention which other spheres of interest 
received, but considerably more: it almost seems as if he
never let go of the reins which he had held as British High 
Commissioner in Germany. Kirkpatrick, in his pivotal role in 
the Foreign Office, took an active interest in the shaping 
of policy on Germany, writing minutes and policy documents
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and talking to Adenauer and his representatives directly. 
When he was still in Germany, his standing as the principal 
German expert of the Foreign Office had meant that the main 
part of the British policy on questions affecting that 
country had been developed there. With his return to the 
Foreign Office, the centre of gravity shifted back to Lon­
don.
It would be wrong, however, to personalise these chan­
ges too much. There was also a general change of atmosphere 
in the relations between the Federal Republic and the Wes­
tern Allies which coincided with, but were not the result of 
Hoyer Millar's arrival in Germany. The Germans had become 
more self-assured: the times, when the High Commissioners
had summoned the German Chancellor to the Petersberg, which 
had been a symbol of their supreme authority, were long 
over(8); when Hoyer Millar assumed the position of British 
High Commissioner he sought appointments to go and see 
Adenauer, while his main contacts were with his representa­
tives, Hallstein and Blankenhorn. When the latter tried to 
circumvent the High Commissioner by going to Geneva and tal­
king to the British representatives at the conference there, 
Hoyer Millar angrily complained to the Foreign Office. It 
was more a personal complaint about Blankenhorn, however, as 
the High Commissioner was conscious that he was no longer 
the only line of communication to the Foreign Office. The 
Germans only became more self-assured in their dealings with 
the Western Allies, because they received clear signals that 
their standing as allies and partners was appreciating.
263
While the British were getting increasingly irritated with 
the French and sometimes disappointed by the Americans, the 
Foreign Office records are full of understanding for and a 
desire to help the German Chancellor as the guarantor of 
pro-western German politics. This was not based on a sudden 
love for the Germans in general, but on clear realoolitik. 
In August 1954, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick wrote in a Foreign 
Office minute:
"whereas the German character has not changed, the world 
situation has. This makes a radical change for the better 
in Anglo-German relations not only necessary, but also 
possible. We have made good progress in recent years and 
should continue on the same cautious but positive lines. 
There is no need to fall over each others feet nor to 
forget German short comings. But practical co-operation 
based on mutual respect rather than affection and above 
all on a healthy instinct of self-preservation vis-a-vis 
the Russians should be easier to achieve between the 
United Kingdom and Germany than between Germany and either 
the United States or France."(9)
In June 1953 P.F. Hancock, the head of the Central 
Department in the Foreign Office responsible for German 
affairs, wrote that "as regards Anglo-German problems, the 
present state of our relations with the Federal Republic is 
so happy that they are few in number"(10). It can be argued, 
therefore, that Hoyer Millar's role was reduced, in compari­
son to that of his predecessors, because of this lack of 
problems. In fact, as Kirkpatrick's words show, their inte­
rest and aims were very much the same. Hoyer Millar's tenure 
as British High Commissioner was therefore different from 
that of General Robertson's and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's in 
two respects: he had a different attitude towards his role
as High Commissioner and the general political situation and
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atmosphere had changed.
In order to describe Hoyer Millar's role in the twi­
light of the Allied High Commission, this part of the thesis 
will be divided into three chapters dealing with the three 
main questions of this period: the relations with the Soviet 
Union and the Berlin Conference, the Saar question, and the 
problems in connection with the ratification of the EDC 
Treaty, which finally led to the abandonment of this plan, a 
renegotiations of the treaties and the Federal Republic's 
integration into NATO. These three topics, however, are very 
much inter-related, as the attempt to build a new relation­
ship with the Soviet Union and differences between France 
and the Federal Republic over the Saar delayed the ratifica­
tion process. Thus, cross references between the chapters 
will have to be made.
In these three chapters it will become clear that Hoyer 
Millar assumed the functions of an ambassador, even though 
he still held the title and theoretically the powers of High 
Commissioner. This description of his reduced role is nat­
urally more difficult, as it has to be gathered from cir­
cumstantial evidence. Clear comparisons are impossible, as 
one will never know whether for example Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick had behaved any differently, had he remained in 
Germany as High Commissioner. It is important to keep in 
mind that times and circumstances had changed.
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RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BERLIN CONFERENCE
In March 1953 Joseph Stalin died. Many in the West 
believed that his death would open a window of opportunity 
for a new relationship between the Western Powers and the 
Soviet Union. On 16 April, President Eisenhower appealed to 
the new leaders of the Soviet Union to give tangible eviden­
ce of a desire for peace, which could lead to a world-wide 
reduction in armament. "We care only", he said, "for since­
rity of peaceful purpose, attested by deeds. The opportunity 
for such deeds are many." Anthony Eden, who in his auto­
biography claimed not to have "shared the optimism" of those 
who saw in the death of Stalin "an easement of the world 
problems", declared that "the Soviet reply lacked the hecto­
ring abuse which had been commonplace in Stalin's time, but 
its attitde to the specific problems named by the President 
yielded nothing"(11). The Foreign Secretary, however, had to 
enter hospital in April 1953 for operations on gall-stones 
and was incapacitated for six months during this important 
period.
"On May 11th, 1953, the Prime Minister, who was acting
as Foreign Secretary in Anthony Eden's absence on protracted 
sick-leave, opened a foreign affairs debate with a well 
thought out and equally well delivered speech", John Colvil­
le, Churchill's Private Secretary wrote, "ending with the
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offer of an olive branch to the Soviet Union. He made this 
speech wholly contrary to Foreign Office advice since it was 
felt that a friendly approach to Russia would discourage the 
European powers working on the theme of Western union. 
However, Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister of State, was personally 
enthusiastic about it, as were most Tories and the Opposi­
tion." Colville added, "I thought it a statesmanlike initia­
tive and knew it to be one which was entirely Churchill's 
own.■(12)
Churchill's "olive branch", the proposal of a four 
power conference, surprised the German Chancellor and he 
sought a clarification and further details when he visited 
London in May of that year. In his autobiography, Adenauer 
expressed relief and satisfaction after his talks with the 
Prime Minister: "Churchill hatte mir anlaesslich meines
Besuches in London im Dezember 1951 versichert, dass Gross- 
britannien zu seinen Verpflichtungen gegenueber der Bundes- 
republik stehe und niemals Vereinbarungen hinter unserem 
Ruecken treffen werde. Ich brachte das Gespraech auf diese 
mir damals gegebene Erklaerung, und zu meiner grossen Be- 
friedigung bestaetigte Churchill sie erneut"(13). Adenauer 
went along with the main ideas of the Prime Minister, as 
presented to him during their talks in London. Even the idea 
of a revival of the "spirit of Locarno", to alleviate the 
Soviet fear of a German attack, did not arouse the Chancel­
lor's criticism. He emphatically stressed that the Federal 
Republic would never attack the Soviet Union and made the 
point that a strong and united Europe would bring them to
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abandon cold war tactics and to seek a solution through 
negotiations.
Churchill, however, did not disclose to the German 
Chancellor that he was considering an even more drastic 
change of British policy towards Germany. In a top secret 
Foreign Office minute Dixon recorded that "in the course of 
a general conversation on May 16th the Prime Minister said 
that he had not closed his mind to the possibility of a 
unified and neutralised Germany. The Prime Minister made 
this remark in the context of a possible high-level dis­
cussion with the Russians and his meaning, I think, was that 
it might be desirable to agree to such a solution for Germa­
ny as part of a settlement with the Russians." Although Sir 
William Strang added to this minute that the Prime Minister 
had told him that "he would be willing to consider the 
unification and neutralisation of Germany if the Germans 
wished, but only if they wished for this", Churchill's 
attitude set alarm bells ringing in the Foreign Office and 
the diplomats felt obliged to draft a minute for the Prime 
Minister, whose conclusion strongly advised against such 
radical changes of policy:
"Our present German and European policies arose from the 
necessity of forestalling further Soviet encroachment on 
other people's territories, whether by occupation or by 
coups d' etat on the Czech model. They are also, 
however, as Dr. Adenauer has stated, desirable in 
themselves, quite regardless of the Soviet menace. The 
struggle for Germany lies at the heart of the problem.
The rearmament of the Federal Republic, her integration 
into Western Europe, the collective defence effort, the 
movement for European unity, are component parts of a 
whole. If we reverse our German policy, we may bring the 
whole structure tumbling about our ears and advance the
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frontiers of the Soviet bloc to the Rhine."(14)
Although there were voices in the Foreign Office who pointed 
out a number of matters on which the Soviet position had 
changed for the better, the main opinion was that nothing 
should be done before the EDC was ratified by the French. 
These optimistic voices were silenced by the brutal 
suppression of a revolt by East German workers on 17 June 
1953: it made any Soviet concession impossible; and it
provided public evidence that not even the most determined 
Western peaceniks could immediately ignore, that the East 
German Government was a repressive Soviet puppet.
Churchill's enthusiasm for a rapprochement with the 
Soviets was held up by a stroke which he suffered in July, 
1953, just as he was about to meet President Eisenhower. 
Lord Salisbury, who stood in as Foreign Secretary during 
Churchill's and Eden's illness, went to Washington in the 
Prime Minister's place, where he was only to able to per­
suade the Americans to agree to four-power talks on Germany 
at Foreign Secretary level. Despite the fact that Churchill 
had been encouraged by a speech Eisenhower had made, the 
President now expressed his opposition to the Prime Minis­
ter's proposals of top-level talks "without officials and 
without agenda". Due to Churchill's illness he had not been 
able to argue with the President at the Bermuda Conference, 
which was to be postponed until December.
Lord Salisbury was now attacked by the Opposition and, 
as Evelyn Shuckburgh noted in his diaries, "all the opti­
mists for having whittled the glorious initiative of 11 May
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down to a mundane and routine meeting of Foreign Ministers 
confined to the topic of Germany. In the FO we all think 
first that this is the utmost he could have got and second 
that it has in fact brought us back to realities"(15). Lord 
Salisbury was conscious of the awkward situation of having 
to run foreign affairs with two Foreign Secretaries in the 
background, who were at odds with each other over the ques­
tion of how to deal with the Soviets.
Churchill continued to be "very wrapped up with the 
possibility of bringing something off with the the Russians 
and with the idea of meeting Malenkov face to face", as his 
private Secretary, John Colville noted, and was "very disap­
pointed in Eisenhower whom he thinks both weak and stupid." 
He was also more and more at odds with his own Cabinet, 
especially with Eden who, in Colville's words, "is set on 
retaining the strength of N.A.T.O. and the Western Alliance 
by which, he believes, Russia has already been severly 
weakened. W. is depressed by Eden's attitude (which reflects 
that of the F.0.)"(16). Evelyn Shuckburgh voiced the opinion 
of many in the Foreign Office when he wrote in his diary 
that this was "an example of the hubris which afflicts old 
men": "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that W.S.C. is
longing for a top-level meeting before he dies - not because 
it is wise or necessary but because it would complete the 
pattern of his ambition and make him the Father of Peace as 
well as of Victory"(17). Personal vanity was, however, only 
one aspect to Churchill's desire for top-level talks; he was
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also driven by fear of the hydrogen bomb.
Throughout the summer of 1953 and despite the fact that 
Lord Salisbury had agreed in Washington to a meeting with 
the Soviets on Foreign Minister level, Churchill continued 
to hanker after a top-level meeting. The train was now, 
however, firmly set in motion for a Foreign Ministers Confe­
rence: a three-power invitation had been sent to Moscow and
a note was promptly received in return. The Foreign Office 
response was dismissed by Churchill as an "ocean of ver­
biage" : "He is still taking the line that nothing less than
a meeting between himself and Malenkov, with or without 
Eisenhower, has any value. He is taking the line that the 
Americans and French "got us into this mess" by refusing to 
agree to such top-level talks and that it is up to them to 
get us out. Actually, of course, it was his speech of 11 May 
which got everybody into the mess. He made it without con­
sultation with his allies, who had never thought such a 
meeting practicable."(18) And those allies, France but main­
ly the United States, remained opposed to a top-level mee­
ting. Eisenhower even conveyed to Churchill that he would be 
opposed to the Prime Minister going to Moscow on his own, a 
"veto" which Churchill heavily resented. Eisenhower withdrew 
that "veto" in 1954 and it seems as if, as soon as Churchill 
had retired, the President rushed to the summit meeting with 
the Soviets.
During that summer a whole series of notes were exchan­
ged between Moscow and the Western capitals quarreling over 
the scope, date and venue of the Foreign Ministers conferen-
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ce. Finally, in December, the Soviets agreed that the Fo­
reign Ministers should meet in Berlin at the end of January 
1954 and discuss Germany and Austria. At a series of mee­
tings the three Western allies worked out their common 
strategy for the conference. A working party, meeting in 
Paris, which was to work out details of this strategy, was 
joined by a German observer, Professor Grewe: this was the
first time that the Germans had been granted access to 
meetings of the Western powers, at which their policy to­
wards the Soviet Union was discussed. The Allied High Commi­
ssioners, however, were not present. This shows how times 
had changed: formerly the Federal Government would have been 
informed by the High Commissioners about the results of such 
meetings; now German observers were send to take part in 
them and the High Commissioners stayed in Germany.
Hoyer Millar, who had been appointed British High Com­
missioner during that summer of 1953, was also excluded from 
the policy making for the coming conference, which went on 
back in London. It was his predecessor, Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, now in the position of Permanent Under-Secreta­
ry of State at the Foreign Office, who together Anthony 
Nutting developed the "Thoughts for Berlin" which was to 
become the basis of British policy for the conference. What 
becomes clear from these two memoranda is that the Foreign 
Office was to "treat Berlin as a cold-war exercise", which 
meant that, in the absence of the prospect of any real 
settlement, it was going to be a propaganda battle. It was
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imperative, in the eyes of the Foreign Office, that the 
break-down of the talks in Berlin, should not be blamed on 
the West: "Therefore to appear convincing and genuine, our
joint efforts should be more than ever directed to proposing 
as much and opposing as little as possible." Anthony Nutting 
wrote: "I suggest, therefore, that at a very early stage we, 
the United Kingdom, should take the initiative in proposing 
a comprehensive and forward-looking plan for German reunifi­
cation, based on the recent Paris talks with Dr. Adenauer's 
representative, i.e. free elections, leading to a free all- 
German Government with the right to participate in the Peace 
Treaty negotiations." Kirkpatrick developed the theme of the 
Berlin Conference as a propaganda battle even further: "I
think we should take effective steps to keep our press 
informed of the Russian attitude. We rather failed on this 
in 1949 ... If the public are brought to understand that the 
Russians are insisting on refusing liberty to a unified 
Germany to associate with us, and whilst declining free 
elections, insisting on imposing on a reluctant Germany an 
all-German Government with a non-elected communist represen­
tation, I believe that there will be no surprise or resen­
tment if the negotiations are abortive." Eden commented on 
these two papers: "I like all this. Will Sir I Kirkpatrick
and Mr. Nutting please together set the machinery in motion 
so that we can give effect to these two exellent 
memoranda."(19)
It is clear, therefore, that the opinion dominant in 
the Foreign Office was determined on the failure of the
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Berlin Conference one month before its start. In fact/ it 
had never liked the idea of contacts with the Soviets at 
this point, but had been bounced into it by the Prime Minis­
ter's speech in May. The whole exercise had already delayed 
the ratification of the EDC and therefore the implementation 
of established British policy which was to make its first 
aim the firm integration of the Federal Republic into the 
Western alliance. The main aim was now to prove to a public 
still uneasy over German rearmament that Britain had done 
all she could to reach an understanding with the Soviets 
without wasting too much time on negotiations/ which in the 
Foreign Office's opinion were not going to produce any 
tangible results. Expectations had been raised at home and 
abroad and the collapse of the talks could irreparably 
damage Britain's European policies, if the West was seen to 
be at fault.
Considerations of the public morale, especially in 
Berlin and the Eastern Zone of Germany, led the Foreign 
Office to instruct the British High Commissioner to explore 
a possible 'fall-back' position. Hoyer Millar himself had 
warned the Foreign Office about a slump in German morale if, 
after the break-up of the Berlin conference, there was 
nothing to hope for any more. The head of the Central Depar­
tment agreed: "If the Berlin Conference is to break down, it 
may be said that, from the point of view of facilitating the 
ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty, the cleaner the break, 
the better. On the other hand, a clean break would not be
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desirable from the point of view of German opinion." Hancock 
suggested three "minor but useful points on which some 
agreement might be reached before the Conference broke 
down": air safety, treatment of war criminals in Spandau
Prison, and inter-zonal questions. The new Permanent Under­
secretary, however, was doubtful whether even such minor 
agreements could be reached:
"All right. But I am not hopeful. In 1949 the Russians 
were anxious to cloak their failure over the blockade.
Circumstances are different now. We should tell Sir 
F. Hoyer Millar that we realise this and ask him to look 
at the problem informally with his colleagues. We must 
not make him look foolish in their eyes."(20)
In these discussions with his colleagues, Hoyer Millar dis­
covered that the United States High Commission opposed any 
preparatory action of this kind: "Their attitude suggests
that the U.S. authorities feel tht if the Conference breaks 
down no attempt should be made to minimise the effect by 
trying to reach agreement on minor points with the Russians, 
or, in other words, if there is to be a break with the 
Russians it should be a clean break, and one capable of 
exploitation by Allied propaganda, etc."(20)
Despite the discouraging attitude of his colleagues, 
Hoyer Millar, two days later, submitted detailed proposals 
for a fall-back position. He divided them into measures 
"which we might try to put into effect by agreement with the 
Russians" and unilateral measure, which, although not stric­
tly falling into the category of a fall-back position, he 
deemed nevertheless "equally necessary as well as easier to 
achieve." He also made a special case for measures concer-
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ning Berlin: "I think the shock to German opinion caused by
a failure of the Conference is likely to be more severe in 
West Berlin than in the Federal Republic as a whole since, 
for obvious reasons, the division of Germany reacts much 
more closely and unpleasantly upon the Berliners in their 
everyday lives. Moreover while the Federal Republic is pros­
pering Berlin is still afflicted with grave economic prob­
lems, including heavy unemployment." The measures which he
suggested and which needed Soviet agreement mainly concerned 
inter-zonal movement and communication. Hoyer Millar was 
conscious of the fact that this could mean continued Soviet 
interference. It also could give the Soviets the opportunity 
to claim that these were problems which should be solved by 
the two German governments, thus forcing them to engage in 
direct negotiations, to which the Federal Government was 
resolutely opposed, as it was to any measure which could 
imply recognition of the East German regime. The British, 
French and American governments were committed to supporting 
them in this determination. The suggested unilateral meas­
ures were either political, as for example "to bring into 
force quickly an advance instalment of the concessions in 
the Bonn Conventions", or economic, as for example increased
Allied investment in Berlin and aid to the population of the
inter-zonal border areas.(21)
Hoyer Millar's ideas of unilateral "consolation prizes" 
found open ears in the Foreign Office, but the preparation 
of a fall-back position was eventually abandoned: "We have
gone as far as we can in examining all this without commit-
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ment," Kirkpatrick wrote, "and I should be against further 
pressure on the Americans at this stage." The British High 
Commissioner himself provided some of the amunition needed 
to kill off his idea: he had admitted that the value of
Four-Power agreement on minor relaxations would be very 
small if the major issues of reunification remained unsol­
ved. And even more importantly, he had drawn attention to 
the under-current of fear in Western Germany that if Berlin 
produced a detente between East and West, and no agreement 
on German reunification, Germany would appear to be getting 
the worst of both worlds(22). Hoyer Millar himself had 
helped to bury one of few and last policy initiatives he 
produced during his time as British High Commissioner in 
Germany.
The report of the tripartite official talks in Paris 
recommended that the German Federal Government should be 
consulted on three subjects: the holding of free all-German
elections, the status of the subsequent all-German Gover­
nment, and the problem of security in Europe. Accordingly, 
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, after consultations with his two 
colleagues, went to see the Chancellor on 4 January to 
present him with three memoranda on these subjects produced 
at the Paris talks. He also delivered a document embodying 
the answers to the questions which Professor Grewe, the 
German observer at the Paris talks, had posed. It was agreed 
that it might be desirable as the next step for the matter 
to be further explored between Professor Grewe and those
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members of the three Allied High Commissions who attended 
the Paris meeting; Hoyer Millar had not taken part in the 
discussions in Paris. He had also not taken part in dis­
cussions between Adenauer and Eden in Paris and only had 
instructions now to remind the Chancellor that the declara­
tion to be made by the U.S., U.K., and France and the whole
security problem were still under discussion between the 
three Governments: Hoyer Millar as the messenger.
Hoyer Millar continued in this role nine days later 
when he met the Chancellor again to show him the "suitably 
edited text" of the Tripartite Group's paper on objectives 
and tactics at Berlin. He sent a record of his discussion 
with Adenauer to the Foreign Office, which in turn sent 
comments on the points made back to Bonn: this series of
telegrams shows considerable similarities of opinion which 
existed between the British Foreign Office and the German 
Chancellor at this point in time. Allied and German experts 
were to consider the remaining divergences of opinion 
further and Hoyer Millar was asked to report on the results 
of these deliberations: Hoyer Millar as the rapporteur.
First, the similarities: "On the statement that one of 
our objectives should be 'to keep open the prospect of 
further negotiation with the Soviet Union at a later date'", 
Hoyer Millar wrote, "Dr. Adenauer expressed anxiety that, if 
French opinion was given to believe that the Berlin meeting, 
whatever its outcome, would be followed by further negotia­
tions, this would immediately become an excuse for further 
delay over the French ratification of the E.D.C." The Fo­
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reign Office shared the Chancellor's view and therefore were 
prepared "to accept the Chancellor's formulation of our 
objectives as to finish the meeting, in the event of fail­
ure, in such a way 'as not to make later negotiations with 
the Russians impossible'." They also agreed that there would 
be serious disadvantages of regarding the Berlin Conference 
as a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but poin­
ted out that "we really could not agree to break off conver­
sations with the Russians on this point alone." They also 
shared the Chancellor's reluctance to have a German Peace 
Treaty included in the agenda, but if the Russians insisted 
on it, would have to accept it. (23)
The Chancellor also gave Hoyer Millar his views on the 
documents which the latter had given him on 4 January on
all-German elections and the formation of an all-German
Government. The Foreign Office commented: "We share the
apprehension of the Germ ans that if we set up a Working
Group on the elections in Berlin during the meeting the 
Russians may be able to delay the outcome of the Conference 
indefinitely. For this reason it is our intention that the 
Foreign Ministers should themselves work out the main prin­
ciples of the electoral arrangements. The details would be 
remitted not to a working group of the Conference, but to 
the High Commissioners who would meet only after the Confe­
rence was finished. We do not think tht this would give 
excuse for any subsequent delay on the part of the French 
Parliament in ratifying the E.D.C. Treaty. We recognise that
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this is a departure from the Paris report." The Chancellor 
also pointed out that he would prefer a Four Power commis­
sion, consisting of uniformed personnel, to supervise the 
elections: "After I had pointed out the practical difficulty 
of producing from our Armed Forces the large number of 
suitably qualified personnel required for this task, the 
Chancellor explained that the personnel concerned need not 
necessarily be regular members of the Armed Forces; the main 
thing would be the impression made on the East Zone popula­
tion by the sight of a foreign uniform as such. Neutral 
observers in civilian clothes would not be at all the same 
thing." Although the Foreign Office had hitherto not been 
much in favour of such supervisory commissions, because they 
were bound to be unacceptable to the Russians, the message 
to Bonn was now: "we are certainly prepared to give it
support."(24)
Second, the divergences: "Dr. Adenauer emphasised that 
he attached great importance to the proposal that new elec­
tions for the East Zone Volkskammer should be held simulta­
neously with the all-German elections." Hoyer Millar tried 
to point out the various objections which could be seen to 
this proposal, for example the possibility that new Volks­
kammer elections would still produce an unsatisfactory As­
sembly and the difficulty of finding adequate candidates. 
His arguments, however, were repudiated by the Chancellor 
and his principal adviser, Walter Hallstein. In objecting to 
this German proposal, Hoyer Millar followed the Foreign 
Office line: "You have already made most of the arguments
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against it," he was told. "We entirely approve of what you 
have said. Furthermore, we do not believe that the elections 
would turn out in the long run as the Germans wish, for even 
if a reasonably representative Government were returned it 
would still be under the heel of the Russians and pressure 
could easily be brought to bear upon it. If if were con­
strained to obey the behest of the Russians, we should find 
ourselves in a most awkward situation. Instead of completely 
ignoring its existence as we can do with the East Zone 
Government, we should have to admit that it was largely our 
own creation."
The Chancellor also told the British High Commissioner, 
that in the Federal Government's view the process by which 
an all-German Government was to be established should be 
determined not by the National Assembly, but by agreement 
between the Bundestag and the newly elected East Zone par­
liament. Hoyer Millar explained this in his telegram: "In
fact the main advantage of this provision, as already ex­
plained to us seperately by Grewe, would be to give the 
Federal Government control over the modalities and timing of 
the transfer of powers to the all-German Government." The 
Foreign Office was strictly against this idea: "We should be 
most unwilling to accept the Chancellor's view ... we are 
confident that the all-German constituent Assembly will be 
the sort of body which the Western Powers and the Chancellor 
himself would wish to see. This is the one rock upon which 
we can count. It would therefore be unwise to allow powers
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which we originally intended for the all-German constituent 
Assembly to be placed in the hands of the Bundestag and the 
East German Assembly jointly."
The greatest divergence of views between Adenauer and 
the Foreign Office was on the last point which the Chancel­
lor raised with Hoyer Millar: that the Occupying Powers
should abandon their existing powers before the all-German 
Government was established. "The Chancellor thought,n Hoyer 
Millar cabled to London, "that the object should be to leave 
the Governments and Assemblies in West and East Germany as 
free as possible. He pointed out that in the East Zone the 
Control Statute had been abolished, so that theoretically 
the East Zone was now free while Western Germany was still 
living under Occupation rule." The Foreign Office professed 
to be "astonished that the Chancellor should question the 
right of the Allied Governments to reserve their existing 
powers with respect to Germany. Obviously we must reserve 
our rights in Berlin or we shall have no legal justification 
for maintaining the status quo there. Equally we must have 
rights with respect to the stationing and security of our 
troops. This is clearly recognized in the Bonn Conventions 
which confirm our reserved powers with respect to the re­
unification of Germany and the Peace Treaty for reasons 
which are perfectly obvious.■(25)
It is difficult to see why the Foreign Office should 
have been "astonished" or surprised by Adenauer's remarks: 
they were like a ceterum censeo for him. He took every 
opportunity to point out his dissatisfaction about the con­
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tinued existence of the Allies' reserved powers with respect 
to Germany. What was different this time, however, was how 
Hoyer Millar handled Adenauer's remarks. When the Chancellor 
had raised the same objections to the Allies' reserved 
powers during the negotiations leading up to the Bonn Con­
ventions, this had led to fierce arguments with Hoyer 
Millar's predecessor, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. In a much more 
ambassadorial fashion, Hoyer Millar had only received the 
comments of the Federal Government and passed them on to 
London, without argument, only at times politely raising 
possible objections and stating his own government's line.
On 18 January the Allied High Commission was handed two 
memoranda, containing the Chancellor's considered comments, 
which repeated, in Hoyer Millar's view, the points which 
Adenauer had made in their conversation five days ago only 
in "rather stronger form"(26). He passed them on to London 
together with agreed comments and recommendations which he 
had agreed with his US and French colleagues. The memoranda, 
however, did include one new point and several others which, 
in Hoyer Millar's words, needed further clarification.
The new point was the Federal Government's request that 
before elections for the National Assembly and the Volkskam- 
mer, the Volkspolizei should be reduced in numbers and 
disarmed to the level of the Federal Republic's Bundes- 
grenzschutz. Hoyer Millar's comment was: "This is a new
suggestion and at first sight a particularly difficult and 
unpractical one"(27). Eden agreed: "Naturally, I sympathiese
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with reasons why Federal Government put this forward, but 
think it totally unrealistic to suppose that Russians would 
ever agree. Volkspolizei form part of their own security 
system. We intend to resist any suggestion that E.D.C. 
should be put into cold storage pending outcome of Berlin 
Conference, free elections etc. It would be difficult to 
justify our taking this line, with the simultaneous demand 
that what are in effect Russian security troops should be 
reduced on this drastic scale."(28)
Two days later representatives of the three High Com­
missioners took up with Grewe the points raised in the 
memoranda. They were grouped under two headings: all-German 
elections which included the new proposal of a reduction and 
disarmament of the Volkspolizei and the proposal for a Four 
Power supervisory organisation; and the formation of an all- 
German Government which included the German proposal for 
elections for a new Soviet Zone Parliament simultaneously 
with all-German elections, the transfer of powers to the 
Natioanl Assembly and the Occupation Statute.
Hoyer Millar's reports about the flood of German propo­
sals at this late stage produced a feeling of anoyance in 
London. The Foreign Office felt that the Western Allies had 
done all they could to include the Germans in the policy 
making process: German observers had been invited to Paris
to the tripartite preparatory talks and there had been top- 
level meetings between Eden and Adenauer and yet, barely a 
week before the Berlin Conference was about to start, the 
Germans had tabled a number of totally new conditions. And
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these conditions seemed to originate with one person: the
German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Hoyer Millar implied 
this suspicion in his comment on the proposal to hold elec­
tions for a new Soviet Zone Parliament simultaneously with 
all-German elections: "The Chancellor feels strongly on this 
proposal which is now stated 'to have been approved by the 
Federal Cabinet'. But its wisdom is doubted by several of 
his advisers including Grewe, as well as by the Americans 
and French here"(29).
The Foreign Office was starting to doubt the Chancel­
lor's intentions, knowing that he had never been keen on the 
idea of a Four-Power meeting. In a very frank telegram to 
Bonn, Eden wrote on 21 January: "I cannot help feeling that 
some of the German comments are unduly perfectionist. I 
wonder whether he would in the event venture publicly to 
demand that German unity must be abandoned unless all his 
requirements are met." Eden went on to outline once again 
his plan to take the initiative at Berlin and put forward "a 
simple and positive set of proposals, avoiding anything 
which might be criticised as unduly complicated and exces­
sively rigid". He clearly voiced his annoyance: "We have
been discussing these matters with Dr. Adenauer since Novem­
ber and it is disappointing that new issues, involving great 
complications, should only be presented to us so late in the 
day." Eden, however, was still eager to go to some length to 
satisfy the German Chancellor:
"The Russians will presumably argue for their scheme of 
a provisional Government formed from the two existing
administrations. ... At that stage we could quite pro­
perly argue that, whereas the Federal Government is 
entirely representative and formed after elections as 
recent as last September, the Soviet Zone administra­
tion, apart from being entirely unrepresentative, 
results from elections held as long ago as October 15,
1950. We could then suggest, and in this context only, 
that in the Soviet Zone at least new elections should 
be held to remedy this anomaly."(3 0)
Hoyer Millar was given the task to discuss this with his 
American and French colleagues and then with the Germans. 
The next day, Adenauer introduced yet another idea: the
Laender in the East Zone should be restored and Landtag 
elections should be held in them under supervision simulta­
neously with all-German elections. Hancock, in the Foreign 
Office, concluded: MI think that we need not be perturbed by 
Dr. Adenauer's new idea ... The views expressed in our 
telegram apply equally to Dr. Adenauer's previous proposals 
and to his new proposal"(31). Discussions moved to Berlin, 
where the Western delegations, led by the Foreign Ministers 
and including the High Commissioners, met for pre-conference 
talks. The Americans, who initially expressed a mild inte­
rest in the latest German ideas, soon agreed to "in­
structions to the High Commissioners to explain firmly to 
Blankenhorn the objections to these last-minute propo­
sals" (32) .
On 24 January, Hoyer Millar reported on their conversa­
tion with the Federal Government's representative, which 
"had not been as difficult as they had expected." Blanken­
horn had noted the arguments and the Western solution to 
strengthen the Supervisory Commission. From the words of his 
representative it became clear that Adenauer had back-trac-
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ked considerably and also that the latest German proposals 
were mainly his own and not necessarily reflected the view 
of the German Federal Parliament: Blankenhorn "had agreed
that publicity of the divergence of views was undesirable, 
and had mentioned that the memorandum had not been cleared 
with the Foreign Relations Committee, as had the earlier 
memorandum, and that therefore it was not generally known. 
He said that Dr. Adenauer had not meant to imply that the 
two suggestions were essential. They could perhaps be kept 
in reserve, should we reach detailed discussions with the 
Russians on the machinery of the elections." The High Com­
missioners had replied that the Chancellor's suggestions 
would not be forgotten, but had not committed themselves to 
raise them at any stage(33).
At this meeting between the High Commissioners and 
Blankenhorn in Berlin, the latter had expressed Adenauer's 
anxiety to be kept informed about developments at the Confe­
rence. The Chancellor had originally intended to go to 
Berlin himself, but had changed his mind at the beginning of 
January; it is very doubtful whether the Western Allies 
would have welcomed his presence there anyway, as it would 
have set a precedent and the Austrian and East German Fo­
reign Minister could have insisted on being invited as well. 
On 5 January Hoyer Millar told Roberts that the Chancellor 
"intended to remain in Bonn throughout the period and to 
keep in touch with what was going on in Berlin through 
Grewe. ... Special aeroplanes were being chartered so as to
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ensure rapid communication between Berlin and Bonn, and 
generally speaking the Chancellor seemed satisfied that he 
would be kept adequately informed of day to day developments 
at the Conference"(34). Nine days later the High Commis­
sioner was informed that the German delegation would be lead 
by Herbert Blankenhorn; although Grewe had originally been 
appointed "Special Representative of the Federal Government 
for the Berlin Conference" and had been closely involved in 
all the preparatory talks, Blankenhorn was a better-known 
figure and had just been given the personal rank of Ambassa­
dor and his appointment was seen as a move to raise the 
profile of the German delegation. A week before the Con­
ference was about to start, the High Commissioners came to 
an agreement amongst themselves on how to keep the Germans 
informed:
"My colleagues and I today discussed question of channel 
of communication between Western delegations and German 
representatives in Berlin. We thought that in matters of 
major importance the three High Commissioners should see 
Blankenhorn and that, when necessary, the chairman of 
the month could come to Bonn to see the Chancellor. 
Normally, however, we thought that the channel should be 
through the Chairman of the month to Blankenhorn, or, on 
routine matters, as through an appropriate member of the 
Chairman's staff to Grewe."(35)
Summing up, Hoyer Millar's role in the run up to and 
during the Berlin Conference of 1954 was that of an ambassa­
dor: he was not personally involved in the preparatory talks 
between the Western allies. He had delegated the preparatory 
quadrupartite work to the British Berlin Kommandant. He had 
only been marginally involved in the policy making process 
in London, his only major policy initiative in suggesting a
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fall-back position having come to nothing. Shortly before 
the Conference he was instructed to deliver the tripartite 
policy papers to the German Chancellor and receive his
comments on them; he was, however, not negotiating with him 
and confessed to the Foreign Office that he had not been
able to change the Chancellor's mind on the latter's new 
proposals: "I was not able to persuade the Chancellor to
modify his ideas, to which he evidently attaches great 
importance"(36). During the Conference he was not involved 
in the negotiations, but was the line of communication to 
the Germans. It has to be stressed, however, that Hoyer 
Millar's role did not differ in any way from that of his
High Commissioner colleagues and therefore should be inter­
preted as a sign of the change in their collective role.
The Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference did not reach 
any agreement on the German and security question. As plan­
ned, Eden took the initiative and proposed a five point plan 
for German re-unification: (1) all-German and guaranteed
free elections; (2) the formation of a national assembly;
(3) preparation of a constitution and a peace treaty; (4)
the acceptance of the constitution and the formation of a 
government; and (5) the signing of the peace treaty with
that government. The new Germany should possess total free­
dom of association. These proposals were called the Eden 
Plan and the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov flatly rejected 
them. He proposed: (1) to work out a peace treaty with
representatives of the Federal Republic and the GDR; (2) to 
have the Bundestag and the Volkskammer form a provisional
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Government; (3) to withdraw all occupation troops, except 
for small contingents necessary for controle, and to hold 
free all-German elections; (4) to form an all-German Gover­
nment . The re-united Germany should be neutral and incorpo­
rated into a European collective security system. The Confe­
rence was broken off without reaching any significant agree­
ment because of these irreconcilable differences.
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THE SAAR QUESTION
The hopes and fears of an East-West rapprochement, 
which had delayed the ratification of the Bonn and EDC 
Treaties, were dashed at the end of the Berlin Conference. 
One obstacle on the way to French ratification of the Trea­
ties, however, remained: the future of Saar territory. This 
question had cropped up again and again during the period of 
the Occupation of Germany and always at the most awkward 
time, souring Franco-German relations and thereby delaying 
important steps towards a peaceful Europe.
Looking at the development of this question throughout 
the period of Occupation, one can detect a shift in the 
British position away from unquestioning support for the 
French position towards the role of a mediator with a some­
times barely hidden pro-German bias. In 1947 Britain had 
supported the Saar's economic integration into France. This 
stance had been reaffirmed in 1950, when the Saar question 
flared up again in connection with the proposed admission to 
membership of the Council of Europe of both the Saar and the 
Federal Republic in the Council of Europe. The proviso in 
both instances had been that the status of the territory was 
a provisional one to be finally settled at a peace con­
ference .
In 1951 the then British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone
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Kirkpatrick, launched an initiative to persuade the French 
and German Governments to solve the Saar question before a 
peace conference. He was convinced that the Saar question 
left unresolved would hamper the process of integrating the 
Federal Republic into the West by leaving a bone of conten­
tion between France and Germany. At that time he was deeply 
involved in this integration process, namely the negotia­
tions leading up to the Conventions signed in May of the 
following year. Kirkpatrick's initiative, which led to a 
joint representation by the British and American Ambassadors 
to the French Government, reflected the shift in the British 
position away from the unquestioning support for the French 
on the issue of the Saar. Considering that the issue was 
finally settled by a plebiscite in 1955, it is interesting 
to note that Kirkpatrick and his deputy debated the "healing 
properties of plebiscites" when they drafted the 1951 des­
patch to London. Kirkpatrick doubted "very much whether a 
plebiscite will lead to the liquidation of this problem and 
sweet reasonableness over the Saar in France and Germany." 
O'Neill, however, was convinced that this was the only 
possible solution and persuaded his superior to recommend it 
to the Foreign Office.(37)
From June 1951 the solution of the Saar question became 
a personal quest for Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and he was also 
able to convince the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony 
Eden, to regard it as one of the main impediments to the 
success of British policy for Germany and Europe. On 2
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December 1952 Eden's Private Secretary wrote into his diary: 
"I found A.E. keen and optimistic about Europe. The vote in 
the Saar has helped the French and he thinks he can get it 
settled. 'I am excited. I think I am on to something.' He 
wants to do it in Paris next week and thinks this the key to 
European problems. Frank Roberts is dubious about this and 
thinks it is better to leave it to Adenauer and 
Schuman.(38)"
The French, however, found the British pressure on the 
Saar question one-sided, namely anti-French, and were get­
ting increasingly annoyed. On 8 January 1953 the French
Deputy High Commissioner, Armand Berard, told his British
counterpart "that the Quai d'Orsay had been disagreeably 
surprised at the strength of Mr. Eden's recent intervention 
in Paris for an early Franco-German solution of the Saar 
question. Berard went on to allege that when the French 
spokesmen had questioned this pressure, Mr. Eden had said 
that he was continually being urged by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
to intervene in this way." Although O'Neill rejected Berard 
in his report to the Foreign Office as "a slippery customer 
who is always flitting to and fro Paris and engaging in 
obscure intrigues with cronies at the Quai d'Orsay and irty
guess is that they may have cooked up this story in the hope
that it would deter us here in Germany from taking too close 
an interest in this business", it is clear that the French 
were becoming increasingly irritated by the British pressure 
on them.(39)
This was made unmistakably clear to Eden when his
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French counterpart, Georges Bidault, told him at a meeting 
in London in February 1953 that, "while always ready to 
receive our advice and to keep us informed, the French 
Government did not want outside intervention or media­
tion. (40)" This French reprimand had two effects: firstly,
the British, in sulks, became much less keen to intervene, 
the Foreign Office advising Eden in March that "in the 
circumstances there seems to be nothing more we can do to 
hasten matters and it would appear undesirable for the 
Secretary of State to raise the question in Paris.(41)" And 
secondly, this can be seen as the beginning of a pro-German 
bias in the British attitude towards the Saar question, 
which the French had wrongly suspected to have existed all 
along. Before Bidault's statement in London, Eden had of­
fered to intervene several times on the French behalf, but 
from now on he was only willing to intervene on both sides 
and in the secret Foreign Office correspondence his under­
standing for the German point of view became more and more 
obvious.
At the Bermuda Conference the British agreed with the 
Americans that an intervention should only take place when 
it was necessary and when it could be effective; the posi­
tion paper which they had prepared at the beginning of the 
year should be held in reserve; and they were both unhappy 
that the French had made the Saar settlement a condition for 
the ratification of the Treaties.
The summer of 1953 saw an extraordinary change of
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scene: the Saar Conventions, which had already caused a
great storm when they had been signed by the French and Saar 
Governments in 1950, came up for revision. Adenauer protes­
ted to the Allied High Commission, as he had done in 1950. 
Now the French, who at the beginning of the year had not 
wanted any intervention, complained of "being left alone in 
the ring with the Germans.(42)" The French High Commissioner 
urged his colleagues to join him in a strong response to 
Adenauer's letter of 25 June and Hoyer Millar proposed to 
support an American intervention, but the Foreign Office 
held him back. Hancock, the head of the Central Department 
of the Foreign Office, wrote in a minute: "Why pester Dr.
Adenauer, who is way ahead of any other German in his will­
ingness to meet the French? We do not want to intervene but, 
if we must, we should intervene with both sides. And our 
intervention should then be effectual and carefully timed. I 
cannot understand why the Americans are always wanting to 
indulge in these small and pointless interventions. It is no 
good nagging.(43)"
Although Eden was convinced that the French were com­
mitting "a great folly"(44) by ratifying the Saar Conven­
tions, he responded favourably to a request by M. Bidault to 
intervene on the French behalf in Bonn. On 28 October Hoyer 
Millar received the following instructions from London: "I
am disturbed by recent indications that Dr. Adenauer is 
receding from the undertaking which he gave after the German 
elections to do his best to reach an early agreement with 
the French on the Saar. It is clearly up to the Germans to
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make the next move. You should therefore take an early 
opportunity to remind the Chancellor of the importance which 
I attach to this matter and express the hope that he will be 
as forthcoming as possible and to do his best to meet the 
French."(45) The High Commissioner delivered the message to 
Walter Hallstein, State Secretary at the German Foreign 
Office, the next day and expressed British readiness "to 
help as far as we could if and when the appropriate time had 
come." Hallstein was grateful, but implied "that any inter­
vention on our part at the present moment would be pre­
mature ."(46)
This was the start of a period during which Hoyer 
Millar and his American colleague were standing on the 
sidelines observing the conversations which began between 
the German Chancellor and the French High Commissioner, 
Francois-Poncet. On 16 November he reported to the Foreign 
Office that "they have already run into heavy weather."(47) 
Hoyer Millar was, however, prevented from doing anything 
more than showing an interest in the progress of the talks; 
his instructions were clear: "keep us informed ... But we do 
not suggest that you should go out of your way to make 
enquiries, since we do not wish to appear to be butting 
in."(48)
The prospect of direct contact between Adenauer and 
Bidault prompted the Americans to propose a formal Anglo- 
American intervention and in January 1954 they submitted 
their latest ideas on the Saar to the British Foreign Of­
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fice. Although Kirkpatrick expressed the general Foreign 
Office feeling about these ideas by calling them "slightly 
half-baked", they made the British move away from their 
reluctance to interfere. In their brief for the Berlin 
Conference they had written: "We should refrain from wasting 
our capital by haphazard and premature pressure upon the 
French and/or Germans"(49); but now messages were sent to 
the British delegation in Berlin to discuss the State De­
partment proposals with their American colleagues. These 
discussions continued after the Berlin Conference had 
finished.
In March Adenauer went to Paris and was presented with 
a new set of French proposals for the solution of the Saar 
question, which envisaged, inter alia, a closer involvement 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, by asking them 
to guarantee the proposed solution. Hoyer Millar was ex­
cluded from the ensuing discussions and complained in a 
letter to Frank Roberts:
"Would you mind having a word with the Departments 
concerned and ask them to keep us rather more closely 
and rapidly informed regarding the course of events 
concerning the E.D.C. and the Saar. Although we are for 
the moment so to speak on the margin of the current 
discussions, we are very closely concerned in both 
questions and may at any moment be called upon to make 
representations about them to the Germans or, 
alternatively, may be questioned about them by the 
Chancellor and his people. It is therefore important 
that we should be kept fully up-to-date. At the moment 
this is not happening."(50)
When Kirkpatrick was High Commissioner, he had never been 
"on the margins of current discussions"; he had initiated 
policies and had not seen making "representations about
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them" as his main function. These are clearly the words of 
an ambassador, who still happened to hold the title of High 
Commissioner. Although Hoyer Millar was still called upon to 
comment on and assess German feelings on the planned Anglo- 
American demarche, the content of this approach, which he 
was supposed to make to the German Government, was worked 
out between the Foreign Office and the State Department: "we 
think that the Ambassadors in Paris and the High Commis­
sioners in Bonn must be provided with a brief agreed tex- 
tually between the State Department and ourselves," the 
Foreign Office wrote. "the complexity of the Saar question 
is such that in our view, unless the Ambassadors and High 
Commissioners work from an agreed document, confusion is 
likely to arise."(51)
Accordingly Hoyer Millar, at the end of March, was 
issued with a very detailed brief, going so far as to 
suggest what arguments to use in discussions with the Ger­
mans. The underlying principle was that "we should in the 
first instance restrict ourselves to pressing the French and 
German Governments to accept unchanged the General Affairs 
Committee's recommendations. We should give them no pretext 
for proposing amendments and should therefore suggest, ini­
tially at least, no alterations ourselves, even in respect 
of points where modification appear desirable."(52) Hoyer 
Millar's main contribution to the Anglo-American plan was 
his recommendation on the timing of its implementation.
The question of timing turned out to be rather com­
plicated and required all the skills which the experienced
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diplomat, Sir Frederik Hoyer Millar, undoubtedly possessed: 
sensitive and unobtrusive observation of the German scene 
and constant readyness to put forward the British point of 
view. An extract from a telegram, which Hoyer Millar sent to 
London on 4 April 1954, will serve here as an example of 
his dealings with the Chancellor:
"I told the Chancellor that, as he of course knew, we 
attached the greatest importance to early Franco-German 
agreement being reached on the Saar. We hoped, 
therefore, that he for his part would do everything he 
could to facilitate this. AS far as we were concerned, 
our view was that on the whole and all things 
considered, the Van Naters report provided the best 
basis for a settlement. The Chancellor did not take up 
this remark of mine, but instead reiterated the 
difficulties which the Germans were now experiencing in 
dealing with the French authorities owing to the 
divisions of opinion and inconsistencies among the 
latter.1 (53)
This was not the planned intervention; Hoyer Millar had 
presented the British point of view and had not achieved 
great results. This is also a clear example of the change of 
the High Commissioner's dealings with the Chancellor: where
before Adenauer had been summoned to the Petersberg and 
later the troika had descended from their Olympus to meet 
the Chancellor, now the High Commissioners met the Chancel­
lor individually. The impact of a common front, which the 
three had represented when they faced Adenauer together, had 
been considerably reduced by the system now in existence, 
when the chairman of the month went to see the latter. Also 
the strength of their representations had decreased: where
before they had been able to issue instructions and make 
demands, the High Commissioners were now relying on their
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powers of persuasion.
The role of the British and American High Commissioner 
would have increased considerably, if the intervention had 
ever taken place. At consecutive meetings, however, Hoyer 
Millar was told by the Chancellor that, although an Anglo- 
American intervention might be necessary and welcome in the 
future, the time had not come yet. The Franco-German talks 
were continueing on different levels and between different 
men and the prospect of a break-through at the next stage 
seemed always close enough for Adenauer to request a delay 
of the Anglo-American intervention. On 27 April, for exam­
ple, Hoyer Millar wrote: "In reply to a remark by myself,
the Chancellor said that he felt it would be premature for 
any Anglo-American representations to be made in Paris or 
Bonn until the result of the coming Hallstein-Schuman talks 
were known."(54) Both the Foreign Office and the State 
Department, eager for their intervention, when it did take 
place, to be effective, let themselves be guided by these 
remarks.
The British were also less willing to put pressure on 
the Germans, because their views were very similar. Hoyer 
Millar informed the Foreign Office that "the Chancellor made 
it clear in the debate on April 2 9 that he has accepted the 
Van Naters Plan as the basis of negotiations and that he 
expects the French to do likewise. As I understand it this 
is also your view and that of the United States Gover­
nment." (55) Even more importantly, the Foreign Office star­
ted to doubt whether, if the Germans could be persuaded to
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make concessions on the Saar question, those concessions 
would have the desired result, namely a French advance of 
the ratification of the 1952 Conventions and the EDC Treaty. 
Hoyer Millar clearly expressed this in his telegram of 5 
May: "unless we can be more confident about French inten­
tions over the E.D.C. we should be careful how far we go in 
bringing pressure to bear on the Germans over the Saar."(56) 
Hoyer Millar, however, made it clear that he thought 
"the position here as regards the Saar is getting steadily 
worse and that the Chancellor's ability to make concessions 
to the French is mauch less now than it was six months ago." 
Despite the fact that he thought the Chancellor would not be 
very receptive to the representations, he stated that in his 
view the time was approaching "when we and the Americans 
will have to intervene vigorously with both the French and 
the Germans to bring them to agreement. If such an interven­
tion is to be effective it will have to be directed as 
closely as possible to the main outstanding points of diffe­
rence, and the nearer we can come to suggesting clear-cut 
solutions the more chances we shall have of success." (57)
The Americans suggested a meeting of representatives of 
the British and American High Commissions, the embassies in 
Paris and the Foreign Office and State Department to meet in 
Paris to work out the revised terms of the planned represen­
tations. Hoyer Millar did not take part in the talks perso­
nally, but members of his staff did, who before hand had 
coordinated their views with members of the American High
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Commission. After the Paris talks the Foreign Office and the 
State Department continued to discuss amendments to the 
brief for the representations to be made in Paris and Bonn. 
Once again Sir Frederik Hoyer Millar felt marginalised: "It
is becoming rather difficult to follow the exchanges between 
London and Washington about amendments to the brief recently 
prepared in Paris. Once agreement has been reached with 
Washington it would, I think, be helpful if you could send 
us a telegram setting out exactly what amendments are to be 
made in the Paris brief."(58)
The formal intervention, however, was again delayed by 
the prospect of a new phase of Franco-German talks over the 
Saar: Adenauer was to meet M. Teitgen in Strasbourg and
Hoyer Millar told the Foreign Office that it might be "bet­
ter to hold our hand for the time being."(59) Although Eden 
had already sanctioned the intervention, the Foreign Office 
went along with Hoyer Millar's judgement of the situation 
and advised a postponement of the representations. From the 
Geneva Conference Eden cabled to London: "Although it does
not sound as if much further progress is likely to be made 
at Strasbourg, I agree that in the circumstances our inter­
vention should be postponed until afterwards. But it seems 
to me that we have now delayed long enough and I would like 
it to be made as soon as possible after Strasbourg."(60)
In fact, the British did intervene in the Franco-German 
negotiations on the Saar which took place in Strasbourg in 
May 1954. But the intervention was totally different from 
what had been planned and agreed with the Americans in
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Paris. For a start, the High Commissioners and the ambassa­
dors were not even present in Strasbourg. And it was in no 
way a formal intervention, but secret, behind the scenes, 
coaxing from the Foreign Office Minister, Anthony Nutting, 
and Frank Roberts, who were in town for the Council of 
Europe meeting. Nutting's report to Sir Anthony Eden is 
revealing in many respects: not only did he describe his
secret mediation, but it also revealed the rifts in the 
Anglo-American-French alliance and the ever closer Anglo- 
German relations. "The significant feature of the method of 
the Strasbourg negotiations," Nutting wrote, "has been the 
cageyness and ellusiveness of the French compared with the 
constant contact and consultation I have had with Adenauer 
and Hallstein." Nutting was full of praise for Adenauer who 
was "a tower of strength compared to our other allies!"
British relations with both the French and the Ameri­
cans had been strained by the Indo-China negotiations taking 
place at Geneva at that time. Nutting hinted at that fact 
when he wrote: "I have had to be very cautious in playing
any British hand over all this since, despite of how the 
Americans have behaved to us, I did not feel I should break 
the Anglo-American front to the extent of playing an offi­
cial intervening role. In offering counsel to either side I 
have therefore used only the spoken word. When it was a case 
of producing a written formula to try and reach agreement on 
the economic questions, I resorted to the subterfuge of 
slipping a draft text to Van Naters for him to present as
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his own idea." Nutting, however, was very doubtful whether 
the agreement, which he had helped to come about, would 
survive:
"It seems a little too good to be true that any French­
man has agreed to the terms of a Saar settlement and I 
fear that there will be some sinister sharpening of anti- 
EDC knives in Paris over the next 48 hours. Teitgen, as 
you know, is regarded in Paris as something of a hopeless 
European fanatic and the fact that he is the man respon­
sible will I fear somewhat fortify the EDC opponents. ...
The Germans have gone remarkably far and I am convinced 
that if the French repudiate this agreement nothing on 
God's earth or in Adenauer's powers of persuasion will 
get the German coalition to offer anything like the same 
terms again ... It would be an enormeous achievement to 
get the final declared preamble settled, though I am 
afraid everywhere the signs are against the French 
Government bringing the EDC to a debate in teh present 
state of the Indo-China negotiations."(61)
Indeed, the optimism created in Strasbourg was quickly 
dashed. Hoyer Millar reported that he had seen M. Berard, 
the French Deputy High Commissioner, who "seemed doubtful 
whether the agreement reached in Strasbourg would stick, and 
to fear that Bidault and Schumann might think that Teitgen 
had gone too far."(62) Indeed, Schumann issued a dimenti of 
the Saar agreement, although he confessed to the British 
Ambassador that this had been a tactical move to retain his 
room for manoeuvre before his party's conference. The Bri­
tish obliged the French in sending instructions to the High 
Commissioner to seek clarifications from the German Gover­
nment. Hoyer Millar complied, but on 9 June he told the 
Foreign Office:
"The Chancellor gave the impression that his patience 
with the French had almost run out, and that he was not 
prepared to make any further concessions to the French 
over the Saar unless and until he could be assured that 
the E.D.C. was going to come into force. Adenauer said
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something to me to the effect that he had heard that the 
United States and United Kingdom Governments were 
contemplating intervening shortly over the Saar 
question. His manner implied that if this intervention 
took the shape of pressure on him to make further 
concessions of substance to the French at this juncture, 
it would meet with a chilly response."(63)
All efforts by the British, seeking clarifications from the 
Germans and supporting the French by offering a guarantee 
of the agreement, however, were in vain. The French Gover­
nment under M. Laniel fell and with it the Teitgen-Adenauer 
agreement on the Saar question. No progress was made with 
the new French Government either: when M. Mendes-France met
Dr. Adenauer in Brussels the Saar question was not even 
discussed.
In August 1954, two years after the Conventions had 
been signed, the M. Mendes-France put the EDC Treaty to a 
vote in the French National Assembly, which finally rejected 
it. During the debate the opponents of the EDC pointed out 
that the absence of a Saar settlement meant that a "pre­
condition" of the Treaty as defined by the Laniel government 
had not been fulfilled. In the final stages of the debate M. 
Mendes-France made it clear that a Saar settlement was still 
to be considered as a pre-condition for the rearmament of 
Germany. Thus, as the efforts started to put together an 
alternative to the EDC, the Saar problem continued to occupy 
not only the French and the German Governments, but also the 
British and the Americans. Their High Commissioners contin­
ued to stand in the wings, observing and encouraging and 
ready to finally launch their long delayed formal interven­
tion.
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The prospect of reaching a settlement of the Saar 
question, however, were dim. On 26 September, Hoyer Millar 
reported to London that the German Chancellor did not wish 
the Saar to be included in the agenda for the formal nego­
tiations in London. Even more, he made it clear that the 
agreement which he had reached with Teitgen in Strasbourg in 
the spring was no longer acceptable as a basis for a settle­
ment. It had been based on the idea of a Europeanisation of 
the Saar and therefore was too closely connected with the 
now defunct EDC(64).
The British Ambassador in Paris pressed the Foreign 
Office to try to change the German Chancellor's mind: "I
think we ought to put some pressure to bear (for a change) 
on the Germans so as to induce them to say that they well 
accept the Teitgen Plan provided that the "supra-national 
element" is provided in some way by the Coal and Steel 
Authority"; but even he had to concede that, if the Germans 
would not budge, "I should imagine that we should have to 
tell the French that they, for their part, simply must not 
make this a "orealable" if they want us, for our part - who, 
after all, are not directly concerned with the Saar - to 
take a further step towards association with the Continent." 
Eden very much agreed with the last part of the statement 
and minuted on the telegram: "I think that Adenauer's posi­
tion is probably too weak to allow him to do what Sir G. 
Jebb suggests." This was also what Sir Frederik Hoyer Millar 
wrote: "while there might be advantage in sounding out the
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Chancellor about the Coal and Steel Community idea, I do not 
think he ought to be pressed if he shows obvious signs of 
disliking it"(65).
Kirkpatrick, after having talked to the Chancellor, 
advised that the British should refrain "from intervening 
until it is clear that we are wanted", to which Eden simply 
added "yes"(66). The time for intervention seemed to have 
come during the Paris Conference in October 1954. On 22 
October, Hoyer Millar wrote in a minute about a conversation 
he had had with Adenauer: "Finally the Chancellor said that
he felt that the time had now come when intervention by the 
Secretary of State was desirable - and indeed necessary if 
any real progess over the Saar question were to be made in 
the next day or two. He referred to a conversation he had 
had with Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick in London the other day, from 
which he had understood that the Secretary of State would be 
prepared to intervene at the right moment. In reply to a 
question from myself, he confirmed that he thought that this 
moment had now arrived."(67) In the end, however, British 
and American representatives, with a mediatory proposal in 
their hands, spent the night of 22 October outside closed 
doors, while inside the French and the Germans were negotia­
ting an agreement on the Saar. The next morning Eden wrote 
in a secret telegram: "German delegation informed us shortly 
before 11.30 a.m. that the French and German experts had 
found solutions to outstanding problems. They were accept­
able to the Chancellor, who was then discussing the position 
with German parliamentary leaders now in Paris. French
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Cabinet are reported to be meeting at 2.30, but arrangements 
for signature ceremony of all four and nine Power agreements 
at 2.45 still stands."(68)
In the last minute a Saar settlement, which Mendes- 
France had called a pre-condition for German rearmament, had 
been reached and the new set of agreements replacing the 
ones signed in 1952 could go ahead. Although the British had 
played the decisive role in these agreements coming about, 
in the end their role in the final Saar settlement was 
limited. The signing of the Saar agreement, however, did not 
mean an end to the Saar problem. Both the French and the 
German Government faced problems in their parliament and 
with public opinion over the agreements reached in Paris. On 
7 December, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who three and a half 
years earlier had first proposed a British intervention on 
the Saar question, wrote: "There is not the slightest use
trying to intervene at this stage to promote an agreement 
on the Saar. ... Meanwhile we should concentrate on doing 
all we can to accelerate ratification in Paris and Bonn. We 
should tell both the French and German Governments to keep 
as quiet as possible over the Saar and moreover to view with 
toleration any statements which the other may make in order 
to facilitate ratification by his own Parliament."(69) In 
the end it was through a plebiscite, a solution which 
Kirkpatrick had proposed in 1951 on the recommendation of 
his deputy, that the Saar's future was finally decided: on
23 October 1955, exactly a year after the agreement had been
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reached in Paris, 67.7% of the inhabitants of the Saar voted 
against it. One year later The French and German Government 
were forced to sign a new agreement accepting the political 
and economic re-integration of the Saar territory into the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
In conclusion it can be said that Sir Frederik Hoyer 
Millar's role in settlement of the Saar question was limited 
in contrast to that of his predecessor. In fact it was very 
similar to that of the British Ambassador in Paris, which is 
yet another proof of the thesis that, although he still held 
the title of High Commissioner, he had already taken on the 
role of an ambassador.
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THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The chapter entitled The Search for an Alternative 
Solution described the immediate aftermath of the Treaties 
signed in May 1952: the problems encountered on the way of
the Federal Republic ratifying the Treaties and the question 
whether France would ever start the ratification process. 
Almost immediately after the signing ceremonies doubts arose 
in the French minds about the military part of the set of 
Treaties, namely the creation of a European Defence 
Community.
"When, subsequent to the signing of the treaty in the 
spring of 1952, world political conditions began gra­
dually to change, the opponents of German rearmament 
(Communists and traditional right-wingers) and its 
supranational form (Gaullists, those representing 
large portions of French industry) were joined by more 
and more supporters of an East-West detente policy, a 
policy of independence in relations to the USA and of 
a 'third-force' Europe. The Socialists, radical socia­
lists and moderate right-wingers in particular, who 
had as a rule supported the foreign policy of the 
French government, fell into serious internal party 
disagreements over the EDC problem. For fear of a 
collapse in parliament the government protracted rati­
fication, with the result that the prospects for an 
acceptance of the project became increasingly 
remote."(7 0)
The British were in an unexpected position: they had
never been very keen on the idea of a European Army, but 
they were the first to complete the ratification process in 
August 1952. In light of the complications, especially in 
France, they secretly started to think about alternatives to
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the EDC in case of its ultimate failure. Although these
deliberations are buried in the closed files of the Western
Organisations Department of the Foreign Office, one can gain
fleeting glimpses of them from comments made by Lord Hood,
the head of the department, on minutes of other departments:
for example, on 10 January 1954 Hood minuted:
"We are, of course, already studying how to obtain a 
German defence contribution if the E.D.C. fails. ...
The Bonn Conventions would have to be adapted to meet 
the new circumstances and though it might be 
necessary and desirable to make some minor
concessions as suggested in this paper, the general
programme should be to promulgate the new political 
deal in Germany at the same time as German membership 
of N.A.T.O. (or of the revised Brussels Treaty) 
became effective."(71)
From another, literally paranthetical comment one can gather 
that the new British High Commissioner, Sir Frederick Hoyer 
Millar, who had arrived in Germany in late summer of the 
previous year, was actively involved in these studies: on 10 
April, Frank Roberts told Hoyer Millar that "if the E.D.C. 
comes to nothing, we shall not only have to find some alter­
native means of obtaining a German contribution to Western 
defence (about which you and the other recipients of this 
letter have been exchanging views with Sammy Hood) but we 
shall also, in our own as well as the German interest, have 
to bring to an end the occupation regime in Western 
Germany"(72).
The second part of Roberts' statement indicates the 
search for ways of winding up the occupation regime in 
Germany, an endeavour which the British pursued with great 
vigour and in which Hoyer Millar played an important role
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(and a more visible one than his involvement in the secret 
studies of alternatives to EDC). In fact, it can be said
that this was his most important field of activity during 
his tenure as High Commissioner and the one which distingui­
shed this position from his later role as Ambassador. Ironi­
cally, the main purpose of the exercise was to relinquish 
the last powers which distinguished the High Commissioner 
from a normal ambassador and it therefore can be said that 
Hoyer Millar's main task as High Commissioner was to see 
through the abolition of his own, very special position.
Hoyer Millar's tenure as British High Commissioner, 
considered from the angle of the winding up of the occupa­
tion regime, can be divided into five periods: the first
lasted from his arrival in Germany until April 1954, during 
which he was considering concessions to the Federal Republic 
in case of deadlock or the indefinite delay of the entry 
into force of the Treaties signed in 1952; the second period 
began when the British and the Americans had given up hope 
of the EDC ever coming into force, although they never
admitted this publicly, and started considering, how the 
Bonn Treaties could be enacted independently of the EDC 
Treaty; when the French National Assembly failed to ratify 
the EDC Treaty in August 1954 matters came to a head and
urgent negotiations began, leading up to the London Con­
ference at the end of September; during the fourth period 
the Allied High Commission had the task of adapting the 1952 
Bonn Conventions to the situation of 1954 and of realising
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the Declaration of Intent issued by the Western Powers at 
the London Conference; during the final period the High 
Commissioners prepared for the termination of the occupa­
tion, while observing the complications once again incurred 
during the ratification of the new and the revised treaties.
When the year 1953 drew to a close, the feeling in the
British Foreign Office was that before long the Germans
would overcome their constitutional problems and complete
the ratification process of the 1952 Treaties, while the
French were still stalling. In November, P.F. Hancock, the
head of the Western Department of the Foreign Office, sent a
letter to the British High Commissioner in Germany asking
him to suggest concessions which should be made to the
Germans to keep them in the Western fold, if this situation
was to arise. He later described his letter as follows:
"In that letter I pointed out that, if the Bonn Conven­
tions and E.D.C. Treaty did not enter into force before 
long, we could not expect the Germans to go on being 
patient. In particular, if the Germans themselves 
ratified the Treaties, it might be necessary for us to 
do something for Germany in advance of French 
ratification. We were not thinking of any major steps, 
but rather of the relinquishment of powers which we 
either did not exercise or did not want to go on 
exercising."(73)
E.J.W. Barnes, who answered the letter for the Deputy High 
Commissioner Jack Ward, suggested four "unpopular powers" 
which could be relaxed "without digging into occupation 
costs or without prejudicing the essentials of our position 
in Germany": the ban on civil aviation, industrial controls, 
decartelisation and deconcentration powers, and the aboli­
tion of the Allied Courts. In his accompanying letter,
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however, he made one important point: "the sort of conces­
sions which you have in mind, and around which we have 
drafted our paper, will only at the best hold the situation 
for a short time. The Germans, who have waited nearly two 
years for the Bonn Conventions are not going to be satisfied 
with a few assorted "concessions" extracted therefrom. ... 
Having reached this stage do we really still want to confine 
ourselves to a painless surrender of dormant rights or will 
the time come when political realism will compel us to go 
further?" He acknowledged that this would require a "deci­
sion of principle at the highest level."
This decision of principle was delayed by the prospect 
of the Berlin Four Power Conference and by the uncertainty 
which it created in the minds of the public and of officials 
in all the countries concerned. The attitude of the British 
Foreign Office towards this Conference has been described in 
a previous chapter. It was convinced that not only would the 
Conference not solve the German problem, but it would make 
the situation worse. Hancock wrote: "It seems to me that the 
question which is likely to confront us after the Conference 
is not so much that of "holding the fort" until the French 
ratify as that of what to do if the French do not ratify." 
He added that for the moment "the only thing to do is to put 
this question to one side until the Conference is over." On 
the same day, however, he wrote in a secret minute: "if the 
French will not ratify the E.D.C., it may be that one of 
these days we and the Americans will be considering the
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bringing into force of the Conventions without the French 
participation,■ and he asked her to examine whether the 
situation in 1954 was comparable to the one in 1947, when 
the Americans and the British had merged their German oc­
cupation zones into the Bizone.(74)
The new American administration under General Eisen­
hower, which entered office in January 1953, put pressure on 
its European allies to ratify the EDC. On 13 December 1953, 
the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, threa­
tened a "painful re-examination" of American European policy 
as a whole, if the West European countries did not unite as 
a military, economic and political unit. The readiness to 
release the Federal Republic into full national sovereignty 
in the case of further procrastination over the treaty was 
publicly expressed by the new American High Commissioner, 
Dr. James Conant, on 27 March 1954:
"One thing seems to me quite certain. The Occupying
Powers are agreed that the Federal Republic should
become a sovereign state. I believe that this will be 
accomplished by the ratification of the pending
treaties, but, if by any chance this should not come to 
pass in the near future, I feel sure that the three 
Occupying Powers will see that it is to the best
interest of all concerned to have the equivalent of the 
Bonn Conventions put into force. In other words, the 
period of occupation is coming to an end."(75)
Four days later Hoyer Millar informed London that Dulles, 
had sent a message of congratulation to the German Chancel­
lor on the German ratification of the EDC. The British High 
Commissioner advised his own Foreign Secretary not to send a 
similar message for the following reasons: "(a) we do not
wish to emphasis the isolated position of France in this
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respect; (b) American attempts to win German good graces
(e.g. Dr. Conant's week-end speech) have been somewhat 
clumsy and we have no particular interest in appearing to 
follow the American lead in this matter."(76) Although Eden 
wrote at the side of (b) "I agree", the German completion of 
the ratification process and the American open display of 
pleasure prompted the Foreign Office to take up the dis­
cussion postponed because of the Berlin Conference. Hoyer 
Millar's rather curt behaviour was softened by Warner on 
behalf of the Foreign Office: "I submit a draft telegram
confirming that no message should be sent to the Federal 
Chancellor. It might, however, appear churlish if the High 
Commissioner were not at least able to congratulate Dr. 
Adenauer on the completion of this very difficult consti­
tutional process and I suggest therefore, that Sir Frederick 
Hoyer Millar should at least be able to express the
Secretary of State's satisfaction informally when he next
happens to see the Chancellor."
At the centre of the discussion within the Foreign 
Office stood the question whether the principles enshrined 
in the Bonn Conventions should be realised independently of 
the EDC Treaty, which the Conventions were coupled to. F.A. 
Warner argued that "if we are not to have a first-class 
German crisis on our hands as well as a French crisis, we 
shall have to be prepared to terminate the Occupation with­
out waiting for final agreement on a defence contribution." 
Lord Hood, on the other hand, believed that it would be a
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mistake to abandon the link between the two: "It is true
that the German rearmament is no longer in doubt, but its 
form is still the centre of controversy, and we shall need 
all the political cards we have in hand in order to obtain a 
defence contribution in an acceptable form." In the end 
Frank Roberts was able to convince his colleagues that "we 
are not called upon to take or even to recommend any major 
policy decision at this stage. We are only preparing the 
ground on the Bonn Conventions side, as we have already done 
on the military side." Accordingly he drafted a letter to 
the British High Commissioner in Germany asking him to 
undertake a study of the Conventions and point out parts of 
them which the Germans were going to reject or want modi­
fied: "in the light of the development of German opinion
since 1952, we must now expect them to object to a number of 
things in the Bonn Conventions which they accepted in the 
last negotiations."(77)
It took the High Commissioner over a month to respond 
to Roberts' letter. His letter of 29 May about the sepera- 
tion of the Bonn Conventions from the EDC Treaty has been 
retained by the Foreign Office, most likely because it 
included comments on the Office's paper on alternatives to 
the EDC which was sent to Bonn on 13 May. From a letter of 
Hoyer Millar's subordinate, C.H. Johnston, to Hancock at the 
Foreign Office of 2 June 1954, one can deduct certain impor­
tant aspects of the High Commissioner's attitude towards the 
problem of the seperation:
"we think the reservation of our rights in regard to
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German rearmament pending international agreement on the 
subject should be effected in a short treaty between the 
three Powers and the Federal Republic designed to cover 
that interim period. If we tried to do it by inserting 
an extra article in the Convention on Relations, this 
would lead the Germans to press for the whole Convention 
to be renegotiated , with all the disadvantages which, 
as the High Commissioner's letter points out, that would 
entail.■(78)
From this quote one can gather that Hoyer Millar advised
against the re-opening of negotiations, presumably because 
the Germans were in a much stronger bargaining position in 
1954 than they were in 1952 and could have pressed for a
more favourable settlement. His predecessor, who had nego­
tiated with the Germans on behalf of the British Government 
in 1951/2, was much more realistic. In August 1954 
Kirkpatrick wrote in a minute to the Prime Minister:
"The Bonn treaties not only gave Germany sovereignty, 
but they imposed a number of disagreeable servitudes.
For example, the Germans were obliged to give our 
troops more rights and privileges than are accorded to 
N.A.T.O. forces. The Germans also undertook certain 
specific obligations in respect of the de-concentration 
of industry, restitution, compensation for victims of 
Nazi persecution, reparations, displaced persons and 
refugees, claims against Germany etc., etc. There was 
also a financial convention relation to the German 
obligation to support our forces in Germany. It now 
looks as if the Germans will welcome the parts of the 
Treaty which give them sovereignty but will tell us 
that the present Bundestag will not accept or ratify
again the musch more numerous parts of the Treaty which 
impose servitudes on Germany."(79)
Kirkpatrick also gave a clear warning to anybody in the 
administration who thought that the same deal could be 
secured in 1954 as in 1952:
"I am afraid that the W.O. must be told firmly that we 
shall do our best, but there is little chance of 
retaining everything in the Troops Convention. Politics 
is the art of the possible. And every W.O. mugwump must 
recognise that it is not possible to secure in 1954 what 
we achieved in 1951 or 1952 after verbal battles lasting
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literally some hundreds of hours."(80)
Kirkpatrick made these comments in August and September 
1954, when the situation had changed even more.
Back in June Kirkpatrick, Anthony Nutting and Frank 
Roberts were discussing what action would be required, if 
the EDC and Bonn Conventions were not ratified shortly. They 
had been consulted by the Americans who had also started a 
serious study of the problem. The new idea was to circumvent 
the problems connected with the Bonn Conventions by working 
from the basis of the existing Occupation Statute. On 10 
June Roberts wrote Hoyer Millar that "we now think it neces­
sary to prepare for the possible case of unilateral United 
Kingdom and United States abrogation of certain sections of 
the existing Occupation Statute." All these discussions were 
clasified as top secret -- "it is clearly most important 
that no wind of this should reach French or German ears at 
this stage"(81) -- because neither the Americans nor the
British wanted to admit publicly that they had given up all 
hope of the Treaties being ratified by the French, as such 
an admission would have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Hoyer Millar, who had been asked to consider the practical 
details of the different plans, came out strongly against 
the idea of abrogating section of the Occupation Statute: "I 
think that only the entry into force of the Bonn Conven­
tions, or the early hope of it, will enable the Federal 
Government to maintain its position beyond the autumn."(82) 
He, for the first time, suggested a declaration of intent, 
to be issued when the EDC was finally dead, which should
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state that the Western Powers (with or without the French) 
would enter into negotiations with the Federal Republic 
about bringing the Bonn Conventions into force independently 
of the EDC.
The British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, 
fully supported the High Commissioner: "I would, however,
most earnestly recommend that, for reasons so convincingly 
set out by Sir F. Hoyer Millar, we should not contemplate, 
except in the last resort, proceeding by abrogating parts of 
Occupation Statute in our two Zones only and still less by 
encouraging Germans to start raising forces in them." He 
pleaded to give the new French Prime Minister a chance to 
make the EDC work: "Advent of M. Mendes-France changes the 
picture ... Unless we are to help to overturn him and thus 
give France a real push towards neutralism we must surely 
give M. Mendes-France a chance of making his plan work." If 
his plan failed, Sir Gladwyn Jebb thought it fully justified 
to press the French to join a declaration on the lines 
suggested by Hoyer Millar. At the end of his telegram Jebb 
grasped the nettle and proposed something which went against 
the grain of British post-war administrations: "As you know, 
I am personally convinced, for reasons which I have ex­
plained at length elsewhere, that it would be far easier to 
get French agreement on all this if Her Majesty's Government 
could see their way to coming into some much looser form of 
E.D.C. which retains only the minimum element of supra- 
nationality."(83) It had been exactly that element of supra-
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nationality which made the British stay outside the movement 
towards European integration, which had produced the Schuman 
Plan and EDC.
From correspondence around 22 June 1954, it becomes
obvious that Hoyer Millar was slightly out of step with
Foreign Office thinking. While he stated that
"there is no doubt that the Chancellor's position has 
weakened in recent months ... It is important, however,
I think, not to over-dramatize the position. Even if the 
worst happens over the E.D.C. and no progress has been 
made by the end of the year, I should still expect to 
find the Chancellor in control of the situation then and 
for some time longer, though subject to increasing cri­
ticism in the country and weakened by growing dissension 
with the coalition."
Kirkpatrick minuted on this telegram: "this errs on the
optimistic side. In Germany the position can melt away with 
bewildering rapidity." And Hancock added: "this is certain­
ly the Department's view. But of course the question resol­
ves itself into an estimate of times and seasons."(84) 
However, it seems to have been more than a differing esti­
mate of times and seasons. Hoyer Millar continued to stress
that "apart from the many practical difficulties involved, 
it seems to me that for us and the Americans to 'go it 
alone' in Germany in major respects would be open to grave 
political dangers,"(85) while the Foreign Office refused to 
rule out unilateral action as a last resort. Both the Fo­
reign Office and Hoyer Millar agreed, however, that the Bonn 
Conventions should be brought into effect by a short treaty 
as soon as the EDC had failed.
The Prime Minister was about to depart to Washington. 
Kirkpatrick sent a short paper to Churchill's Private Secre­
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tary, John Colville, which embodied seven propositions to 
which the Secretary of State thought the Prime Minister 
might invite the Americans to agree. This paper provides a 
good summary of the Foreign Office position at that time:
"1. The situation in Germany is slipping fast.
2. If within the next two months it is clear that the 
French will not admit Germany to the Western Club, we 
shall have to act promptly to restore the situation.
3. For the situation in Germany cannot be indefinitely 
frozen once again whilst the great debate goes on.
4. So we must bring the Bonn Conventions into effect by 
a short treaty when paragraph 2 is operative.
5. Or if the French will not agree even to this, the
U.K. and the U.S. High Commissioners must do what they
legally can in their zones.
6. If this broad line is agreed, Anglo-American
officials can start working out the execution.
7. they can also consider alternatives, including
Germany entering N.A.T.O. 1 (86)
In Washington, on 27 June the American President and the 
British Prime Minister agreed a minute; in it they stated 
that, in case of the failure of the French Assembly to 
ratify EDC before recessing for the summer, "it would be 
necessary in the interest of retaining the alignment of the 
Federal Republic with the West promptly to take such steps 
as were open to them to restore to the Federal Republic the 
measure of sovereignty contemplated by the Contractual 
Agreement." Although they wanted to maintain in full force 
their public and private support of EDC and discourage any 
public discussion of alternatives, they ordered official 
talks to begin in London on 5 July to coordinate these 
steps.
The British High Commissioner did not take part in the 
talks personally, but sent Charles Johnston and Maurice
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Bathurst. They kept him informed and tried to represent his 
views. They were, however, not able to dissuade their col­
leagues to consider as a final solution, if all else failed, 
an Anglo-American unilateral action. The final report and 
its annexed documents set out three alternative, though 
still purely hypthetical solutions: the first course of
action, in the event of the EDC having been rejected or 
postponed in Paris by about mid-August, was to negotiate 
between the three Western Powers and the Germans two proto­
cols. Together they would (a) bring the Bonn Conventions 
into force before the EDC; (b) prevent German rearmament 
until the EDC or some alternative arrangement had come into 
force; and (c) provide for continued support cost for the 
Western troops stationed in Germany in the interim period.
The final report stated that "the reason why there are 
two Protocols is that, so far as procedure in the United 
States is concerned, it is necessary to submit to the Senate 
only the proposal to seperate the Bonn Conventions from the 
E.D.C. Treaty. Therefore the first Protocol is designed for 
this purpose, while the second Protocol, ... would be put 
into force as an executive agreement by the United States 
Government."
The second protocol also included a provision that, if 
the EDC had not entered into force 90 days after the signa­
ture of the protocols, any of the signatory states was 
allowed to review the agreements "with a view to obtaining 
an immediate contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany 
to the defence of the free world." This Article 3 was clear-
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ly directed against France. Britain and America were not 
going to put up with French delaying tactics any longer, 
which they stated unambiguously in the final report: "The
end of the 90 days might well mark the parting of the ways 
on these issues between the Two Powers and France."(86)
The second alternative course of action was to do the 
same thing by tripartite action, e.g. through the High 
Commission, falling short of treaties subject to ratifica­
tion. This method might be employed in the event of a French 
refusal to join with the Two Powers in the course of action 
described before. The British, however, considered this 
course of action unlikely to be fruitful.
The third and final alternative, which was to be adop­
ted in case of the French having rejected both the two 
described above, was action by the U.K. and the U.S. over 
French opposition. Most of the provisions of the Bonn Con­
ventions could be brought into effect without French agree­
ment insofar as they would be matters within the competence 
of each High Commissioner in his own zone, or matters which 
could be dealt with by the Allied High Commission acting by 
majority vote, the British and American High Commissioners 
outvoting the French High Commissioner. Frank Roberts, who 
chaired the London talks, described this course of action as 
"much less desirable", but went on to say that "we have 
however been gratified and surprised to discover that the 
two Governments could do a great deal to improve the German 
position by majority vote in the Allied High Commission,
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i.e. without proceeding to the last resort of disregarding 
existing tripartite commitments."(88) This problem was also 
described in the final report: "The only things which could
not be done as above ... would be to put an end to the 
Occupation in the U.S. and U.K. Zones of Germany and to 
deprive of authority the Allied High Commission and its 
organs including the Military Security Board. The termina­
tion of the Occupation is of course the major German requi­
rement. As against this, the consequence of breaking the 
tripartite agreements would be serious." This is the point, 
which the British High Commissioner, Sir Frederick Hoyer 
Millar, had repeatedly made.
On 13 July, three days after the Anglo-American talks 
ended in London, Hoyer Millar went to see the German Chan­
cellor to communicate to him the gist of those talks and 
their results. Adenauer seemed "grateful for this communica­
tion". The High Commissioner summarised the Chancellor's 
attitude in a telegram to London: "if, as a result of no
progress being made over the E.D.C. by the time the French 
Parliament rises, we decide to go ahead with the plan for a 
new treaty, great care would have to be taken to ensure that 
the French did not delay the resultant negotiations indefi­
nitely; ... if the French should decline to be a party to 
such a treaty, then the United Sates and United Kingdom 
Governments must waste no time making some alternative 
arrangements for the restoration of sovereignty to 
Germany."(89)
The French reacted rather strangely to the London
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talks, almost as if they wanted to forestall their decisions 
ever been put into action. On 16 August the French Ambassa­
dor in London informed Kirkpatrick that "M. Mendes-France 
had spontaneously suggested that it might be a good thing 
for him to tell Dr. Adenauer when they met in Brussels on 
Thursday that if the French Parliament failed to pass the
E.D.C. he would be ready to discuss the immediate entry into 
force of the Bonn Conventions.M(90) The French Prime Minis­
ter repeated his wish to give Germany her political 
sovereignty without delay, when he visited Churchill's 
country home Chartwell on 25 August; he was anxious to find 
out what plans the British and Americans had made for doing 
this. The American State Department, however, was opposed to 
handing over the London documents to the French. The British 
Embassasy in Washington was told that, in the American 
opinion, Mendes-France "was clearly out to defeat E.D.C. and 
could not be trusted not to make some use of this exchange 
to imply that he was actively discussing alternative 
solutions with us and the Americans. He would probably 
exploit his visit to Chartwell in this way anyhow."(91) The 
Foreign Office totally agreed.
The French deeply resented this Anglo-American snub and 
it can be said that these few days before the vote in the 
French National Assembly on the EDC Treaty were a low point 
in the relations between the three powers. In the end, two 
years after they had been signed, the French National Assem­
bly refused to ratify the Bonn Conventions and the EDC
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Treaty.
"The more far-reaching fears associated by EDC supporters 
with a failure of the project did not prove justified.
... On the contrary, the crisis triggered by the failure 
of the EDC made it clear to all involved that apart from 
the special ambitions of the USA, France and the Federal 
Republic there was a basic level of common 'Western' 
interest. Since, moreover, none of those involved could 
afford to damage these interests, agreement on a 
substitute for the EDC solution to German rearmament was 
reached remarkably quickly."(92)
In fact, as Wilfried Loth, the author of the book from which 
the last quote was taken, argues "the effect of the crisis 
triggered by the collapse of the EDC was thus a fundamental 
consolidation of the Western camp."(93)
On 2 September 1954, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar went to 
see the German Chancellor to discuss the new situation after 
the French rejection of the EDC. Adenauer, in his autobio­
graphy, described this meeting as a perfectly amicable af­
fair, during which the High Commissioner had delivered a 
message of support from both the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, had explained the British preference of a NATO 
solution to the problem of German rearmament and had told 
the Chancellor about the London talks:
"Hoyer Millar kam dann auf die politische Seite des 
ganzen Problems zu sprechen. Seit einer Reihe von 
Monaten sei eine britisch-amerikanische Arbeitsgruppe in 
London damit beschaeftigt, eine Alternative fuer den 
Fall des Scheiterns der EVG auszuarbeiten. Zu Beginn 
dieser Arbeiten sei man der Ansicht gewesen, dass die 
Inkraftsetzung des Deutschlandvertrages der erste 
Schritt sein muesse und dass die militaerische Frage 
anschliessend ausgearbeitet werden solle. Inzwischen 
habe man diese Auffassung geaendert. Es sei durchaus 
moeglich, die politische und militaerische Seite des 
Problems gleichzeitig anzufassen und eine umfassende 
Loesung herbeizufuehren. Wenn ich dies wuensche, so 
bestuenden britischerseits keine Bedenken. Auf jeden 
Fall muesse man die Sachlage erneut ueberdenken. Eile
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tue aber not."(94)
Adenauer's recollections of that day seem softened with
hindsight; he was anything but in an amicable mood on 2
September: the American High Commissioner, who had gone to
see the Chancellor prior to his British colleague to inform 
him about the London decisions, had telephoned the State 
Department "to say that his interview with Adenauer was very 
stormy and the Chancellor's reaction to the protocols was 
much more violent than even he had foreseen. The Chancellor 
apparently said that a leak to the public of these protocols 
would destroy his position in the Bundestag."(95)
The British had some advance warning about the German 
opposition to the plan of cutting the link between the Bonn 
Conventions and the EDC Treaty, in other words between the 
political and the military sovereignty. On 27 August, Baron 
von Welck, the political director of the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, had told Hoyer Millar that "any solution 
on the lines indicated above would not be acceptable to the 
Federal Government, since it would involve discrimination 
against Germany; in respect of rearmament, the Federal 
Government were only interested in obtaining full 
sovereignty in one instalment."(96)
The Foreign Office must have genuinely felt that the 
London decisions were going to help Adenauer. It sent in­
structions to Hoyer Millar to use his meeting with the 
Chancellor on 2 September to build up the latter's 
confidence:
"Your general approach should be one of sympathy with Dr.
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Adenauer in the cruel and undeserved predicament now 
facing him. Your first object should be to put heart into 
him and to persuade him that his friends abroad are 
determined to find in a short time a generally acceptable 
solution to the problem of German association with the 
West. They are relying upon his statesmanship and leader­
ship to make this p o s s i b l e (97)
Bearing in mind the experience of his American colleague/ 
Hoyer Millar tried to adopt a more elastic and comprehensive 
approach with the Chancellor. At the outset of their inter­
view he pointed out that the United Kingdom authorities 
appreciated that the circumstances had changed since the 
London talks in July; presenting the London documents "I 
made it clear, however, that these were in no sense intended 
as our last word, nor were they being communicated to him on 
a take it or leave it basis. The Protocols had been drawn up 
in a genuine attempt by the United States and United Kingdom 
governments to find a quick solution of the problem and in 
an effort to help the German Government.” The procedure 
envisaged in London, to seperate the Bonn Conventions from 
the EDC and to bring them into force at once by means of 
short protocols, were obviously no longer welcome to the 
German Government. Hoyer Millar cabled his main impression 
about the interview with the Chancellor to London:
"Although he did not actually say so, he implied that 
his objections to the Protocols rested not so much in 
the fact that he wished the politcal and military 
problems to be settled simultaneously, as in the fact 
that the felt that in the altered circumstances it was 
now not practical politics to talk of bringing the Bonn 
Conventions into force more or less as they stood. He 
said that from the German point of view, it was 
primarily a psychological problem. If we and the 
Americans were now to try to go ;back to 1952 and 
disregard everything which had happened since then, 
German opinion would not understand it and would lose 
confidence in the United States and the United
329
Kingdom."(98)
It is debatable, whether Hoyer Millar's impression was cor­
rect: Adenauer was very much interested in settling the
political and military problems simultaneously and it is 
clear that he was more favourably disposed towards the 
British representations because they were more comprehen­
sive, in other words they included the plan of the Federal 
Republic's integration into NATO, although this was presen­
ted as a purely British proposal at that stage.
Adenauer, however, was clever enough to give the Bri­
tish High Commissioner the impression that the only problem 
with the London proposals was that the Germans would no 
longer accept the 1952 version of the Bonn Conventions. This 
move forced the Western Powers not only to search for ways 
of solving the political and military problems simul­
taneously and of giving the Federal Republic her full sove­
reignty, but also to accept a re-negotiation of the Bonn 
Conventions on probably more favourable terms for Germany. 
Adenauer's gamble paid off. Ludolf Herbst summarises this 
unexpected result of the failure of the EDC as follows:
"Das Scheitern der EVG-Vertraege in der franzoesischen 
Nationalversammlung verlaengerte fuer die Bundesrepublik 
zwar diesen Schwebezustand, bot zugleich aber auch eine 
Chance: Bonn konnte nun neu verhandeln und setzte eine
erhebliche Verbesserung des Deutschland-Vertrags durch. 
Zudem trat an die Stelle der EVG-Integration nun die 
NATO-Integration, eine aufs Ganze gesehen militaerisch 
effizientere und fuer die deutsche Seite guenstigere 
Loesung.■(99)
For the British the month of September 1954 was a time of 
frantic activity: the day after Hoyer Millar had reported
his interview with the Chancellor, the Foreign Office under-
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took an urgent examination of the Bonn Conventions with the 
aim of ascertaining which provisions therein were essential, 
desirable or expandable to the British. Frank Roberts summa­
rised the Foreign Office's thinking under two headings: "(a) 
what we cannot give away and (b) what we shall not be able 
to secure". Under the heading (a) he made three points: 
first, two of the three powers reserved to the Western 
Powers in the Convention On Relations, namely powers in 
Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the unification of 
Germany and the peace treaty; second, the substance of the 
Finance Convention which "lays on Germany an obligation to 
make a continuing contribution to Western Defence comparable 
to that of other principal Western countries; and to assist 
for a specified period to meet the costs of the forces of 
other powers in Germany"; third, those parts of the Settle­
ment Convention which would be normal and appropriate in a 
peace treaty or where action had not already been completed, 
for example deconcentration and restitution. Under (b) he 
also made three points: first, the rest of the Settlement
Convention; second, "the bulk of the Forces Conventions, 
since we can only hope to get normal NATO treatment with 
perhaps some small improvements justified by the presence of 
such large forces in Germany"; and finally, the special 
powers to deal with an emergency.(100)
Adenauer, in his autobiography, wrote: "Der Besuch
Hoyer Millars war der Auftakt zu Bemuehungen des britischen 
Aussenminister Eden, urn uns alle aus der Sackgasse, in die
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wir hineingeraten waren, herauszufuehren."(101) Eden left 
London on 11 September on a tour of the capitals of the 
countries, who in 1952 had signed the EDC Treaty. The 
purpose of the trip was to introduce and to rally support 
for the plan of reactivating the Brussels Treaty, of invi­
ting the Federal Republic and Italy to participate in it, 
and finally to integrate the two countries into NATO. On 12 
September Eden arrived in Bonn.
Parallel to the talks between him and Adenauer, the 
Legal Advisor of the British High Commissioner, Maurice 
Bathurst, took up discussions with a German representative, 
Wilhelm Grewe, about changes to the Bonn Conventions. The 
Foreign Office was quite pleased about the course of these 
discussions: "On the whole," P.F. Hancock minuted on 14
September, "the Germans seem to be taking a very reasonable 
line. But of course we are only just at the beginning."(102) 
These discussions continued after Eden left Bonn, first on 
an informal Anglo-German, and then, after 21 September, on a 
quadripartite, basis. Eden had sent a telegram to Bonn 
saying: "Mr. Dulles and I agreed yesterday that, before a
Nine Power meeting in London, it would be desirable for the 
three Western High Commissioners to clear the ground as far 
as possible with the German Government on the best methods 
for termination of the Occupation."(103)
The alternative solution, which the British proposed in 
September and which Eden had sought support for on his tour 
of the European capitals, was not without its problems:
"A number of concessions were necessary before this
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solution was to appear acceptable to all those 
involved, and these were often made only after dramatic 
disagreements: Mendes-France accepted after a visit
from Eden on 16 September the principle of the 
membership of the Federal Republic in NATO (beyond the 
Brussels Treaty); on the same day, Adenauer persuaded 
Dulles, who had hastened to Bonn on a lightning visit, 
that the Brussels Treaty solution contained the maximum 
which was at that time attainable in terms of a 
European integration, thus diverting him from 
continuing to foil the plan as an attempt to neutralise 
Europe."(104)
At the Nine Power Conference in London between 28 September 
and 3 October both the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom guaranteed a continued military presence on 
the European continent. In return, the Federal Republic 
conceded the right to build atomic, nuclear or biological 
weapons, guided missiles, large warships and bombers; 
Adenauer also issued a declaration that Germany would not 
use force to achieve an alteration of her frontiers or 
reunification. The way was thus clear for the founding of 
the Western European Union.
The short period between the London Conference, which 
ended on 3 October, and the Paris Conferences, which began 
on 19 October, was a time of hectic activity: the principles 
agreed in London had to be transformed into treaties. The 
French High Commissioner, Andre Francois-Poncet, described 
this period in his own inimitable way: in 1952, after the
anticipatory reduciton of its powers and its personnel in 
the wake of the signing of the initial treaties, the High 
Commission had gone "into a state of half sleep. It was 
aroused from this by the crisis resulting from the failure 
of the European Defence Community." As its share of the
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workload connected with the search for a remedy for this 
crisis, the High Commission undertook the review of the Bonn 
Conventions, in order to adapt them to a situation which was 
no longer that of May 1952, and to revise them in favor of 
Germany. "On this occasion, it blazed with one last flame 
and once again there was a period of fever."(105)
The exploratory discussions, which had taken place on 
official level before the London Conference, now turned into 
serious quadripartite negotiations upon the termination of 
the Occupation. In an exhausting final spurt the main 
committee met thirteen times in seven days, between 9 and 16 
October, some meetings lasting until the early hours of the 
morning, but it managed to settle the majority of points of 
contention. The British played an important role in these 
negotiations, as the British Legal Adviser, Maurice 
Bathurst, who had held the preliminary talks with his German 
counterpart Wilhelm Grewe, chaired most of the meetings. In 
contrast to the 1951/2 negotiations, therefore, the main 
negotiating partners were not the German Chancellor and the 
Allied High Commissioners, but their officials.
At the end of these negotiations Sir Frederick Hoyer 
Millar was left with "a somewhat unfortunate impression" of 
German negotiating tactics. He complained that "the Germans 
were not slow to add new points" to the list of alterations 
to the Bonn Conventions, which had been agreed before and 
adopted at the London Conference and which the Germans 
themselves had wished to be regarded as binding. The Germans
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also "tended to regard a concession by us not as a means of 
finding a compromise but as an invitation to further 
pressure by them." Hoyer Millar did not think that "the 
Germans have shown up particularly well in these negotia­
tions. ... Perhaps both sides approached the negotiations 
with more suspicion than one would wish at a time when the 
Federal Republic is about to enter N.A.T.O., but these 
suspicions were certainly more marked on the German side. 
Their methods were sometimes naive and not always 
commendable."
Despite these irritations the negotiations had been 
very successful. Only three points were not agreed upon in 
Bonn and were therefore left to be decided by the Foreign 
Ministers in Paris: the stationing of allied forces, the
Review Clause in the Relations Convention, and the publica­
tion of the subsidiary documents attached to the Conven­
tions. Hoyer Millar concluded:
"It may be that we shall be asked in Paris to grant 
further concessions in return for acceptance by the 
Germans of a compromise ... With the Germans in their 
present mood I hope we shall be able to resist any 
further concessions, (and not allow ourselves to be too 
much influenced by what the Chancellor can be relied on 
to say about his internal difficulties), if we are to 
avoid encouraging their appetite and so storing up 
trouble for ourselves over the next few years. It is in 
their interest more than anyone else's to reach speedy 
agreement at Paris on the end of the occupation."
At the Foreign Office the High Commissioner's report pro­
duced some consternation. Hancock wrote in a minute on it: 
"I think it is rather surprising that Sir F. Hoyer Millar 
should complain. No-one has ever supposed that the Germans 
were feeble in negotiation or that they were not out for
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what they could get." And Kirkpatrick added: "I agree with
Mr. Hancock. The Germans always have and always will want 
watching. They are expert chisellers; and the slightest 
success stimulates their appetite. But I can't detect any­
thing very new in this account of their behaviour. It is 
reminiscent of what we had to put up with in 1951-52, when 
more often than not Professor Grewe in the sub-committee 
went back on the agreement or compromise concocted by the 
Chancellor and the High Commissioners."(106)
Comparing Kirkpatrick's and Hoyer Millar's attitude 
towards negotiating with the Germans, one is tempted to draw 
a conclusion about their rather different characters: 
Kirkpatrick was much more actively and personally involved 
in the negotiations and, from his descriptions of them, one 
gets the feeling that he rather enjoyed the clashes of wits 
as an intellectual exercise. With his sharp and shrewd mind 
he seems to have been an equal match to his German counter­
part in the negotiations, namely the German Chancellor, 
Konrad Adenauer. Hoyer Millar, in contrast, was described by 
his subordinates as "not given to intellectual nit-picking". 
He preferred fair and straight dealings. He also had almost 
paternal instincts towards his staff, on whom the negotia­
tions had imposed a "very considerable burden"; it is not 
surprising therefore that in the last paragraph of his 
already quoted telegram he praised their work, especially 
that of Maurice Bathurst, to whose "unremitting efforts" it 
was due "that the negotiations here have been brought to
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such a satisfactory conclusion."
At the same time as these negotiations took place, the 
Allied High Commission was also involved in realising the 
Declaration of Intent issued at the London Conference on 3 
October. The German Chancellor had first requested such a 
declaration to be made in the wake of the French National 
Assembly's rejection of the EDC Treaty in August; he needed 
some assurance that, if he agreed to new arrangements, the 
Federal Republic would not have to suffer a repeat perfor­
mance of the fate of the initial agreements; in other words, 
the Germans should not have to wait for the benefits of any 
new treaties, while these treaties went through an equally 
long ratification process. In a conversation with the Ameri­
can High Commissioner, Dr. James Conant, Adenauer said that 
what he had in mind was a declaration on the part of the 
three Western Governments that they would not exercise their 
Occupation powers vis-a-vis the Federal Republic.
The Foreign Office received this request favourably: 
Kirkpatrick wrote that "I would have no objection to this. 
It is simple, requires no ratification and rescues us from 
an untenable position in Germany."(107) On this recommenda­
tion by his highest ranking official, Eden made the follo­
wing proposal on 28 September:
"I pointed out that all Four Governments were agreed that 
the Occupation of Germany should be terminated as soon as 
practicable. ... Since this process would be bound to 
take some time, I proposed that there should be a 
Declaration of Intent on the part of the Three Occupying 
Powers to take as soon as possible the steps necessary to 
terminate the Occupation regime. This would include a 
statement by the Occupying Powers that they would 
instruct their High Commissioners not to use in the
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meantime the powers of which it is proposed to divest 
them except in agreement with the German Federal 
Government."(108)
Adenauer welcomed this proposal as showing that the Con­
ference had produced concrete results. He said the faith of 
the West German population had been somewhat shaken by 
recent events. The proposal was refered to the experts and 
the Foreign Ministers agreed on it on 3 October.
In a secret brief for a Cabinet meeting in November, 
the Foreign Office explained why this Declaration had been 
necessary. There were two reasons: "The Germans have had to 
wait three years since the Three Powers originally announced 
their decision to terminate the Occupation at the Foreign 
Ministers' Conference in Washington in September, 1951." And 
"during the London Conference we had to ask Dr. Adenauer to 
make a number of important concessions to meet M. Mendes- 
France."(109) The implementation of this declaration, how­
ever, proved more difficult than expected. As the brief 
pointed out: "when we came to put the Declaration into
effect we found that the Germans had not the necessary 
legislation in force to take over most of the functions of 
the Allied High Commission."
Hoyer Millar's initial comments on the implementation 
of the Declaration of Intent, which pointed to this problem, 
were received in London with some alarm: "I find Sir F.
Hoyer Millar's letter rather disturbing. On the strength of 
the Declaration of Intent the Germans are expecting us to do 
something concrete and quick. If nothing much is done, there 
will be great disappointment and frustration." A bold ges­
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ture was needed. Although the High Commissioner pointed out 
that the restoration of German civil aviation had the "snag" 
of being prohibited under the demilitarisation provisions, 
Hancock wrote to Hoyer Millar that "our own feeling is that 
we should within reason try to be helpful to the Germans 
over civil aviation, seeing that it is perhaps the major 
psychological point."(110)
Within the United Kingdom's High Commission a working 
party was set up to study the effects of the Declaration of 
Intent. When it submitted its final report, including de­
tailed annexes specifying which of the High Commissioner's
powers should be retained and which could be relinquished,
the Foreign Office's comments on it included a serious 
rebuke for Hoyer Millar's initial reaction: "the latest
report is a distinct improvement on the letter to Sir Frank 
Roberts from Sir F. Hoyer Millar which seemed to show a
disinclination to take any serious steps in the immediate
future."
The report made two recommendations on tactics of the
implementation of the Declaration: "(i) We should try and
give the Germans one really important new freedom as a 
result of the Declaration, to convince them and the world 
that we meant what we said (the best choice for this purpose 
would be Civil Aviation "sovereignty"). (ii) Where we do 
retain powers between now and S-day we should be as unob­
trusive about it as possible." It also made recommendations 
on procedure: no complete list of powers to be relinquished
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should be published, but steps towards the fulfilment of the 
Declaration should be publicized; and the Federal and the 
Land Governments should be consulted over as wide a field of 
occupation activities as possible and Germans should be 
associated with the work of tribunals and coordinating bo­
dies .
All these recommendations were, however, unilateral 
British ones and still had to be agreed by the Americans and 
the French, but as the Foreign Office pointed out "it is 
clear that the British Element of the High Commission are 
anxious to give the Germans as much benefit as possible from 
the Declaration without delay."(Ill)
The results of the quadripartite negotiations in Bonn 
on the revision of the 1952 Treaties were proposed to the 
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany at the first of 
the four Paris Conferences held between 19 and 23 October 
1954.(112) The four men signed the modified Conventions on 
Relations between the three Western Powers and the Federal 
Republic, agreed on a protocol on the lifting of the Occupa­
tion Statute and the end of the occupation regime, and
reaffirmed the security guarantees of the Western Powers and
the Federal Republic's assistance for Berlin. The amended
Treaty granted the Federal Republic its sovereignty. Al­
though this sovereignty was still conditional, the Treaty 
went much further then the 1952 version: the preamble and
the 'binding clause' were scrapped and the 'revision clause'
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was extended to include the reunification of Germany.
In view of the fate of the initial treaties, the after- 
math of the Paris Conferences was not very encouraging. On 
3 0 December the French National Assembly approved the Wes­
tern European Union, founded at those conferences, but only 
with 287 votes to 260 (with 79 abstentions). The controver­
sies over the agreements were chiefly responsible for M. 
Mendes-France's resignation on 5 February 1955. It took the 
French Council of the Republic until 28 March to ratify all 
the treaty agreements. The French Government, however, re­
fused to deposit the instruments of ratification, and there­
by terminate the Occupation regime, before the Federal Re­
public's entry into NATO.
Mendes-France's resignation seriously depressed the 
British Foreign Office. Expecting months of French par­
liamentary juggling, with the probable conclusion that in 
the end the French would not be able to ratify the treaties,
F.A. Warner wrote in a secret minute: "My conclusions are
that although for the moment we should naturally not change 
our present policy of waiting for French ratification, we 
should immediately get to work on alternative courses of 
action and should begin discussion of them with the Ameri­
cans. "(113) With a definite feeling of deja-vu all concerned 
departments of the Foreign Office including the Western 
Organisation Department got to work. Resulting papers were 
sent to Bonn for comments.
Britain was the first signatory country to ratify the 
revised Bonn Conventions on 22 February 1955. Heeding an
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agreement by the three Western Powers, however, to deposit 
their instruments of ratification jointly, the British post­
poned their deposit. Waiting for their allies to follow 
suit, they were getting increasingly annoyed with the French 
stalling tactics: when the French Embassy in London enquired 
with the Foreign Office, whether ratification in June would 
be regarded as falling within a reasonable period of time, 
an exasperated Kirkpatrick minuted "that June will not do. 
The French will go on postponing for ever. After June we 
shall be told that the 1956 General Election is pending and 
nothing can be done -- and so on ad infinitum."(114) When 
the French started insisting that they would not allow the 
agreements to take effect before the Federal Republic's 
entry into NATO, the frustration in the Foreign Office 
mounted: "I am afraid", Warner wrote in a secret minute on
10 April, "that the French Government are within their 
strict rights if they choose to take this line, although it 
is clearly not what we should expect from a loyal 
ally.n(115)
The French Government, however, was not the only one 
which found it difficult to have the Paris Treaties rati­
fied. The German Chancellor faced opposition from the SPD, 
extra-parliamentary groups, and even from his coalition 
partners, the FDP, over various parts of the agreements. The 
British High Commissioner, now not more than an ambassador 
if only for the title, was restricted to observing the 
situation. His predecessors with their far reaching powers
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might have intervened in a similar situation, ordering, 
cajoling, influencing. Hoyer Millar watched and reported to 
London.
The SPD turned against the Paris Treaties because it 
believed that German rearmament and integration into the 
Western bloc would make reunification impossible. Encouraged 
by a fresh round of Soviet notes, it demanded another Four- 
Power conference. It was supported by the German Trade Union 
Congress (DGB) and by an ever stronger extra-parliamentary 
resistance movement. On 29 January 1955 a rally took place 
in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt and an anti-rearmament mani­
festo was passed. Two weeks later Hoyer Millar warned London 
that the movement against rearment was gathering strength in 
Germany and that, while the parliamentary position in Bonn 
was sound, the Federal Government was increasingly out of 
touch with public opinion on the subject:
"There is no doubt that these views are held not only by 
the SPD voters but by a large body of moderate opinion 
in Germany who are genuinely concerned for the prospects 
of reunification and unable or unwilling to consider the 
question of overall East-West relations except as a 
purely German problem. ... If the French should fail to 
ratifiy the Paris Agreements as they stand, that wind 
might increase to gale force; even if they do ratify, 
the future may not be all plain sailing for the 
Chancellor and the Western Powers."(116)
It was true that the Federal Government's parliamentary 
position was sound: the governing coalition had won a com­
fortable majority in the 1953 elections. The ratification of 
the Paris Agreement nevertheless had anything but a smooth 
passage through the German Parliament. The FDP, junior par­
tner in the governing coalition, was opposed to the Saar
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Statute which formed an integral part of the Paris Agree­
ments. Hoyer Millar's report on the ratification debate in 
the Bundestag on 27 February 1955 pointed out that
"the acrimonious exchanges between the Chancellor and 
the Free Democrats (FDP) over the Saar ... have undoub­
tedly widened the breach in the coalition. ... Apart 
from the storms around the FDP, the debate was probably 
the Federal Parliament's most distinguished performance 
yet, even though the result was taken for granted."(117)
Hoyer Millar's reports of a rift in the coalition worried 
the Foreign Office. Anthony Nutting feared that a break up 
of the coalition could endanger the passage through the 
Bundestag of legislation connected with Paris Agreements and 
he discussed with Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, whether Hoyer 
Millar should talk to the Chancellor. In the end, the deci­
sion was left to him; in a letter to the High Commissioner
G.W. Harrison pointed out that "you alone can say whether 
any intervention on your part would be helpful or the rever­
se. "(118) Five years earlier the British High Commissioner 
would not have felt it necessary to ponder whether his 
intervention would be welcomed; with only a short while 
until the Federal Republic was to become a sovereign state, 
British officials were literally more diplomatic. In the 
end, Hoyer Millar decided against letting "any words of 
advice" fall as the Chancellor's aid Herbert Blankenhorn 
"confirmed our impression that the Coalition crisis will 
probably blow over."(119)
Hoyer Millar's main task in these last months as High 
Commissioner was to prepare the termination of the Allied 
High Commission and the wrapping up of the Occupation re­
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gime. All three High Commissioners met in February to 
discuss the procedure, although Britain at that time was the 
only country which had completed the ratification process. 
At that time they were still planning to deposit the in­
struments of ratification jointly with the Chancellor at a 
ceremony attended by the Federal President and other digna- 
tories, after a final meeting of the Allied High Commission 
at which it was going to dissolve itself and terminate the 
Occupation regime. The next day the three ex-High Commissio­
ners were to call seperately on the President, in the order 
of their arrival in Germany, in order to hand him their 
letters of credence. Hoyer Millar wrote in a letter to 
London on 28 February:
"I attach importance to this action being taken 
seperately; if it was taken jointly, e.g., at the 
ceremony the day before, this would start off the new 
regime on an unfortunate leg from the point of view of 
the Germans, who are highly sensitive about the 
possibility of having to deal with a solid tripartite 
front, on the lines of the Allied High Commission, after 
the end of the Occupation.n(12 0)
There was, however, more to the end of the Allied High 
Commission than diplomatic protocol: certain institutions
and people were able to make the transition into the new era 
by simply changing their names or titles, as for example the 
Land Commissioners and Land Observers, who became Consulars. 
Other institution, however, had to be dissolved completely, 
as for example the Military Security Board. During a tele­
phone conversation with P. Hancock at the Foreign Office, 
Hoyer Millar described the difficulties about the mechanics 
of the termination of the Occupation regime. Hancock was
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only mildly sympathetic: "I see no cause for perturbation.
Bonn clearly feel it their duty to make the exercise look 
formidable. They have tackled worse tangles in shorter pe­
riods before now." He drafted a letter to Bonn saying: "The
termination of the Occupation has been just round the corner 
for at least three years. We should never be able to explain 
things to the Secretary of State if the entry into force of 
the Agreements had to be postponed for ' technical" 
reasons."(121)
For reasons of American public opinion, the US Gover­
nment instructed its High Commissioner to deposit the in­
struments of ratification unilaterally on 20 April 1955. 
Hoyer Millar cabled to London that he saw no particular 
advantage in Britain following the American example: "It
would, in fact, rather painfully isolate the French High 
Commissioner from his two colleagues and make the eventual 
ceremonial ending of the occupation rather an anti-cli­
max. "(122) The Federal German Government decided to follow 
suit so that no uncertainty might arise in the light of 
opinion in Germany or developments in Austria(123) as to the 
Government's determination to go forward with its policy.
The final act of the Allied High Commission took place 
with rather less pomp and ceremony than might have been 
expected: on 5 May, 1955, the Allied High Commission held
its final meeting at which it dissolved itself; at noon that 
day the French and the British High Commissioners deposited 
their instruments of ratification and later that day sepera­
tely presented their credentials to the Federal President.
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The Occupation regime in the Federal Republic had formally- 
ended. Roger Allen, who reported for Hoyer Millar on the 
proceedings of the day, criticised the "last minute con­
fusion about the various arrangements for this day". But his 
colleague at the Foreign Office, Hancock, disagreed: "I do 
not quite see why the German bungling of the arrangements is 
to be taken as a sign of political immaturity. On the whole 
it seems to me that the political maturity of the Federal 
Republic is remarkable. We can hardly expect the Germans to 
be very enthusiastic about the termination of the Occupa­
tion. It was long overdue."(124)
347
Comparing the three British High Commissioners one can 
draw the conclusion that Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar was the 
least influential of the three, both in relation to British 
policy making and in his impact on the Germans. In Germany 
the powers of the Allied High Commission had been reduced by 
the revision of the Occupation Statute, by the completion of 
certain occupation programmes, and by voluntary restraint on 
the part of the High Commissioners. Also the tripartite 
nature of the Allied High Commission had changed: with ever
decreasing tripartite matters to be discussed and handled, 
the Council met less frequently. The High Commissioners did 
not meet the Chancellor together any longer, but seperately 
and less frequently.
In the time leading up to and during the Berlin Four 
Power Conference his main task was to act as a line of 
communication between the Federal German and his own gover­
nment. The planned Anglo-American intervention over the Saar 
problem never took place and even if it had Hoyer Millar was 
not the author of the alternative solution. The last main 
task of the Allied High Commission was to renegotiate the 
1952 Bonn Conventions: Hoyer Millar left this work mainly to 
his Legal Advisor and other members of his staff.
The conclusion, however, are in no way a bad reflection 
on Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar the person. They are, instead, 
a reflection of the changed circumstances and atmosphere of 
the time. He was chosen as the first British Ambassador to 
the Federal Republic of Germany and only by the adverse 
fortunes of the Treaties signed in the year before his
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arrival did he happen to hold the title of High Commissioner 
for the first one and a half years of his tenure. He consi­
dered himself as an ambassador and he was very effective and 
well liked in that role. Between his arrival in Germany in 
1953 and the end of the Allied High Commission he can there­
fore be called an Ambassador in waiting.
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CONCLUSION
On 5 May 1955 the Allied High Commission held its 109th 
and final meeting. The old rule of that the chairmanship 
should rotate month by month decreed that the American High 
Commissioner, Dr. James Conant, should preside over the 
meeting; Conant, however, chose to give way to his French 
colleague, M. Andre Francois-Poncet. Conant thus honoured 
the one High Commissioner who, in his own words, had witnes­
sed the birth of the Allied High Commission, had taken part 
in its activities during its entire existence, and was now 
present at, even taking an active part in, its burial.
The grand old diplomat, known as a master and lover of
bon mots. did not disappoint his audience on this historical
occasion, summarising in a witty speech the history of the
institution, which was coming to an end on this day, and
honouring all who had played an important role in it. His
rather uncritical portrait of his own country's role is
excusable in the circumstances, as the occasion demanded a
broad sweep rather than a balance sheet. His main theme was
the transitional character of the Allied High Commission and
its role as guardian of the fledgling democracy:
"The High Commission, therefore, never considered its 
role as that of a Cerberus, a rigerous and pitiless 
controller, a master insisting without thought on the 
least of his prerogatives. Its powers were vast. They
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were but rarely exercised. Rather than the method of 
punitive sanctions, it preferred that of warning and 
advice and that of concurrence obtained by mutual 
agreement. The High Commission has not been a mast on 
the top of which Gessler's hat was placed for the 
population to salute; it has been the staff to which one 
binds a young tree, not to halt it from growing, but on 
the contrary to help it in its growth."(1)
Francois-Poncet had to acknowledge the fact, however, that 
the young tree outgrew the staff it was tied to sooner than 
expected: "In September 1949, when it was founded, it was
assumed that the High Commission would last about ten 
years." Another man of the first hour, the first British 
High Commissioner, Sir Brian Robertson, confessed in an 
interview in 1970 "the Americans were more quick than we 
were ... to realize the importance of turning over authority 
to the Germans. We clung onto the thing too long. We rather 
fancied ourselves as colonial administrators, I suppose, and 
we were pretty good at it."(2)
Indeed, the Americans seemed to have taken the decision 
to return to Germany her sovereign rights already in 1949 
and to have regarded the Allied High Commission as a transi­
tion necessary to placate their allies. Throughout its exis­
tence they pressed ahead, coaxing and threatening their 
allies to follow their policy for the future of Germany. Yet 
in the details of the running of the occupation of Germany 
they were as reluctant to give up their powers as the next; 
for example, as it has been proven in this thesis, the 
Americans were much more reluctant than the British to let 
the Federal Government take charge of foreign affairs, espe­
cially to allow German ambassadors in Washington, London
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and Paris.
The American reluctance over details, however, was 
surpassed by far by the French over fundamentals: for them,
because of deep seated, psychological reasons the occupation 
regime ended too soon. Those old anxieties and misgivings 
about the Germans might have been hidden on 5 May 1955 by 
the charming M. Francois-Poncet, but they had held up the 
sovereignty of Federal Republic since 1952 and even in 1955 
they were not totally forgotten.
Robertson's remark, therefore, appears to be too mo­
dest: the British adopted a more liberal attitude towards
details of the running of the occupation of Geramny than the 
Americans and a more liberal attitude towards the fundamen­
tals of it than the French. Sir Brian was the only the one 
of the three High Commissioners to have first hand knowledge 
of the Military Government of Germany and in 1949 that 
period of direct administration ended in the three western 
zones. Robertson not only knew the differences between the 
period before and after 1949, but he was intent upon making 
these differences noticeable and visible to everybody.
The Occupation Statute granted to the Federal Republic 
by the three Western Allies clearly defined the rights and 
obligations of both the new republic and of the Allies. The 
Allied High Commission was charged with the mission to 
ensure the operation of and the respect for the Occupation 
Statute. And nobody knew both the extent and the limitation 
of that Statute better than Sir Brian Robertson, who had 
been instrumental in drafting it.
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As has been proven in this thesis, he adopted a 
watchful laissez-faire attitude. The times, when the Allies 
could order any institutional or structural change had pas­
sed with the Military Government. This can be seen most 
clearly in Robertson's discussions with his American collea­
gue about various German laws on the freedom to engage in 
any chosen profession: despite his sympathies for McCloy's
enthusiasm and good intentions, he argued that the American 
ideal of free choice of profession could not be imposed on 
the Germans under the Occupation Statute. Any changes could 
no longer be imposed on the Germans, but had to be nego­
tiated. The first tangible evidence for these new parameters 
of Allied German relations was the Petersberg Agreement and 
it is not surprising that the High Commissioner, who was 
most sensitive to the new circumstances, namely Sir Brian 
Robertson was instrumental in bringing about this agreement.
If Robertson's remarks appear to be too modest, they 
are nevertheless significant, as they contain the most 
adequate description of the British attitude towards their 
role in Germany in these five and a half years: they rather
fancied themselves as colonial administrators. Faced with a 
historical precedent in Germ any after the Second World War, 
the British searched for a framework to deal with the situa­
tion and at least subconsciously adopted one with which they 
were well aquainted: colonialism. Thus, if they considered
the occupation of Germany as a colonial period, the second 
part of it, the era of the Allied High Commission, can be
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seen as the period of decolonisation.
This explains why they adopted a position in the middle 
between the American eagerness for German sovereignty/ first 
voiced in 1946 by Secretary of State Byrnes, and the French 
desire to keep Germany occupied as long as possible. The 
British preferred an evolutionary approach to decolonisa­
tion/ a step by step devolution of power to the native 
government/ with periods in between, when the natives had to 
prove themselves worthy of the next instalment. In the same 
way they preferred an evolutionary approach to the 
sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany: they were
committed to the same extent as the Americans were to this 
eventual aim, they wanted to reach it by a gradual transfer 
of power to the German Government/ which remained under 
constant scrutiny.
Even the fact that this transfer turned out to be less 
gradual than the British might have liked it to be, that it 
developed a certain momentum beyond their control and was 
hastened along by developments outside Germany, can be rega­
rded as a parallel to the British decolonisation experience. 
The first part of this thesis therefore aimed to prove why 
the first British High Commissioner, Sir Brian Robertson, 
deserves an epithet borrowed from the language of colonia­
lism, although the one given to him by his biographer, 
Charles Richardson, "the benevolent and sympathetic vice­
roy", can be slightly misleading.
The parallels between the British approach to decoloni­
sation and to the occupation regime in Germany, however, are
360
not the only reason for choosing that particular epithet 
for Sir Brian. It also served as an metaphor to describe the 
vast powers which the High Commissioners possessed at the 
beginning. Of course, the American and French High Commis­
sioners were endowed with the same powers in the Occupation 
Statute and for that reason this thesis is a description of 
the history of the Allied High Commission in general, its 
role, its work and changes which occured to its structures 
and powers during the five and a half years of its existen­
ce; and in particular the role which the British High Commi­
ssioner played in that general story. The history of the 
institution and its changing nature is therefore one of the 
three strands which run through the three parts of this 
thesis on the three British High Commissioners.
The conclusion of this strand of the thesis is that the 
British High Commissioners played a significant role in the 
history of this institution. They were instrumental in brin­
ging about changes to it, as for example the end of the 
dismantling programme and the return of the foreign policy 
prerogative to the German Government. No attempt was made, 
however, to pass a value judgement, whether they played a 
more or less significant role than their American or French 
counterparts.
Although the American and French High Commissioners are 
mentioned extensively in the thesis, the main aim was not to 
compare them with the British. It was rather to compare and 
contrast the three men, who one after another became British
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High Commissioners. This comparison is the second strand 
which runs through the entire thesis. It has been proven in 
the three parts of the thesis that they were three very 
different men, who played three very different roles, in 
three very different circumstances.
By a coincidence of history the tenures of the three 
British High Commissioners roughly correspond with the three 
big stages in the development of the Allied High Commission: 
Sir Brian Robertson left shortly before work started on the 
revision of the Occupation Statute; Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's 
tenure ended after the signature of the Bonn Conventions; 
which meant that Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar arrived in 
Germany when the Allied High Commission should have already 
gone through its final change already and have ceased to 
exist. If Robertson experienced the dawn of the Allied High 
Commission, Kirkpatrick lived through the day, and Hoyer 
Millar endured an extended twilight period.
The thesis also did not intend to describe in any 
detail the American or French policy towards Germany. The 
main aim was to describe British policy and only in as far 
as American or French policy influenced it -- which of 
course is considerably -- they are related, but always from 
the British point of view, i.e. mostly through Foreign 
Office eyes. In conclusion one can say that Britain consis­
tently pursued one overriding policy aim: to tie the Federal 
Republic firmly into the Western block.
The third theme, which runs through the thesis, is how 
the three British High Commissioners influenced the shaping
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of the British policy for Germany. The three parts of the 
thesis presented evidence for the hypothesis that the degree 
of influence of the British High Commissioner depended on 
their personal rapport with the Foreign Secretaries of the 
time, as for example Sir Brian Robertson's good relations to 
Ernest Bevin, which enabled the former to initiate the
compromise leading up to the Petersberg Agreement. The 
degree of influence also depended on the power of his 
office: when the actual power of the British High Commissio­
ner had declined to the level of little more than that of an 
ambassador, as in the case of Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, 
his influence on British policy making was no greater than 
that of the British Ambassador in Paris or Washington.
The epithets given to the three men in each case served 
as the basic framework for the individual parts of the
thesis. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick considered himself as much a 
colonial administrator as his predecessor did -- in his 
autobiography he wrote of "our stewardship in Germany"(3) —  
and would have deserved a similar epithet to that of Sir
Brian. His main task during his tenure, however, was the
arduously long and highly complicated negotiations leading 
up to the Bonn Conventions signed in 1952, which had as one 
intended result the end of the Allied High Commission. For 
this act of self-eradication Kirkpatrick deserved the 
epithet "The Negotiator".
This epithet is more than merely descriptive: these
negotiations were highly significant, as in them the founda-
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tions were laid for future relations between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Western Allies. The epithet is 
also laudatory: Kirkpatrick was not only involved in for­
mulating the British policy for Germany, but was also in­
strumental in achieving that policy's aims in the negotia­
tions he took part in as British High Commissioner. Those 
aims were to keep the United States of America tied to, the 
Soviet Union out of, the Federal Republic committed to, and 
Britain associated with -- as loosely as possible and as 
firmly as necessary -- Western Europe's destiny.
Kirkpatrick was less successful as a negotiator as far 
as a German contribution to Western defence is concerned. 
His initial plan of a federal police force for the Federal 
Republic came to nothing. He personified the reluctant and 
unethusiastic attitude of the British towards German rearma­
ment. The policy aims described above and the depressed 
economic situation, which Britain found itself in at the 
beginning of the fifties, however, made that rearmament 
unavoidable. Kirkpatrick was instrumental in the British re­
think on this topic. His prefered way of bringing about this 
rearmament was discarded in favour of the French plan of a 
European Defence Community during his tenure as British High 
Commissioner. Kirkpatrick, however, in his subsequent posi­
tion of Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign 
Office, had the satisfaction of bringing about the implemen- 
tion the original plan of integrating a German army into 
NATO after the failure of the EDC in 1954.(4)
The epithet of the last British High Commissioner, Sir
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Frederick Hoyer Millar, eminated from a personal conversa­
tion with him, during which he described himself as an
ambassador rather than a High Commissioner. Indeed, by the
time of his arrival in Germany, the circumstances had chan­
ged radically, not least because of the fact that the insti­
tution of the Allied High Commission should have ceased to
exist if it had not been for the delay of the ratification 
of the treaties signed in 1952. During his tenure as British 
High Commissioner he was therefore more of an "Ambassador in 
Waiting" than the colonial administrator that his predeces­
sors had considered themselves as.
The "Great Men" historiography has been criticised. In 
the case of this thesis choosing this methodology was justi­
fied, because the Allied High Commissioners were endowed 
personally with unique and far-reaching powers. These three 
individuals held the supreme authority in their zones and 
collectively in the whole Federal Republic. They were not 
democraticly accountable, but received orders from and re­
ported to their governments. In the beginning, however, 
because of the sheer amount of decisions which had to be 
taken, they ruled without interference, in an almost 
absolute fashion. The only real check on the power of the 
individual High Commissioner were the other two.
The methodology to describe this period from the per­
spective of the High Commissioners, however, does not mini­
mise the contribution of other members of the Allied High 
Commission. Nor does it ignore the influence of members of
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the German or British Governments and administrations, espe­
cially members of the British Foreign Office and certain 
advisors of the German Chancellor.
The character of this thesis is mainly descriptive, its 
aim being to describe the history of the Allied High Commis­
sion and the British role in it. However, besides describing 
British policy towards Germany, the question was also put 
whether it was successful and one can conclude that it was. 
By concentrating on the British High Commissioners in Germa­
ny, the thesis describes this fundamental period in Anglo- 
German relations from a very special angle, as these three 
men had a profound and personal impact on it.
366
FOOTNOTES
(1) FO 371/118265/WG 1074/175
(2) Oral History Interview with General Lord Robertson of 
Oakridge, conducted on 11 August 1970, for the Harry S. 
Truman Library, p.4f
(3) Kirkpatrick, Ivone, The Inner Circle, p.247
(4) on this subject see:
Dockrill, Saki, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament
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